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ABSTRACT
We live in a world where errors in computing are becoming ubiquitous and come from a
wide variety of sources – from unintentional bit flips in devices to deliberate approximations
and malicious attacks. Future systems must be built to extract maximum computational
efficiency while operating with heterogeneous sources of errors. The paradigm of Error-
Efficient Computing offers a promising solution by designing efficient computing systems
that conserve resources (e.g., time, energy, cost) by allowing the system to make controlled
errors.
Despite its promise, the widespread adoption of error-efficiency has been thwarted by (1)
a lack of principled and unified methodologies to assess and exploit error-efficiency opportu-
nities in a given system and (2) excessive programmer burden. This dissertation addresses
these limitations by developing methodologies that enable systematic, principled and scalable
application of error-efficiency with minimal programmer input.
Starting from first principles, the first contribution of this work is the development of
automated application-level error analysis tools and techniques that can automatically de-
termine, with high speed and accuracy, the output that a given program will produce for each
of the billions of errors that the program might encounter in its computation and data. Using
automated error analysis, a comprehensive view of the application’s error characteristics, or
in other words its error profile, is derived without the need for programmer expertise. To
demonstrate the versatility of this approach, the next contribution of this work is to show
how the automatically generated application error profiles can be used to devise different
(hardware- and software-based) error efficiency solutions – from low-cost resiliency to ap-
proximate computing – that can be customized to the application and/or user requirements
and output quality targets. Finally, using the novel insight that analyzing a piece of software
for (hardware) errors should be similar to testing it for software bugs, concepts from software
testing are systematically adapted to significantly improve the speed and scalability of auto-
mated error analyses ; while the improvements in speed and scalability makes error analysis
more practical within a computing stack, the methodology used lays the foundation for a
principled integration of (hardware) error analysis into the software development work-flow.
Overall, the contributions of this dissertation further the goal of enabling the adoption of
error-efficiency as a first-class design principal by developing systematic methodologies that
allow a principled, unified, and yet, customizable way of exploiting error-efficiency.
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH VISION
We face an urgent need to improve compute efficiency due to the following trends: (1)
diminishing benefits (in performance and power) of CMOS technology scaling, (2) increased
computational demand due to the explosive growth of data and (3) increasing susceptibility
of hardware to errors – from faulty devices to malicious attacks. The intersection of these
trends makes it extremely expensive to guarantee perfect functionality across a range of
computing systems – from high performance computing systems to low-power edge devices.
Fortunately, the workloads that are driving this demand for computing (learning, recognition,
mining and search, among others) also provide opportunities since their primary goal is not
a precise, numerically correct answer. Rather, their ‘correctness’ lies in producing results
that are good enough, or of sufficient quality, to produce an acceptable user experience.
The paradigm of Error-Efficient Computing [1] exploits this forgiving nature of appli-
cations by allowing the computing system to make controlled errors. Such systems can be
considered as being error-efficient: they only prevent as many errors as they need to for an
acceptable user experience. The definition of what constitutes an error varies across sys-
tem components and which errors are acceptable depends on the application and/or user
expectations. Allowing the system to make errors can conserve resources. The resources
conserved could be time, energy, bandwidth or more abstract quantities such as reliable
operation, manufacturing costs, etc. Some examples of error-efficient techniques include
(1) approximate computing [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] which deliberately introduces er-
rors in computation for improved performance or energy, and (2) ultra-low cost hardware
resiliency [12, 13, 14, 15, 16] which allows some unintentional hardware errors to escape
as user-tolerable output corruptions (rather than incurring high overheads to prevent all
errors).
Error-efficient computing can revolutionize the way we design hardware and software to
exploit significant new opportunities for compute efficiency. Error-efficiency has the poten-
tial to be a key enabler for many emerging application domains – Autonomous Vehicles,
Industrial Robotics, Virtual Reality etc. – with strict power, performance and/or reliabil-
ity requirements. Despite its promise, the widespread adoption of error-efficiency has been
thwarted by (1) a lack of principled and unified methodologies and (2) excessive programmer
burden.
The overarching vision of this thesis is to (1) enable the adoption of error-efficiency as a
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first-class design principle by a variety of users, regardless of expertise, using (2) methodolo-
gies that allow a principled, unified and yet, customizable way of computing efficiently with
heterogeneous sources of errors.
1.2 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPACT
In order to fulfill the research vision outlined above, this work starts from first principles
by asking one of the most fundamental questions for error-efficient computing – how do errors
in a program’s execution affect its output? Today we rely on program or domain experts
to have a deep understanding of how errors (perturbations in program execution) affect
program output and articulate them via error specifications [3, 4, 5, 17, 18, 19] which are
then used to devise error-efficient solutions. The undue burden placed on the programmer is
very limiting for the adoption of error-efficiency since such expertise is sparse and can take
years to develop for a given domain [20, 21, 22].
This work addresses these limitations by developing methodologies that enable sys-
tematic, principled and scalable application of error-efficiency without the need
for programmer expertise. This thesis makes the following key contributions:
(1) It demonstrates, through a motivational study, the effectiveness of error-efficient tech-
niques in meeting the strict performance, energy and resiliency requirements of emerging
edge computing domains. This is the first study (in collaboration with IBM research) to
show that software approximations can be applied to improve the computational efficiency
of a state-of-the-art vision analytics workflow on-board Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
without degrading system resiliency [22, 23].
(2) It develops automated error analysis techniques and tools that determine the im-
pact of billions of errors on program output with high speed and accuracy. The automated
error analysis tools developed in this work – Approxilyzer [24], gem5-Approxilyzer [25] and
DataApproxilyzer [26] – are the first-of-their-kind to quantify output quality for virtually all
errors (for a given hardware error model) in program instruction and data. The application
error profiles they generate provide a comprehensive view of the application’s error char-
acteristics with absolute minimal programmer intervention. Two tools have been publicly
released [27, 28] with a third release planned shortly.
(3) It demonstrates the versatility of the automated error analysis approach, by showing
how the automatically generated application error profiles can be used to devise different
(hardware and software) error-efficiency solutions – from low-cost resiliency to approximate
computing – that can be customized to the application and user requirements [24, 26].




Automated Application-Level Error Analysis




Application’s Comprehensive Error Profile
Figure 1.1: Summary of the contributions made by this work.
software testing techniques to significantly improve the speed and scalability of error analysis.
Minotaur lays the foundation for systematically integrating (hardware) error analyses into
the software development workflow.
Figure 1.1 shows a pictorial view of the contributions of this work along with the associated
publications and open-source tool releases [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. Overall,
this work democratizes error-efficient computing by broadening the reach of error-efficient
computing to novice programmers and new domains.
1.3 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH
1.3.1 Error-Efficiency for Emerging Domains
Error-efficient computing can enable emerging domains, such as edge-computing (UAVs,
connected cars, industrial robotics, etc.), to meet strict performance and energy require-
ments. However, the strict reliability requirements of some mission-critical (high impact of
failure/disruption) applications in this domain have traditionally not allowed inexact com-
putations. For example, edge computing platforms on UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles),
that are engaged in rescue and recovery operations, must not only meet strict real-time
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performance, energy and bandwidth requirements, they must also be resilient while operat-
ing in harsh environments subject to sharp variations in temperature, altitude and weather
conditions, and tolerate glitches in input and output. Hence, any error-efficiency solutions
applied to such systems (to improve, say, performance and energy) must not degrade the
system resiliency.
In a collaborative study with IBM Research [22], we demonstrate the resiliency and ef-
fectiveness of error-efficiency techniques for edge-computing applications used in Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles or UAVs (the concepts are relevant to other applications as well). The
workload studied is a state-of-the-art Video Summarization (VS) application (developed at
IBM Research) that constitutes key end-to-end video and image analytics performed aboard
UAVs. This first-of-a-kind work that studies the effect of approximations on system perfor-
mance, energy and resiliency, shows that software approximations yield significant energy
and performance (up to 68%) benefits for the end-to-end VS work-flow without degrading
the overall resiliency of the system. This study serves as motivation for the rest of the work
in this thesis.
1.3.2 Tool-Suite for Automated Application-Level Error Analysis
For any error-efficiency solution, we first need a fundamental understanding of how errors
in a program affect its resultant output quality. Techniques today rely on program/domain
experts for this knowledge which is severely limiting.
To mitigate this limitation, this work develops a suite of automated application-level error
analysis tools (henceforth referred to as the AEA tools) [25, 26, 31] that can automatically
extract the error characteristics of applications. In this work, an error is defined as a pertur-
bation in program state (computation or data) caused by an underlying fault in hardware.
Using a hybrid technique [32, 33] of program analysis and some error injections, these tools
comprehensively analyze billions of possible errors that can impact a program’s execution
with high accuracy (>95% on average) and at low-cost (requiring up to five orders of mag-
nitude fewer error injections than näıve techniques). Furthermore, they can precisely (at
fine granularity and within low error margins) quantify the output quality produced in the
presence of each of the errors they analyze.
The AEA tools impose minimum burden on the programmer and only require the user
to provide an unmodified program, a (domain-specific) quality metric and, optionally, a
quality threshold. The error analyses techniques developed in this line of work are general
and can be used to analyze different general-purpose computations and error models (single-
and multi-bit error models spanning instructions and data are studied in this work). To
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the best of our knowledge, these are the first application-level error analysis tools that
satisfy the requirements of automation (minimal programmer burden), accuracy, precision,
comprehensiveness, low-cost and generality. The output of automated error analyses are
comprehensive application error profiles that list the errors that can affect the program’s
execution along with the corresponding output quality expected for each of the errors. The
application error profiles can then be used by programmers or systems to understand the
application’s error characteristics.
While Chapter 3 provides the details about the automated error analysis techniques, a
brief description of the tools developed as part of it this work are provided below.
Automated Analysis of Errors in Program Instructions (Compute):
Approxilyzer [31] is the first automated error analysis tool to quantify the impact of
virtually all errors (for a given error model) in program instructions on the program’s output
quality with high accuracy and speed. The error model used in Approxilyzer is single-bit
transient errors in register operands of dynamic instructions. Approxilyzer’s output is the
application’s comprehensive instruction error profile. In order to enable researchers to easily
use and extend Approxilyzer concepts, we build a fully open-source error analysis toolkit
called gem5-Approxilyzer [25]. gem5-Approxilyzer uses the open-source gem5 simulator
and is designed to enable researchers to adapt and extend it to different instruction set
architectures (ISAs).
Automated Analysis of Errors in Program Data (Storage):
Errors in instructions (compute) and data (storage) propagate differently through the
program and, hence, require different analysis techniques. We build a tool called DataAp-
proxilyzer [26] to automatically analyze and quantify the impact of errors in program data
on output quality. DataApproxilyzer accurately and comprehensively analyzes many, and
in some cases all errors (for a given error model) in program data. The error model used
in DataApproxilyzer is multi-bit (1-bit, 2-bit, 4-bit and 8-bit) transient errors in system
memory. The output of DataApproxilyzer is the application’s comprehensive data error
profile.
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1.3.3 Automated Error Analysis to Customized Error-Efficiency
An application’s error profile can be used to understand its error characteristics, which can
inform customized error-efficiency. For example, this work demonstrates how an applica-
tion’s instruction error profile is used for error-efficiency solutions targeted towards ultra-low
cost resiliency to hardware errors [31]. It shows that large resiliency overhead reductions
(up to 55%) are possible if the user is willing to tolerate a very small loss in output accuracy
(1%) while still providing high (99%) resiliency coverage [31]. In another example, the ap-
plication’s error profile is used to identify promising subsets of instructions and/or data for
approximate computing across different quality thresholds and approximation targets. An
illustrative end-to-end workflow demonstrates the automatic identification and mapping of
non-critical (approximate) data (for given user quality targets) to be stored in approximate
DRAM with low refresh rates (which saves energy but incurs modest errors), without pro-
grammer intervention [26]; prior techniques required the programmer to identify non-critical
data with annotations.
The error profiles of applications are also used to gain insights that can motivate further
research. For example, Chapter 4 shows that error profiles for the same application, compiled
to different ISAs (SPARC vs. x86), can vary widely [25]; motivating the need for customized
error-efficiency for different architectures.
1.3.4 Leveraging Software Testing Techniques for Efficient and Scalable Error Analyses
This work introduces a framework called Minotaur [29] that significantly improves the
speed and scalability (across multiple inputs and workloads) of error analysis techniques.
Minotaur uses the insight that analyzing an application for (hardware) errors has many
conceptual similarities to analyzing it for software bugs ; therefore, adapting techniques from
the rich software testing literature can lead to principled and significant improvements in
error analyses. Minotaur is the first work to suggest leveraging software testing methodologies
for comprehensive error analysis ; thereby, laying the foundation for a principled integration
of hardware error analysis into the software development work-flow.
Minotaur identifies and adapts four concepts from software testing to: (a) introduce the
concept of input quality criteria for error analysis and suggest a simple but effective criterion
(statement coverage at the object-code level); (b) develop a methodology to create high
quality (fast) minimized inputs from (slow) standard benchmark inputs; (c) prioritize the
analysis of specific program locations for a given error analysis objective and terminate
analysis early when the objective is met; and (d) show scalable error analysis over multiple
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inputs by progressively prioritizing analysis over fast (but potentially inaccurate) inputs first.
Minotaur improves the speed of comprehensive error analysis by 4x, on average, over state-
of-the-art tools like Approxilyzer. These gains go up to 39x (or 55x) when the error analysis
is targeted to specific techniques like hardware resiliency (or approximate computing).
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Chapter 2: ERROR-EFFICIENCY FOR EMERGING DOMAINS
Real time edge computing [34, 35] is a rapidly growing field where real time data processing
and other compute services are pushed away from centralized points to the logical extremes
or edge of a network. This reduces the communication bandwidth needed between edge
devices (e.g., sensors) and the central data center by performing analytics and knowledge
generation at or near the source of the data. One of the key enablers of this trend is the
presence of simultaneously high-performance and energy-efficient embedded systems that
can be used to do computing in devices that are at the edge of the network. Real time edge
computing has many applications such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), connected cars,
industrial robotics, etc.
Figure 2.1: Co-operative swarm of UAVs engaging in computation for real-time applications.
Figure 2.1 illustrates a real-life application of edge computing. Here, a swarm of UAVs,
supported by a terrestrial server at the back-end, carry out tasks such as surveillance of hos-
tile targets or rescue and recovery in the event of natural disasters. The UAVs communicate
data and other analytics with the ground servers through wireless connections whose band-
width, security and reliability might vary depending on physical and environmental factors.
Hence, for real-time critical tasks, it is increasingly becoming essential that each UAV be
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equipped as a highly efficient mobile embedded system that can locally perform essential
real-time computing tasks. One such task that is often performed locally aboard the UAV
is Video Summarization [36]. This task involves extracting concrete context from the input
video stream – captured by the many cameras on the moving UAV surveying a wide area
– and summarizing it, usually in the form of a panoramic image. The panoramic image
can then be transfered to a central ground server for further processing, for say, tracking or
identifying rescue targets.
Edge computing platforms, such as that described above, are often deployed in rugged
terrains with harsh environmental conditions and must satisfy the following requirements:
a) ensure high performance to meet real time deadlines, particularly for mission-critical
applications, b) be energy efficient to enable long range computing, and c) be resilient while
operating in harsh environments subject to sharp variations in temperature, altitude and
weather conditions, and tolerate glitches in input and output [37].
Error-efficient techniques such a Approximate Computing [7, 38] are increasingly gaining
traction as a viable approach for high performance and energy efficiency. Approximate com-
puting environments allow deliberate, but controlled, relaxation of correctness and trade-off
computational accuracy for improvements in performance and energy. Many edge comput-
ing applications involve processing sensory signals (image, audio, etc.) which can inherently
tolerate inaccuracies in data and/or computation without compromising overall mission tar-
gets and goals. This presents an opportunity to redesign these algorithms to incorporate
approximate computing with the goal of meeting stringent performance and energy targets
(requirements (a) and (b) from above) under specified constraints.
However, while most approximate computing techniques have in-built metrics and tech-
niques to guarantee a certain output quality, it is not clear how they work in the face of
sources of vulnerability in the processor, such as soft errors, voltage noise and aging phenom-
ena. Further, these effects can be exacerbated (increased probability of radiation strikes at
high altitudes in UAVs) when the approximate computing paradigm is adapted to the harsh
conditions that these systems encounter during their operation. For successful deployment
in edge computing environments, it is critical to ensure that the application of approximate
computing techniques which yield performance and energy improvements not degrade the
overall system resiliency (requirement (c) from above).
This work focuses on studying the interaction between software approximation and the
application’s resiliency to soft errors (henceforth referred to as application resiliency or
simply resiliency) and to my knowledge is the first work to do so. To demonstrate this
interaction a state-of-the-art end-to-end video summarization application [36] is analyzed
which represents a typical and key vision analytics workflow executed by embedded systems
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on-board UAVs.
In particular, this work makes the following contributions:
• The application resiliency of an end-to-end video summarization application (hence-
forth termed as VS for brevity) is studied. The VS application serves as a represen-
tative workload for on-board UAV processing. Specifically, we study the application’s
resilience to radiation-induced soft (transient) errors, by performing runtime architec-
tural fault injection experiments. All analyses are performed across two distinct inputs
that realistically portray the different types of input video stream captured by cameras
on the UAV.
• Performing resiliency analysis on a full, long-running end-to-end workflow is more ex-
pensive (in time and compute) than analyzing individual smaller kernels that together
constitute the larger work-flow. This trade-off is examined by estimating the resiliency
of individual representative kernels or hot functions in the VS application. It is shown
that the hot functions are sub-optimal at capturing the behavior of the full applica-
tion, thus motivating the need to develop and evaluate realistic applications with a full
end-to-end workflow.
• This work characterizes the performance and energy of three different software approxi-
mation techniques applied to the VS algorithm. It shows that the approximations yield
significant speedup and energy savings (up to 68%) without compromising the quality
of the panoramic image output.
• The resiliency of approximate VS algorithms are examined. It is found that the ap-
proximations yield similar resiliency profiles to the baseline (precise) algorithm and in
the worst case lead to a slight increase in Silent Data Corruption (SDC) rates (up to
2%). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first work that examines the effect of
software approximations on application resiliency.
• Furthermore, the SDCs caused by the approximate algorithms are examined using a
novel quality metric suitable to the domain of UAV image analytics. The results show
that most of the SDCs generated by the applied approximations have small quality
degradations and can potentially be tolerated by the application.
In summary, this work shows that error-efficiency techniques such a software approx-
imation can be utilized to achieve significant gains in performance and energy without
affecting application resiliency. This work does not claim to cover all possible types of
error-efficiency techniques (or even the best ones) or comment on the general resilience of
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different techniques. Instead, the intent of this study is to encourage a comprehensive evalu-
ation (performance, power, resilience) of system optimizations and show that highly effective
and resiliency-aware error-efficient techniques are possible in enabling emerging application
domains such as edge computing.
2.1 BACKGROUND
2.1.1 Video Summarization
UAVs are increasingly being used to perform tasks such as surveillance of hostile tar-
gets and rescue and recovery in the event of natural disasters. For decisive action in all
these scenarios, it is essential to first extract and summarize the concrete context from the
input video stream captured by the moving UAV. This operation is termed as Video Sum-
marization. A sophisticated video summarization work-flow requires application of several
Computer Vision techniques.
Figure 2.2: Video summarization for UAV videos.
One such example of an end-to-end application flow is described in Viguier et al. [36],
where the UAV multimedia processing pipeline focuses on summarizing videos captured by
the camera on-board the UAV. The framework for achieving this is shown in Figure 2.2. In
order to achieve large data reduction without significant loss of events of interest, two types of
summarizations are included: coverage and event summarization. Coverage summarization
involves a complete panorama generation which describes the entire video with a single image
that represents the entire spatial coverage area of the camera. The coverage summarization
relies on spatially relating different video frames from the cameras, projecting them into
a common view space, and stitching them together to build a single panorama. Event
summarization comprises of tasks such as detection, recognition and tracking of moving
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objects such as vehicles and pedestrians. Finally, both intermediate results are integrated
by overlaying the tracks (of moving objects) on the panorama to create a comprehensive and
concise summarization of a whole UAV video.
This work focuses on coverage summarization. In particular, the focus is on algorithms
that perform the task of generating video panoramas of the landscape covered by the cameras
on a UAV and on energy-efficient and reliable implementations of the same.
2.1.2 Approximate Computing Techniques
Approximate computing is a fast growing trend that allows controlled relaxation of cor-
rectness for better performance and energy. Many techniques have been proposed that
leverage approximate computing at the software [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44], programming lan-
guage [2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 19, 45] and hardware [6, 7, 8, 9, 18, 46] level for improved performance,
energy or reliability. Since application level resilience is measured in this work, the anal-
ysis is focused to software approximations. In particular, three broad classes of software
approximations are studied.
(1) Input sampling: In this class of approximation, computation is only performed
over a subset of the input. This class of approximation is especially popular in big data
analytics [47] where the amount of data over which the computation needs to be performed
is prohibitive in time and resources.
(2) Selective Computation: Another popular class of approximations are those in
which only a fraction of the work is performed compared to the precise program. While
the underlying algorithm remains unchanged, selective computations are simply skipped or
dropped [39].
(3) Algorithmic Transformation: These approximations transform the code and re-
place precise but expensive computation with cheap but imprecise computation.
The selection of which approximations to apply depends on the application/domain and
the end goal. For example, approximations skipping certain loop iterations [39] and ap-
proximations dropping some synchronizations [41] in the program both belong to the broad
category of selective computation and either, both or neither might be an appropriate ap-
proximation for a given application. Section 2.2 describes approximations belonging to each
of the categories described above that are specific to the application studied.
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Figure 2.3: Flowchart describing the key tasks that comprise the Video Summarization
Algorithm.
2.2 VIDEO SUMMARIZATION ALGORITHM
The system architecture of interest in this work is a model where a swarm of UAVs is
engaged in image scanning, analysis and stitching with the end goal of creating a global
panorama of the observed landscape. Towards this goal, we describe in this section a video
(image) stitching algorithm that has been developed and implemented in our experimental
evaluation platforms (in collaboration with IBM research). This application (henceforth
referred to as the Video Summarization (VS) algorithm) takes input videos captured by
moving cameras and generates panoramas that provide a global view of the landscape. Since
the input video is a concatenation of images captured by (various) moving cameras, it can
contain various segments with dissimilar viewing angles and settings. Each of these segments
are summarized by mini-panoramas and are stitched into a global panorama (simply referred
to as panorama) at a later stage. In this work, we restrict the analysis to the generation of
a panorama from video captured by a single camera on-board a single UAV.
2.2.1 Functional Overview
While a full detailed description of the algorithm is provided in [48], we describe the key
capabilities of the algorithm [49] in the following paragraphs. A representative flow of the
algorithm is shown in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.4: Simple example of stitching two images.
One of the fundamental functions performed by the VS algorithm is the comparison,
transformation and stitching of two images from the input video. The algorithm first iden-
tifies key regions of interest (key points) within each image and then looks for matching key
points within the images to identify potential common areas. It then applies transforma-
tions to the two images so that they are aligned correctly and have the same scale, lighting,
perspective etc., before proceeding to stitch them together. Figure 2.4 shows this process
using two sample images. We utilize FAST (Features from Accelerated Segment Test) de-
tectors [50, 51] and ORB (Oriented FAST and Rotated BRIEF) descriptors [52] to achieve
efficient and accurate feature point detection and matching. RANSAC (RANdom SAmple
Consensus) [53] is used to compute the homography transformation between the two images.
Using the technique described above, successive frames of the input are pair-wise compared
in the initial pass of the algorithm. However, not every pair of adjacent frames has enough
matching key points to compute the homography transformation. In this case, we estimate
a simpler affine transformation which requires fewer matching points. If sufficient number
of matching points cannot be found even for the affine transformation, the corresponding
frame is discarded. To generate the overall output panorama we align every frame to the
first by transforming all the frames to have the same coordinate system as the first frame
by using the homography transformations described above.
There are various other sophisticated elements of the stitching algorithm that are used
to improve the rendered quality of the output panorama. The mathematical details of the
transformations and corrective actions (e.g., to avoid blurs and distortions) are omitted here
for brevity. Depending on the quality and number of the input video clips (collected by
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the moving cameras), the amount of computation performed by the video summarization
procedure can vary.
2.2.2 Inputs to the Video Summarization Algorithm
I evaluate the VS application using two aerial videos from the VIRAT (Video and Image
Retrieval and Analysis Tool) dataset [54] – 09152008flight2tape1 2 (hereby referred to as
Input 1) and 09152008flight2tape2 4 (hereby referred to as Input 2). We use an input size
of 1000 frames for both inputs.
The VIRAT dataset was chosen for the evaluation to represent realistic scenarios of videos
captured during aerial surveillance with variations in resolution, diversity in scenes, changes
in scale, focus and camera angles. The two inputs that we profiled vary significantly in
these aspects as well as in the nature with which these parameters vary in the video stream.
For instance, the number of changes that occur in Input 1 are much higher than Input 2,
leading to a much larger number of mini-panoramas generated in the first input set. These
videos were sampled at periodic intervals to yield around 3000 frames across the duration of
the entire video. In addition, we further downsampled the video by a factor of 3 to enable
a statistically significant number of error injection experiments to run within a reasonable
amount of time without perceivable loss in information or image quality.
2.3 APPROXIMATE VIDEO SUMMARIZATION ALGORITHMS
As described in Section 2.2, the Video Summarization (VS ) application is capable of
effectively capturing several hours of video in single stitched image frames. However, given
the constraints on power efficiency (of the on-board device) as well as real-time requirements
of the mission, a complete and exact implementation of the algorithm may not be possible.
In [37] and [55], the authors examine techniques to mitigate this limitation by dynamic
adjustments of the link bandwidth and processor voltage/frequency.
In this paper, we consider software approximation, to the VS algorithm, as a means
to realize performance and energy targets. Since computations involving images can be
inherently tolerant to inaccuracies in data and/or compute, approximations to the the VS
workflow have the potential to yield significant benefits without unduly compromising the
quality of the final panorama image output.
We study three different approximations (belonging to the three broad classes described
in Section 2.1.2 and presented in the same order). The details of the approximate algorithms
are described below:
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(1) Random Frame Dropping (VS RFD): In this algorithm, we randomly drop
frames from the input stream. Apart from improving the effective frame rate, this input
approximation aims to leverage redundancies in consecutive images captured by a moving
camera without substantial degradation in output image quality. In this work, we demon-
strate results with up to 10% of the input frames being dropped.
(2) Key Point Down Sampling (VS KDS): The VS algorithm described in Sec-
tion 2.2 involves the computation of feature (key) points and attempts to match them across
frames in order to be able to stitch the frames together. We propose an approximation in
which matching is only performed on a fraction (one-third) of the key points as compared
to the precise algorithm. This significantly reduces the computation time, which varies as
O(n2) with the number of key points. In this algorithm, the source of error could be due to
some frames being dropped on account of having insufficient matching key points. In such
cases, it is hoped that the redundancy of the image will still enable complete coverage of the
input video in our summarized output.
(3) Simple Matching (VS SM ): In the default algorithm, each key point in the current
frame is compared with all key points in the incoming frame and the two nearest neighbors
are determined for each key point. The key point is included in the list of good matches only
if the ratio of the distance between the nearest and 2nd nearest neighbor is above a certain
threshold; i.e., the nearest match is sufficiently closer than the 2nd nearest. This reduces the
probability of a false positive, i.e., the probability that the key point in a frame incorrectly
maps to a point in the subsequent frame, even if, in reality, there is no matching object.
In case of VS SM, the algorithm is altered to determine only the single nearest neighbor
for each key point. In addition, we place an upper bound on the actual distance value and
consider only those matches whose nearest neighbor is within a fixed distance of the key
point. Hence, only those key points in the incoming frame which match almost perfectly
with those in the original frame would be considered. Note that this technique still leaves
room for some errors, for example, when there are two identical objects in the image. In
such cases, both nearest neighbor distances could fall within the threshold and the mapping
could happen to the incorrect object.
2.3.1 Effectiveness of the Approximate Implementations
An approximate algorithm has to produce acceptable quality outputs while enabling some
system benefit (e.g. improved performance or energy efficiency). Hence, the three approx-
imate algorithms are examined from the point of view of both system benefits and output
quality to determine if they are good candidates for further study.
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System benefits of approximation: We carried out an experimental evaluation of these
algorithms on an IBM POWER-based server class machine. Figure 2.5 shows the Instructions
Per Cycle (IPC), execution time and energy, normalized to the baseline VS algorithm. We
observe that VS RFD provides the maximum reduction in execution time (68%) for Input
1 by just dropping 10% of the total frames. On the other hand, VS KDS yields the highest
performance improvement of 18% in case of Input 2. Since the IPC (and hence, the power)
remains relatively constant across the default and approximate implementations, the energy
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of IPC, execution time and energy of the proposed approximate
algorithms (VS RFD, VS KDS, VS SM ) for Input 1 and Input 2, with the values normalized
to the corresponding baseline (VS ) for each respective input.
Comparison of output quality: Figure 2.6 compares the output images generated by
the baseline VS algorithm and the three approximations described for the two inputs. Visual
inspection shows that the approximate algorithms generate output images of acceptable
quality. Even in the approximate output image with the worst quality (VS RFD for Input
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1), the quality degradation is due to image perspective and all the pertinent information in
the final panorama is retained.
Tradeoffs between performance and output quality: The difference between the
two inputs is evident from the tradeoffs between performance and output image quality for
each approximation. For instance, a visual inspection of the output panoramas generated
by the baseline VS algorithm and the three approximations (Figure 2.6) show that Input
2 is more robust to the proposed approximation techniques as compared to Input 1. On
the other hand, the performance benefits due to approximation are clearly greater in case of
Input 1.
This difference in the impact of approximation on the two inputs can be attributed to
the fact that the variation between consecutive frames is much more pronounced in Input
1 than in Input 2. The execution time improvement is primarily due to the polynomial
complexity of the algorithm in terms of number of frames that are processed. In addition
to the frames dropped by the approximate implementation, the algorithm also discards
additional frames without stitching them to the overall panorama, when sufficient matching
points are not found. Consequently, the proposed approximation techniques result in several
frames of Input 1 being discarded. While this reduces the number of computations, resulting
in greater performance and energy benefits as compared to Input 2, it also adversely affects
the output quality to a greater extent. The differences between the output images can be
further analyzed quantitatively by means of our proposed metric, described in further detail
in Section 2.4.4.
Figure 2.6: Comparison of the output panoramas obtained from baseline VS algorithm (a)
and various approximation techniques (b,c,d) for the two input image sets.
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2.4 METHODOLOGY
This section describes the design methodology and the evaluation environment used to
measure the resiliency of the VS algorithm as well as its approximate versions. In sec-
tion 2.4.3 a small case-study is described to understand the trade-offs of performing re-
siliency analysis on a full end-to-end application (such as the VS algorithm) vs. constituent
small kernels. Section 2.4.4 defines a metric to calculate the quality of the corrupted output
produced by the application when perturbed by errors. This metric is later used to analyze
the quality of the corrupted outputs produced by the approximate VS algorithms.
2.4.1 Measuring Resiliency of Video Summarization Algorithm
Error injection is a widely used error analysis technique where an error is injected (typically
one at a time) in a real or simulated machine and the outcome (impact of the error) is
studied [56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61]. My goal is to evaluate the application-level resiliency of the
VS algorithm and its different approximate versions in the presence of hardware transient
errors. The error model studied in this work assumes the occurrence of single bit errors in
the architectural register file. The impact of an error on a program can be described by the
following four outcomes:
(1) Mask: The error is masked by consecutive execution such that the application pro-
duces the correct output. This can happen if the error affects dead state or if the corrupted
state is overwritten before being used.
(2) Crash: The error catastrophically affects the program state and results in the program
crashing. For example, an error that leads to an out of bounds memory access.
(3) Silent Data Corruption (SDC): The error propagates through the program ex-
ecution and corrupts the output. This is called a Silent Data Corruption because there is
no obvious symptom of the error till the execution completes and the output is found to be
corrupted.
(4) Hang: The error corrupts the internal state of the program such that neither com-
pletes nor crashes but hangs.
Comprehensively injecting errors in each potential error site in the program execution is
prohibitively time consuming. For instance, in this study, each bit in every architectural
register at every single execution cycle is a potential candidate for error injection. For most
applications, the number of error sites is prohibitively large. Hence, we rely on statistical
error injection in randomly selected error sites in the execution. This technique provides
statistical summaries of the impact of errors on the application by estimating average rates
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for Mask, Crash, SDC and Hangs. Alternate, more comprehensive and higher precision
techniques such as Relyzer [62] could be applied but are left to future work.
For accurately estimating the application resiliency, it is essential to perform error injec-
tions in a significant number of error sites that are uniformly distributed over the program
execution. We use the term error-site coverage (or simply coverage) to indicate the relative
robustness in the number and distribution of error sites picked for error injections.
We estimate the minimum number of error injection experiments needed to get an adequate
statistical sample by observing the different rates of Mask, Crash, SDC and Hang over many
error injections and the point at which these rates stabilize. In other words, the minimum
number of error injections required are at the knee of the trend curves for the Mask, Crash,
SDC and Hang rates. Beyond the knee of the curves, increasing the number of error injections
should only change the outcome rates trivially.
2.4.2 Error Injection Environment
Error injection experiments are conducted on the IBM POWER-based machine, running
Linux RHEL 6.5 operating system. The Application Fault Injection (AFI) [37] tool is used
to perform error injections and evaluate the application’s resiliency. Figure 2.7 shows the
main components of AFI.
AFI is composed of two modules. The first module, Fault Injector takes the un-modified
application binary, and injects error bits into the application’s architectural state. Users can
change the injection configurations to specify where to inject errors and how many errors to
inject per run. For this study, AFI is configured to inject one single bit error (bit flip) in a
general purpose register (GPR) or a floating point register (FPR). The execution cycle at
which the error is injected is random. Once the program execution is continued after the
error injection, the second module, the Fault Monitor, will check the application’s running
state and capture a potential hang or crash. If the application finishes normally, the Fault
Monitor invokes a result checking procedure to determine if the outcome of the error injection
is an SDC or Masked result.
Separate experiments are performed for error injections in GPRs and FPRs to enable
separate examination of the vulnerability of these two register types to single bit flips.
2.4.3 Studying full end-to-end workflow vs. small (hot) kernels
An optimized statically compiled binary (using GCC 4.8.2 and OpenCV version 2.4.9)
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Figure 2.7: Overview of the Application Fault Injection framework.
experiments on a large application like the VS algorithm, that run to completion, are time
consuming and therefore limit the number of error injections that can be performed.
Since the application is a composition of many program and library functions, the question
arises – can one simply carry out a resiliency study of some representative hot functions
(functions that account for a significant fraction of the application execution time) and use
the results to reason about the resiliency of the VS algorithm? If so, can one then study the
resiliency of just those functions? This can lead to either reduced overhead (less number of
error injections) or increased coverage (error injections take lesser time to run to completion
and hence we can potentially do more of them).
To investigate further, we undertake a case study to perform resiliency analysis on a
hot kernel taken from the VS application to see if the resiliency profile of the kernel is
representative of the full end-to-end application. We show in Section 2.5.3 that this is not
the case and the result of such an analysis is sub-optimal. This further motivates the need to
develop and analyze full end-to-end applications that realistically simulate the full workflow,
as opposed to studying just small kernel benchmarks that perform individual tasks.
Fig 2.8 shows the execution time distribution (by function) for the VS algorithm extracted
using the Linux utility tool Perf [63]. Approximately 68% of the execution time is spent in
OpenCV libraries [64]. 54.4% of the total execution time is consumed by just one OpenCV
function – WarpPerspectiveInvoker, which is called from the WarpPerspective function, that
applies a perspective transformation to an image according to a transformation matrix.
Thus, we choose WarpPerspective as the hot function whose resiliency profile is studied.
































Figure 2.8: Execution profile of the VS application
calls the OpenCV function WarpPerspective on them and returns the transformed image as
the output. Essentially, WP is equivalent to having a stand-alone WarpPerspective function
and the output of WP is the return value of the function as seen by the VS application.
The function WarpPerspective in turn calls two other functions: warpPerspectiveInvoker
and remapBilinear. We study the outcomes from error injections in GPRs in these two
functions for VS and WP. The error injection framework, AFI, affords the ability to control
where the errors are injected and for this experiment we only consider the error injection
experiments that inject errors in the functions of interest and observe the outcome at the
end of the program (either VS or WP).
2.4.4 Defining SDC quality
As described in Section 2.4.1, any deviation in the application output due to an error is
defined as a Silent Data Corruption or SDC. SDCs are the least desirable outcome of errors
since they are very hard to detect until the application execution is completed and the
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corrupted output is generated. At that time it is too late for recovery techniques to correct
the error. Crashes, on the other hand, can be detected using low cost symptom-based
detectors [57] and hence protecting error sites that produce crashes incurs low overhead.
Since SDCs do not produce any easily detectable software symptoms, protection against
SDCs is normally done through techniques like redundancy that have high overhead. In
order to reduce the resiliency overhead, we aim to quantify the egregiousness or severity of
the SDCs produced so we can identify tolerable or benign SDC error sites that do not need
to be protected.
Since the VS application produces an image (mini panorama) as the output, the check
to determine if an SDC was produced is an image comparison between the error-free ap-
plication’s output (henceforth referred to as the golden output) and the corrupted output
produced by the application execution injected with an error (henceforth referred to as the
faulty output). To determine if there is an SDC, AFI’s result checking procedure simply
compares the error-free output, known a priori, with the output produced by the erroneous
execution, and classifies the outcome as an SDC if there is any difference between the two
images.
In addition to knowing how many error injection experiments result in SDCs, we am
interested in quantifying the quality of the SDCs produced; i.e., the deviation between the
golden and the faulty output. To do this, we define a quality metric which is calculated as
follows:
Given a golden image g img and a faulty image f img, some global transformations are
applied first to ensure that differences due to perspective, lighting, camera angle etc. are
removed. This is done because, in the given system, the end purpose is to use the output
image of the VS application for identification, tracking and/or surveillance. Hence the
content of the image is of greater concern and minor cosmetic disturbances in the final
image can be tolerated. The two transformed image matrices obtained after this corrective
step are g img tr and f img tr. The pixel by pixel difference of these two images is given by
the matrix pixel diff img, such that
pixel diff img = g img tr− f img tr (2.1)
Since in the scenario of interest, the final panorama is going to be viewed by a human
being, some errors in the color gradation of individual pixels can be tolerated. Thus, we
only wish to capture those differences in the image where the pixel coloration is significantly
modified. For this purpose, another matrix pixel 128 diff img is defined where values from
pixel diff img are stored only if the difference value is greater than 128, i.e. over half the range
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for an 8 bit pixel which can assume values between 0 and 255. Then, the relative l2 norm,
which estimates the deviation of the faulty output image from the golden output image (in
percentage) is described as,
relative l2 norm =
||pixel 128 diff img||2
||g img tr||2
∗ 100 (2.2)





2 + . . .+ x
2
n (2.3)
Once the relative l2 norm of a faulty image has been calculated, that SDC is assigned an
integer number called the Egregiousness Degree (ED) which corresponds to the floor of its
relative l2 norm value. The higher the ED, the worst the quality of the corrupted output
image. For example, if an SDC output has a relative l2 norm of 10.25%, it is assigned an
ED of 10. Any SDC that has a relative l2 norm of greater than 100%, is not assigned an
ED and is automatically categorized as an egregious SDC that must be protected.
2.5 RESULTS
2.5.1 Resiliency Profile of Video Summarization Algorithm
As described in Section 2.4.1, the minimum number of error injections needed are deter-
mined by studying the trend curves of the Mask, Crash, SDC and Hang rates with increasing
number of error injections. As seen in Fig 2.9(a), the trend curves for the different rates start
stabilizing after 1000 error injections and only vary slightly with increasing error injections.
Thus, we conclude that a minimum of 1000 error injections is required to provide a statistical
summary of the VS algorithm. Unless otherwise specified, all the experiments in this study
use 1000 error injections (for each type of register; combined GPR and FPR is 2000 error
injections).
The random error injections also provide good coverage in terms of the registers and bits
in which the errors are injected. A representative histogram is presented in Fig 2.9(b).
It shows that the errors are uniformly distributed among the 32 GPRs (for both inputs).
We similarly confirm that the errors are uniformly distributed among 64 bits within the
registers. For brevity, we have shown the coverage data (minimum error injections required
and register coverage) for error injections in GPRs. Error injection experiments for all the
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Figure 2.9: Graphs to show Coverage of error injection experiments. (a) Different error
injection outcome rates with increasing number of error injection experiments for VS al-
gorithm. The knee of the curve stabilizes at 1000 error injections. (b) Number of errors
injected in different GPRs across 1000 experiments show a uniform distribution.
Figure 2.10 shows the different error injection outcome rates for 1000 error injections each
in GPRs and FPRs for the VS algorithm. The resiliency profile looks very different for
injections in the GPR and the FPR registers and we will explore these differences in the
following paragraphs.
Error Injections in GPRs: Instructions that use GPRs form the bulk of the application
and are heavily used in memory and control instructions and hence errors in them lead
to the large Crash rate (40.16%). Analyzing the Crash outcomes further, the majority of
the crashes can be attributed to the following two causes: 1) Segmentation Faults that
generally occur due to memory access violations (92%), and 2) Abort signals raised by the
application/library when it encounters internal constraint violations (8%). Analyzing the
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Figure 2.10: Resiliency Profile for the VS algorithm. Different error outcome rates for errors
injected in GPR and FPR registers for the two different inputs are shown.
bit positions in the registers are more likely to result in a Crash. This is primarily because
all the GPR registers are used heavily in control (corruption of any bit can cause a Crash)
and memory (higher order bits more likely to cause a Crash) operations and, hence, are
vulnerable to catastrophic outcomes when corrupted.
Error Injections in FPRs: Errors injected in the FPRs of the VS application are Masked
99.7% of the time. This is due to the way FPRs are used in the application. The VS algo-
rithm operates on images which are stored as 8-bit integer pixels. Floating point operations
are only used when some manipulation of the pixels is required. To do this, the integer
pixels are converted to floating point, some transformation is applied and then they are
converted back to integer using a saturation algorithm. The saturation algorithm causes
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Figure 2.11: Resiliency Profile for the VS algorithm and its approximate versions. Different
error outcome rates, for errors injected in GPR register for the two different inputs, are
shown.
2.5.2 Resilience of Approximate VS Algorithms
Figure 2.11 shows the error injection results for 1000 error injection experiments in the
GPRs of the different approximation algorithms compared with the baseline VS application
for both the inputs. Similar to the baseline VS algorithm, FPR error injections in the
approximate algorithms are masked > 99.5% of the time and hence we do not show them
here. The Crash, Mask and Hang rates of the approximate algorithms is very similar to the
baseline VS algorithm. This is not surprising since the execution profiles of the approximate
algorithms are very similar to the baseline VS algorithm. For Input1, the SDC rates increase
from 1% (VS ) to 3% and 2.5% for VS RFD and VS KDS respectively. In both these
approximate algorithms, the errors that may have been masked in the final image (due to
overlap by similar frames in the stitching process) are now exposed as SDC due to a reduction
in redundancy; precipitated by dropping frames from input in VS RFD or due to insufficient
matching key-points in VS KDS.
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2.5.3 Trade-offs of studying an end-to-end workflow



























Figure 2.12: Comparison of the Masked, SDC and Crash rates for error injections in two hot
functions for VS application and the stand-alone toy application WP.
As discussed in Section 2.4.3, we ask the following question: can one estimate the re-
siliency of the VS application by studying the resiliency of the representative stand-alone
WP application? The results of the error injection experiments for both VS and WP are
shown in Figure 2.12.
The Crash, Mask and SDC profiles of the standalone WP is different from that of an
end-to-end workflow like the VS. In the VS application, the output of the WarpPerspective
function would then be used to perform some other computation further down the workflow
and, hence, there is a compositional effect where multiple computations flow into each other.
This causes the effects of an error to manifest differently than if the workflow ended at the
output of the hot function. In our case, the compositional effect leads to higher masking as
the SDCs that are generated by errors in the WarpPerspective function are masked later in
the workflow (for example, an adjacent image could later be stitched over the area corrupted
by the function output).
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Hence, we conclude that it is essential to analyze an entire end-to-end workflow, instead
of just studying hot kernels/functions, to get an accurate understanding about the resiliency
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Figure 2.13: Quality of SDCs generated by GPR error injections in different video summa-
rization algorithms. Each point on a given curve represents the percentage of SDCs (Y axis)
generated that have an ED less than or equal to the ED represented on the X axis. (a)
and (b) - The ED of the SDC is calculated by comparing against VS golden for Input1 and
Input2 respectively. (c) and (d) - The ED of the SDC is calculated by comparing against
the corresponding Approx golden for Input1 and Input2 respectively. Some of the curves do
not reach 100% on the Y axis due to a very small fraction of SDCs that are classified as
needing protection and not assigned an ED.
Figure 2.13 classifies SDCs according to their ED. In order to study a statistically sig-
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nificant number of SDCs, we perform 5000 GPR error injections per input and analyze the
resulting SDCs. To calculate the ED of an SDC output image, it is compared to a base-
line golden image. For the SDCs produced by the VS algorithm, this is straightforward as
the golden image is the output of the error-free execution of the VS algorithm. For SDCs
produced by the approximate algorithms, there are two potential golden images to compare
against – the golden VS output (VS golden) or the golden output of the corresponding
approximate algorithm (Approx golden). For example, ED of an SDC produced by error
injection in VS RFD can be calculated by either comparing it to VS golden or by compar-
ing it to VS RFD golden. We show the distribution of SDC egregiousness using both these
methods.
Figure 2.13(a) and Figure 2.13(b) show the ED of the SDCs when compared against
VS golden for Input1 and Input2 respectively. The degradation in SDC quality in the
approximate algorithms, as evidenced by the larger fraction of SDCs having higher EDs,
is particularly sharp for Input1 (Figure 2.13(a)). On further analysis we observe that this
is because the deviation between Approx golden and VS golden calculated using the metric
specified in Section 2.4.4 is large. Even though it is verified by visual inspection that the
approximate algorithm outputs are acceptable (Section 2.3.1), the metric assigns them a
large ED. This may imply that the metric used is very conservative and we undertake a
discussion about this in Section 2.6. For example, the ED of the VS SM golden for Input 1
when compared to VS golden is 37. It thus follows that all subsequent SDCs produced by
VS SM will have an ED greater than or equal to 37. This is the reason for the shift in the
ED curves of VS SM with respect to the baseline VS in Figure 2.13(a).
Thus, to get a true understanding of the quality of the SDCs produced by the approxi-
mate algorithms, their egregiousness is estimated by comparing them to their corresponding
Approx golden output (Figure 2.13(c) and Figure 2.13(d)). The graphs show that the over-
all trend for the SDC quality for the VS and its approximate algorithms are very similar.
The approximations do not fundamentally change the quality of the SDCs produced. For
Input 2 (Figure 2.13(d)), the SDCs from VS KDS have slightly worse quality (80% of SDCs
produced by VS have ED less than 6 as opposed to ED of 14 for VS KDS ). This follows
the trend seen in Section 2.3.1, where for Input 2, VS KDS shows the most energy gains
from less computation as a result of dropped frames. This in turn leads to a degradation of
output quality. Another trend seen is that overall, the SDCs produced are relatively benign
(even with our conservative metric). For example, for Input 2, 87%, 87%, 90% and 73% of
the SDCs for VS, VS RFD,VS SM and VS KDS respectively have an ED of less than 10.
Thus, a large majority of the SDC causing error-sites need not be protected if an error of
10% is acceptable.
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Figure 2.14: a) Default output (VS ) b) Approximate output (VS SM ) c) Absolute pixel dif-
ference between default and approximate outputs d) Thresholded difference between default
and approximate outputs.
Hence, although approximating the VS application minimally changes its resiliency profile
by slightly increasing the number of SDCs generated, this is offset by the fact that a large
percentage of these SDCs may be tolerable and hence the cost of protecting them is low.
Thus, it is possible to realize safe, yet efficient approximations for this state of the art Video
Summarization algorithm from the point of view of performance, power and reliability.
2.6 DISCUSSION ON SDC QUALITY METRIC
Gauging if an approximate algorithm is good enough or if an SDC is tolerable in image
processing applications like the VS algorithm is heavily dependent on the image comparison
algorithm that calculates how closely the approximated image or the faulty image matches
the original image. While manual inspection is still the best way to determine if the quality
of an image is acceptable, this is impractical in cases where a large number of such images
are generated or when an automated decision has to be made based on the error seen in
the output. In Section 2.4.4, I outline an algorithm and metric to estimate the error in
the output image, but this algorithm can produce false positives and can label some SDCs
as more egregious than they actually are. For the outputs of the VS SM algorithm the
relative l2 norm generated by the image comparison algorithm is approximately 37% and
8% for Input1 and Input2 respectively. This is because as can be seen in Figure 2.14(c),
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the pixel difference of the two images is considerable as the pixels in the faulty image have
slightly shifted when compared to the default image. But to a human viewing these two
images, there is no perceivable difference. Another factor to consider is that two images
having the same relative l2 norm may not be equally egregious depending on the final usage
of the output. For example, even if 30% of a faulty image is blacked out, it may still be
useful for surveillance or tracking if the remaining 70% had useful information that can be
deciphered by a human being. Estimating an automated metric to compare images used for
such domains remains an open problem.
2.7 CONCLUSION
In this work we study an end-to-end video summarization VS application that serves as a
representative emerging workload for the domain of Real Time Edge Computing. We charac-
terize the workflow of the application and examine three different approximation techniques
to improve the power and performance efficiency of the workload while maintaining sufficient
output integrity. We undertake a detailed resiliency study of the application as well as its
approximate versions and show that the approximations do not degrade the resiliency of
the baseline algorithm. We further introduce metrics to quantify the error introduced in
an output image and use them to understand the behavior of SDCs in the different Video
Summarization algorithms. We show that many of the SDCs produced by the application
can be tolerable to the end user and hence can reduce the cost of protecting the appli-
cation against transient faults. Thus, we conclude that error-efficient techniques such as
software approximations are not only effective but also safe for emerging edge-computing
applications.
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Chapter 3: AUTOMATED APPLICATION-LEVEL ERROR ANALYSIS
Error-efficient computing techniques redefine “correctness” as producing results that are
good enough or of sufficient quality to be acceptable to the user. Hence, one of the fun-
damental requirements for achieving safe and effective error-efficiency is to understand how
errors (perturbations in computation and data) encountered during a program’s execution
affect the quality of the program output. With such knowledge, the system or end-user
would have the ability to precisely make the desirable trade-offs in quality, resiliency, perfor-
mance, and resource usage. The process of determining the output (quality) produced by a
program in the presence of (given) errors is referred to as error analysis. The “holy grail” of
error analysis is that it must be: (1) Accurate; it should provide the guaranteed impact of a
given error on the end-to-end output quality, (2) Precise; it should determine the impact on
output quality at fine granularity, (3) Comprehensive; it should provide the output quality
impact for virtually all errors for a given error model, (4) Automatic; it should impose the
absolute minimal programmer burden, (5) General ; it should be applicable for general error
models and applications, and (6) Low-cost ; it should perform comprehensive error analysis
across billions of errors in a program’s execution in an inexpensive fashion.
Error analysis techniques that satisfy all six of the above requirements pose a significant
research challenge and have thus-far remained elusive. Researchers have made significant
progress by relaxing some of these requirements. For example, one class of techniques rely on
empirically introducing a small (statistically determined) sample of errors during a program’s
execution (referred to as error injection) and observing the resultant behaviour [22, 65, 66,
67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74]. These techniques aim to provide statistical averages or
probabilistic bounds of program behaviour under errors; they cannot comprehensively and
accurately guarantee impact on output quality for the large majority of errors that are left out
during sampling. Another class of techniques leverage program analysis to understand how
errors in data may propagate to affect program output [15, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82].
While fast (low-cost), such techniques cannot accurately and precisely model an error’s
impact on execution since they use information from an error-free execution.
In the absence of systematic and general-purpose error analysis methodologies, a large
majority of error-efficient techniques today rely on program or domain experts to understand
the error tolerance characteristics of their program and articulate it via custom annotations,
data-types, error-bounds on function parameters etc. [3, 4, 5, 17, 18, 19] . This has been very
limiting since such expertise is sparse and can take years to develop for specific domains [20,
21, 22]. To mitigate this limitation, this work develops a suite of automated application-level
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error analysis tools [25, 26, 31] that can automatically extract the error characteristics of
applications.
The error analysis tools developed as part of this work can accurately (>95% on average,
up to 99.9%) quantify the impact of virtually all errors (for a given error model) in a pro-
gram’s computation and data on its final output quality at very fine granularities (within a
2% error margin). Using a hybrid approach (built upon prior work [33]) of program analysis
and relatively few (up to five orders of magnitude less) error injections, these tools can com-
prehensively analyze billions of possible errors that can impact a program’s execution at low
cost. They impose the absolute minimal programmer burden by only requiring the user to
provide an unmodified program (along with relevant program inputs), a (domain-specific)
quality metric and optionally a quality threshold. These tools are general and can be used
to analyze any general-purpose application and have been evaluated for five different error
models. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first application-level error analysis
tools that satisfy all six requirements of automation, accuracy, precision, comprehensiveness,
(relatively) low-cost and generality. The output of automated error analyses are compre-
hensive application error profiles that list the errors that can affect the program’s execution
along with the corresponding output quality expected for each of the errors. The application
error profiles can be used by programmers or systems to understand the application’s error
characteristics.
The suite of tools described in this work have been systematically developed to enable
errors analysis in both instructions (compute) and data (storage). In this work, an error is
defined as a perturbation in program state (instructions or data) caused by an underlying
fault in hardware. We focus on transient errors in this work. Specifically, we develop the
following three automated error analysis tools:
1. Approxilyzer: Approxilyzer performs analysis of errors in program instructions (com-
pute). Approxilyzer [31] is the first automated error analysis tool to quantify the im-
pact, of virtually all errors (for a given error model) in program instructions, on the
program’s output quality with high accuracy, precision and (relatively) low-cost. The
error model used in Approxilyzer is single-bit transient errors in register operands of
dynamic instructions. Approxilyzer’s output is the application’s comprehensive in-
struction error profile. We have open-sourced and publicly released Approxilyzer [27].
2. gem5-Approxilyzer: To address the limitations in usability imposed by the pro-
prietary simulator (Simics) and ISA (SPARC) used in the original implementation,
we developed a fully open-source re-implementation of Approxilyzer, called gem5-
Approxilyzer [25]. gem5-Approxilyzer has been built using the open-source gem5
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simulator [83] and designed in a modular fashion to enable extensions to different
ISAs, starting with X86 in this work. We have open-sourced and publicly released
gem5-Approxilyzer [28].
3. DataApproxilyzer: Errors in instructions (compute) and data (storage) propagate
differently through the program and, hence, require different analysis techniques.
While Approxilyzer and gem5-Approxilyzer analyze errors in program instructions, we
developed DataApproxilyzer to analyze errors in program data. DataApproxilyzer [26]
is the first automated error analysis tool to quantify the impact, of virtually all errors
(for a given error model) in program data, on the program’s output quality with high
accuracy, precision and (relatively) low-cost. The error model used in DataApproxi-
lyzer is multi-bit (1-bit, 2-bit, 4-bit and 8-bit) transient errors in system memory. The
output of DataApproxilyzer is the application’s comprehensive data error profile.
The rest of this chapter details the design choices, analysis techniques, methodology
and effectiveness of the automated application-level error analysis tool-suite. In the rest
of the document the Automated Error Analysis tools described above (Approxilyzer, gem5-
Approxilyzer and DataApproxilyzer) are collectively referred to as AEA tools.
3.1 MOTIVATION FOR HIGH-LEVEL DESIGN CHOICES
This section briefly explains the motivation for making specific high-level design choices
(which are orthogonal) for the error analysis techniques employed in this work.
3.1.1 Application-level Error Analysis
Different error-efficient techniques have been proposed at the level of software [10, 39, 40,
41, 42, 43, 44, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88] and hardware [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94,
95, 96, 97] with different trade-offs and targeted at different resource savings. We envision
future systems to contain a heterogeneous mix of error-efficient computing components with
control knobs that are exposed to software. The optimal combination of error-efficiency
techniques for a given workload can then be customized or tuned based on the output
quality requirements of the user and the error resilience characteristics of the workload. This
methodology is analogous to computing systems today where selective computing elements
(e.g., functional units, accelerators etc.) are activated at the direction of software (the
workload). As will be shown in Section 4.2, different applications have widely varying error
characteristics and a one-size-fits-all approach to error-efficiency is sub-optimal. Hence,
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this work focuses on developing systematic methodology to perform error analysis at the
application-level.
3.1.2 Object Code Analysis
Application-level error analysis can be performed at source code [82, 98], compiler IR [99,
100] or object code (assembly) [13, 33] level. The advantages of source code and IR level
analysis are twofold: (1) It is easier to reason about the results of the error analysis in
relation to the source code and hence there is a simple 1:1 mapping to any programming
language framework where the error characteristics can be specified and (2) The generality
of error analysis is preserved across different architectures.
However the cost of preserving this generality is sacrificing customized ”tight” solutions
that may leave some computing efficiency untapped. Since the end goal is to enable maxi-
mum benefit from highly optimized and customized error-efficiency solutions, we choose to
perform the error analysis on assembly level (object) code. We will show that this choice is
validated (in Section 4.2.4) by undertaking a comparison (using gem5-Approxilyzer) of the
same application compiled to two different ISAs. The error profiles of the same application
are very different – leading to different static instructions being picked for resiliency and
approximate computing solutions – under the two different architectures. This opportunity
to customize architecture-specific error-efficiency solutions could not have been afforded by
analysis of the source code or IR. Hence, the choice is made to perform error analysis at the
object (assembly) code level.
3.1.3 Architectural Error Models
We choose architectural error models for our application-level error analysis. Architectural
error models (i.e., errors that affect the architectural state of the workload) are commonly
used in software-centric analysis [33, 82, 98, 99] as they are general and not hardware specific.
Architectural error models are also useful for analyzing software in the early design phases
when detailed lower level models are not available.
While architectural error models are important and realistic [101], they account for only
a subset of hardware errors that can occur in a system. Accurately modeling how low-level
(gate-level) hardware faults manifest at the architecture level is an open research problem
today. Simulating all low-level faults in the system provides accuracy but is intractable in
speed and cost. To bridge the gap between the accuracy of low-level fault models and the
speed of high-level error models, researchers have suggested techniques such as hierarchical
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simulations [58] and fault dictionaries [102]. These techniques, however, are either applica-
ble to a limited set of faults or still too slow for exploring resiliency profiles for complete
applications. Additionally, their complexity and lack of generality further limits their use.
In the absence of high fidelity models that can translate the effects of low-level hardware
faults on the system, analysis techniques (especially those at the early stage of software/hard-
ware development) use high-level architectural models. It is important to note that the errors
represented by architectural models are realistic for a class of hardware errors. For example,
an error in the output latch of an adder can propagate and result in a single bit error in the
architectural register file.
While progress is being made to improve the fidelity of error models, comprehensively
analyzing high-level architectural models is an important research problem. Being able to
comprehensively and effectively analyze large numbers of high-level errors can not only pro-
vide increased coverage (for modeling the effects) of hardware errors today [101] but can
potentially play an important role in comprehensive testing of hardware and software in the
future (when better translation is available between the low-level and high-level error mod-
els). This work significantly improves the state-of-art to show how high-level architectural
errors can be analyzed accurately, comprehensively and at low-cost (a problem that was
intractable before this work).
We note, however, that concepts and methodology developed as part of this work are gen-
eral and can potentially be applied to other (lower-level) error models as well. For example,
a recent tool called Merlin [103] takes inspiration from hybrid error analysis (specifically
the concept of error equalization similar to that used in this work) and applies it to a set
of lower-level micro-architectural errors. Extending the error analysis techniques from this
work to comprehensively analyze other error models is part of our future work.
3.2 MOTIVATION FOR HYBRID ERROR ANALYSIS
Error analysis techniques in the literature can be classified into three main categories
(focused largely on transient errors):
(1) Error injection: The most widely used evaluation technique is error injection, where
an error is injected (typically one error at a time) in a given cycle in a real or simulated
system and its impact studied [56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 99, 104, 105, 106]. This technique can
predict the impact of an error with high accuracy. Unfortunately, comprehensively injecting
each error of interest at each cycle in an execution is prohibitively time consuming. Most
work therefore performs statistical error injection which injects selected error types in a
randomly selected sample of execution cycles. While such a technique can provide statistical
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summaries of the program’s behaviour under errors (for example, silent data corruption
rates), it does not accurately determine the impact of errors that are unsampled.
(2) Program analysis: Some evaluation techniques examine certain (static or dynamic)
program properties to identify program locations that are vulnerable to errors [15, 75, 76, 77,
78, 80, 82, 98, 107]. These techniques are much faster than error injection based techniques,
but their accuracy (in precisely modeling the impact of errors on program output) has not
been previously validated
(3) Hybrid injection+analysis: A recent work, called Relyzer [33], demonstrates the use
of a hybrid technique – which uses a combination of program analysis and error injection
– to comprehensively analyze virtually all single-bit errors in integer registers of dynamic
instructions within a program. Relyzer applies static and dynamic program analyses (with
some heuristics) to determine when different errors in the program’s instruction result in
the same outcome (i.e., impact the output similarly). For a set of errors that are shown to
produce equivalent outcomes, Relyzer performs error injection for only one of these errors
(referred to as the pilot) to determine that outcome. Relyzer uses program analysis to
prune the number of error injections needed for comprehensive error analysis by 99.78%
and demonstrates an accuracy of >96% (for error outcome prediction). Relyzer’s analysis is
used to accurately determine which instruction errors will lead to Silent Data Corruptions
(SDCs), where an incorrect output is produced.
Although Relyzer is 2 to 6 orders of magnitude faster than comprehensive error injection, it
unfortunately still spends a significant amount of time in error injection for the pilot errors.
Thus, while Relyzer is certainly more practical than comprehensive pure error injection,
compared to program analysis based techniques, its accuracy comes at a significant cost in
speed – the program analysis techniques studied average running times of approximately 5
CPU hours compared to 2.5 days of wall clock time on a 188 cluster node for Relyzer (90%
of this time is spent on error injections).
A legitimate question therefore is whether current program analysis based techniques
obviate the need for hybrid tools such as Relyzer altogether. As mentioned above, it has
not been previously possible to test the accuracy of program analysis based techniques. The
availability of Relyzer allows us to perform such a test.
In this work, we evaluate the accuracy of several program analysis based techniques using
Relyzer [30]. We use program based metrics proposed by [98] and some derivatives as
examples of pure program analysis based techniques that have been suggested to measure
the vulnerability of instructions to SDC. By comparison with Relyzer, we show that, in
general, these program analyses based metrics and their various derivatives and combinations
are unable to adequately predict an instruction’s vulnerability to SDCs [30]. Although it
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is possible that other analysis based techniques (and more sophisticated machine learning
techniques) are more accurate, a comprehensive evaluation of all such techniques is outside
the scope of this work. Nevertheless, the negative results provided here do indicate that there
is much work needed to develop accurate pure program analysis based techniques, and hybrid
techniques (like Relyzer) provide a valuable solution to the error analysis problem. Thus, a
hybrid error analysis technique is chosen for developing the automated error analysis tools
described in this work.
3.2.1 Methodology to evaluate program analyses based techniques
To evaluate the accuracy of pure program analyses based techniques, we study metrics
proposed by [98] and some derivatives. Particularly, we explore the following two metrics
from [98] for a given static instruction, as an indicator of its vulnerability to producing SDCs.
(1) Fanout is defined for a static instruction that writes to a register as the cumulative fanout
of all the dynamic instances of the instruction. Fanout for a dynamic instruction that writes
to a register R is defined as the number of dynamic uses of R before the next dynamic
write to R. (2) Av.lifetime is defined for a static instruction that writes to a register as
the average of the lifetimes of dynamic instances of the static instruction. Lifetime for a
dynamic instruction Id that writes to a register R is defined as the number of cycles from
the execution of Id to the last use of R before the next dynamic write to R.
We also explore the following three metrics. (1) Av.fanout, which is the fanout averaged
over all dynamic instances of an instruction. (2) Lifetime, which is the cumulative lifetime
over all dynamic instances of an instruction. (3) Dyn.inst, which is the total number of
instances of the static instruction. The last metric was also explored in the prior work, but
did not show promise – we present it here because it performed better than other metrics in
some cases in the results.
We evaluate the five metrics using five single-threaded applications – two (randomly se-
lected) from PARSEC [108] and three (randomly selected) from the SPLASH-2 [109] bench-
mark suites. Table 3.4 provides a brief description of these applications and inputs used.
We collect the values of these metrics at the instruction level using Wind River Simics [110].
All the metric values are normalized to one. Since lifetime and fanout for an instruction are
derived from its destination register, the metrics evaluation is restricted to errors in destina-
tion registers. For a given static instruction, we also obtain the number of SDCs it produces
by employing Relyzer and use it as the golden metric (sdc), also normalized to one.
Although Relyzer analysis is orders of magnitude faster than naiv̈e error injections cam-








LU 512× 512 matrix, 16× 16 blocks
Water 512 molecules
Table 3.1: Applications studied.
error equalization) to cover all the error-sites (program locations where an error can occur;
which for Relyzer’s error model is integer register bits in dynamic instructions). In the in-
terest of simulation time, prior work has instead chosen to analyze or cover a large subset
(>95% but <100%) of error-sites, which is sufficient for most applications [33]. In this work,
an aggregated Relyzer coverage of 97% is used. To ensure that the missing error information
did not skew the metrics evaluation, we additionally ensured that all error-sites belonging
to static instructions that cover at least the top 75% of the metric values were analyzed.
Any missing information, therefore, is from static instructions that have among the lowest
metric values and the lowest dynamic instruction counts.
Metric evaluation:
Three different methods are used to evaluate the metrics described above. The first two
methods quantify how accurately the individual metrics predict SDCs in isolation while the
third evaluates a combinations of the metrics.
Correlation coefficient: For each application, correlation coefficients1 between individual
metrics and sdc (golden metric) is measured to study the linear relationship between them.
Cost vs. SDC reduction: We note that the objective of estimating SDCs with metrics is
to identify optimal set of SDC-targeted error detectors. We therefore employ a 0/1 knapsack
algorithm to find an optimal set of detectors that will provide the largest SDC reduction at
a given cost – we assume duplication for detectors and charge one instruction as the cost of
duplicating and comparing results for one instruction on average (similar to [13]). Thus,
SDC reduction vs. cost graph for each application is obtained using the known SDC count
for each instruction from Relyzer. We call this Relyzer curve (RC).
We then apply the same knapsack algorithm using the metric of interest, instead of the
1Correlation coefficients cc are a standard measure of the linear relationship between two variables X and
Y giving a value between +1 and -1 inclusive. |cc| gives the strength of the correlation (1 indicates a perfect
linear correlation and 0 indicates no correlation between X and Y). We use Pearson’s correlation coefficients
in our analysis.
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SDC count, and plot a similar tradeoff curve which we call Prediction curve (PC). This curve
is the predicted SDC reduction vs. cost curve if the metric were accurate. We also plot an
Actual curve (AC) as follows: for each point on the PC curve, we calculate and plot the
actual number of SDCs (from Relyzer) covered by the instructions actually identified by the
metric in the PC curve. This gives us the actual SDC reduction vs. cost curve of the metric.
For a given cost, the gap between AC and RC tells us how well the metric estimates SDCs
(the smaller the gap, the better).
Combining multiple metrics: We also evaluate combinations of the above metrics using
linear models based on regression techniques that use these metrics to predict SDCs being
produced by the instructions. We use the statistical tool R to build (least square) linear
regression models for each of the benchmarks, which take the following form:
sdci = β0lifetimei + β1fanouti + β2av.lifetimei+
β3av.fanouti + β4dyn.insti + εi
(3.1)
We also attempt to evaluate a non-linear combination of the metrics. Since some non-linear
relationships between variables (or metrics) can be approximated using linear regression on
polynomials,2 we evaluated another linear regression to model the following:
















3.2.2 Accuracy of pure program analyses based metrics
This section presents the results for the accuracy of program analyses based techniques,
evaluated using the methodology described in Section 3.2.1
Correlation coefficients
Table 3.2 shows the correlation coefficients between sdc and individual metrics for all the
metrics and applications studied. It shows that av.lifetime and av.fanout have virtually no
correlation with sdc for our workloads. Lifetime displays weak to virtually no correlation
2The more complex the non-linearity, the higher the order of polynomials required.
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and fanout exhibits moderate correlation for Blackscholes, FFT and LU. Although dyn.inst
is the only metric that shows high correlation with sdc for a few applications (FFT and LU),
there is no single metric that uniformly demonstrates a strong linear relationship with sdc
for all our workloads. Furthermore, when correlation is calculated on the combined data
points from all the benchmarks (represented by All), none of the metrics display a strong
association with sdc.
Applications vs lifetime fanout av. lifetime av. fanout dyn.inst
Blackscholes
sdc
0.25 0.56 -0.05 -0.04 0.68
Swaptions -0.04 0.21 -0.03 -0.02 0.27
FFT 0.08 0.52 -0.03 -0.01 0.82
LU 0.19 0.56 -0.02 -0.01 0.80
Water 0.08 0.40 -0.02 -0.01 0.52
All 0.13 0.49 -0.02 -0.01 0.62
Table 3.2: Correlation coefficients between metrics and sdc for different workloads.
Cost vs. SDC reduction
Here we compare optimal cost vs. SDC reduction curves for the metrics vs. Relyzer by
plotting the RC, PC, and AC curves as described in Section 3.2.1. For brevity, the cost
vs. SDC reduction curves are presented for a representative subset from our workload and
metric combinations in Figure 4.7.3
In the remainder of this section the term gap is used to signify the difference in the Y axis
(SDC) for a given value on the X axis between the different curves.
Graphs for LU:dyn.inst and FFT:dyn.inst show a high correlation between PC and AC,
which was expected based on Table 3.2. (The gap between the PC and AC curve – which
shows the inaccuracy in the SDC coverage claimed by the corresponding metric – is lower
for these graphs).
However, even for these best cases there is a significant gap in SDC reduction between the
AC and RC curves, showing that these metrics do not pick the optimum set of detectors. For
example, at dynamic instruction overhead of 20%, the loss in SDC reduction for LU:dyn.inst
and FFT:dyn.inst is 37% and 17%, respectively (compared to RC). This is primarily because
3For graphs that use av.lifetime and av.fanout, the PC curve immediately goes up to very close to 100%.
This is because the static instructions that have very large values for av.lifetime and av.fanout have few
dynamic instructions. Hence, these static instructions account for a large fraction of these metrics and the
execution overhead of protecting them (based on dynamic instruction count) is very small.
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Figure 3.1: SDC reduction vs. execution overhead. The X axis plots % execution overhead
(in terms of increase in dynamic instructions) and the Y axis represents % reduction in
SDCs.
the instructions that do not produce SDCs were also selected for protection (false positives)
by the metrics.
Overall, the significant gaps we observed in the SDC reduction between AC and RC for
a given overhead reveals that the individual metrics are poor predictors of SDC causing
instructions. This also indicates that correlation coefficient alone is not a determining factor
in predicting SDCs.
Combining multiple metrics
Table 3.3 shows the result of the linear regression (Equation 3.1) for the workloads studied.
It shows the metrics that are significant4 to the model and the model’s adjusted R2. The
adjusted R2 value estimates the percentage of variance in sdc that is explained by the metrics.
If the adjusted R2 is high then the derived model is considered robust. For example, 0.66
adjusted R2 for LU implies that only 66% of the variance in sdc can be explained by the
metrics, which leaves 34% as unexplained or caused by randomness. However, a low adjusted
R2 value can be interpreted either as (a) the model is missing key additional explanatory
4A standard t-test is used to calculate the significance of the individual linear regression coefficients.
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0.61 [0.67] 1.46 [> 104] 264 [> 103] 285 [> 104]
Swaptions dyn.inst, lifetime 0.07 [0.26] 4.48 [4.16] 4.55 [4.25] 4.64 [4.44]
FFT dyn.inst, lifetime 0.68 [0.69] 6.91 [> 107] 10.1 [> 107] 5.94 [> 105]








0.39 [0.50] 4.55 [9.97] 4.40 [14.3] 4.45 [79.2]
Table 3.3: Linear regression summary. The significant metrics and the main number in each
cell are the result of using linear regression based on Equation 3.1. The numbers in the
square brackets are results using linear regression on polynomials based on Equation 3.2.
variables (other metrics), or (b) that a linear model is not sufficient to explain the relationship
between the metrics and sdc. Overall, we make the following observations:
• No common model (formed by a linear combination of our metrics) that offers a best fit
for all our workloads was identified. For different applications, different metrics were
identified as being significant contributors. For metrics that prove to be significant
for multiple applications, the respective regression coefficients (βi) were different. For
example, even though fanout is identified as a significant metric for Blackscholes, LU,
and Water, the regression coefficients (β1) were 0.60, -0.21, and -0.33 respectively.
• The adjusted R2 values varied between 0.07 (for Swaptions) to 0.68 (for FFT) and
were mostly lower than desired.
• The last three columns of Table 3.3 show the ratio of the Root Mean Square Error
(RMSE) to the Mean for K-fold cross validations (CVK)
5 with K = 10, 4 and 2. Even
for models that have relatively high adjusted R2 value (e.g., for LU or FFT), the cross
validation showed high errors (values >1) in the predicted and observed SDCs. For
example, for FFT, the average error for CV4 is a very high 10.1 times the mean.
The results from nonlinear regression (Equation 3.2 in Section 3.2.1) are presented in
brackets in Table 3.3. They show a trend similar to that of linear regression – no common
model for the studied workloads is identified. The adjusted R2 has improved for all the
workloads, which indicates that a nonlinear combination of the metrics can perform better
5Cross validation (CV) is a model validation technique for accessing how well the results of the analysis
generalize to an independent set. A K fold cross validation splits the population randomly into K parts. K-1
parts are used for training the model and the remaining one part is used for testing. This is done K times
until all the parts have been used for testing.
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than a linear combination in predicting SDCs. However, for several applications the adjusted
R2 value is still poor, indicating that other metrics and/or different nonlinear regression
models are required. The last three columns show that the error from cross validation is also
high. In the data sets for some of the applications, there are outliers that have significantly
larger metric values than others. During CV when these outlier metric values are fed into the
model, they produce large deviations in the output which result in higher RMSE. Regression
on polynomials further exacerbates this problem as the model exponentially increases the
error. For example, in FFT just one instruction accounts for approximately 96% of av.fanout
of the entire application and removing it brings the CV error for polynomial regression down
from approximately 107 to approximately 5. Although removing these outliers may improve
the error rate, it also means that we are removing from our analysis instructions that the
metrics identify as the most vulnerable. Since we are evaluating the predictive capacity of
the metrics, we choose to not remove these instructions.
In summary, simple linear and nonlinear models using the pure program analyses based
metrics we study do not uniformly explain or predict SDCs in the workloads studied. While
other program analysis based metrics may be more effective, these results provide evidence
that developing such metrics is not straightforward and establish the value of hybrid error
analysis techniques (such as Relyzer) in accurately determining the impact of errors on
output.
3.3 COMMON CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGY FOR AUTOMATED ERROR
ANALYSIS TOOL SUITE
The following sections provide a brief description of common concepts, terminology and
methodology employed in the development and evaluation of all three automated error analy-
sis tools described in this work – Approxilyzer, gem5-Approxilyzer and Minnow (collectively
referred to as AEA tools) .
3.3.1 High-Level Objective of Error Analysis
The goal of the error analysis undertaken in this work is to characterize the impact of any
given error (per the error model) in a program’s execution with high accuracy and precision.
The term error site(s) is used to refer to specific points in the application’s execution where
an error could be encountered. Thus, if the error model used is single-bit transient errors in
architectural registers (as in the case of Approxilyzer [31] and gem5-Approxilyzer [25]), then
an error site will refer to a specific bit in a specific operand register of a specific dynamic
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instruction.
The error analysis must accurately determine the outcome (impact on program output)
of an error - no output, correct output or corrupted output with quality degradation Q (
measured compared to the output generated by an error-free execution) – for virtually all
error-sites in the program. We will use the term output quality hereafter to refer to the
degradation in output quality caused by an error in the execution.
Since error-efficient techniques trade-off output quality for resource savings, the error
analysis must determine output quality with high precision – for example, the tools must
be able to distinguish if an error resulted in an output quality degradation of 20% vs 23%
etc. Finally, it must do this using a general methodology (applicable to different applica-
tions and error models) that is (relatively) inexpensive and imposes minimal burden on the
programmer.
3.3.2 Error Models
The AEA tools are designed to analyze errors in both instructions (compute) and data
(storage) in a given application. In this work we focus on transient bit-flip errors [98, 111,
112, 113, 114, 115]. Targeted bits (in instruction and data) are flipped (value changed
from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0) and remain in corrupted state till they are overwritten. The error
models for instructions (used in Approxilyzer and gem5-Approxilyzer) and data (used in
DataApproxilyzer) are described below.
Error Model for Instructions
The error model used is a single bit transient error in instruction registers. This error
model has been widely used in literature [13, 33, 98, 111, 115] and shown to be effective [115].
Specifically, our error model is a single bit transient error in an operand register of a dynamic
instruction in the program. Hence, an error site refers to a specific bit in a specific operand
register in a specific dynamic instruction. Errors in both integer and floating point archi-
tectural registers are studied. The error can occur in the source operand register (the error
occurs just before the register value is read by the instruction) or the destination operand
register (the error occurs just after the register value has been written by the instruction) of
a given dynamic instruction. To illustrate with an example, consider a dynamic instance of
an multiply instruction with register operands r1, r2 and r3. We consider single-bit flips in
registers r1, r2 and r3 that are accessed by this instruction (one at a time, in different bits).
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Error Model for Data
The error model used is multi-bit transient errors in (data stored in) system memory. We
focus on multi-bit errors in memory words as they are are an increasing concern [116, 117,
118, 119] in modern memory systems. Furthermore, unlike in the case of single-bit memory
errors, widely used ECC schemes are incapable of protecting the memory against multi-bit
errors in the same word (two-bit errors can be detected but not corrected; errors in three or
more bits can neither be detected or corrected). We study errors in data memory regions
(both heap and stack); errors in memory regions containing code are not studied.
Error sites for data corruption (during a program’s execution) in memory have both a
spatial (where, i.e., which memory address) and a temporal (when, i.e, what cycle in the
program execution) component. For example, consider a data byte D that is accessed (read-
/written) multiple times (by different dynamic instructions) during a program’s execution.
A given error in D could impact the output quality differently depending on whether it
occurs while being accessed by dynamic instruction X vs. dynamic instruction Y. Thus, it
is essential to distinguish and identify data errors based on both when and where the error
occurred. In order to capture the temporal component of errors we record the first dynamic
instruction in the program execution that reads (error occurs just before the read) or writes
(error occurs just after the write) the corrupted data bit(s). Thus, an error site is defined as
individual (random) bits in data bytes that are accessed (read/written) by a given dynamic
memory instruction. To illustrate using the example described above, for a given dynamic
instance X of a memory instruction (load/store) that accesses (reads/writes) data byte(s)
D, we consider n-bit errors (one at a time, in different combinations of n bits) in D.
Specifically, we study the following four error models:
1. 1-bit: A single bit error in a given data bit accessed by a given dynamic instruction
2. 2-bit: Error in any two data bits of the n (n >= 1) bytes of data accessed by a given
dynamic instruction.
3. 4-bit: Error in any four data bits of the n (n >= 1) bytes of data accessed by a given
dynamic instruction.
4. 8-bit: Error in any eight data bits of the n (n >= 1) bytes of data accessed by a given
dynamic instruction.
In this work, we study errors in an abstract memory device from which data is read or
written. This allows us to study the impact of errors on data while being agnostic to different
















Figure 3.2: Overview of the input and output interface of the Automated Error Analysis
tools.
it is possible to accurately determine the impact of any and all data errors (for a given
error model). Thus, we chose an error model where data errors are always “activated” or
consumed by the execution. This need not be true in systems that have caches. For instance,
an error in DRAM will not be activated if a copy is present in SRAM (the execution will
access the error-free data from the SRAM). Similarly, an error in a clean (not dirty) line in
SRAM will not be activated if it is evicted before it can be read. The techniques presented
in this work are generally applicable to errors in both SRAM and DRAM. Depending on
particular system memory configurations, a subset of data errors will simply not be activated
(and hence need not be analyzed).
3.3.3 Inputs for Error Analysis
As shown in figure 3.2, the AEA tools require the following inputs from the user:
1. Application: An (unmodified) application that the user wishes to analyze along with
its relevant program input parameters.
2. Quality Metric: Underlying any error-efficient computing solution is the need to quan-
tify output quality through an end-to-end quality metric. To quantify the quality
(degradation) of a corrupted output, it is essential to find a measure of its difference
from the golden (error-free) output. This “difference measure” is referred to as the qual-
ity metric – technically, this is a quality degradation metric since the higher the value of
the difference, the lower the quality. The quality metric is domain-specific [87, 120, 121]
and the AEA tools assume that the programmer or user will supply it.
3. Quality Threshold (Optional): Another parameter pertinent to many use cases for
error-efficient computing is the quality threshold that sets a bound on the maximum
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quality degradation that is acceptable to the user. The quality threshold is an optional
parameter that the AEA tools can take as input from the user. Since programmers
may want to use the AEA tools for analysis or tuning, these tools enables them to
specify quality threshold ranges if they so desire. In the limit, no threshold range may
be specified, in which case the tools will perform their analyses for the full range of
quality degradation.
Along with the application, the quality metric is the absolute minimal input required
by any error analysis tool. It is a tall order for any tool to predict how the user intends
to use the program output and, hence, how they wish to calculate output quality. For
example, in a program with numerical outputs, the user might want to measure the average
deviation (from the golden output) across all components or might want to measure the
maximum deviation for each individual output component. Error analysis tools (including
the AEA tools developed in this work) assume that the user will provide the quality metrics.
Although an orthogonal concern, in order to assist the user, we envision incorporating simple
domain-specific libraries in the error analysis framework that include common sense quality
metrics and thresholds that a user can choose. For example, the maximum of the relative
(percentage) difference between the golden and error-free output components, L2-norms of
matrices, and absolute differences are examples of quality metrics that quantify the deviation
of the erroneous output from the error-free one. Negative values and infinities are examples
of obviously unacceptable outputs for many financial applications – the user can choose to
apply acceptable thresholds. Section 3.3.5 describes specific metrics and thresholds used
in evaluating the AEA tools. The error analysis methodology developed in this work are
independent of the quality metric and quality thresholds chosen.
In summary, the AEA tools developed in this work place the absolute minimal burden on
the user, by only only requiring an (unmodified) application, an end-to-end quality metric
and, optionally, acceptable quality thresholds.
3.3.4 Quality Aware Error Outcome Categorization
The impact of an error of the output of an execution is referred to as error outcome.
Traditional error analysis schemes broadly classify error outcomes as either Masked (the
effects of the error are masked by the execution and correct output was generated), De-
tected (no output was generated, as in the case of program crash or hang), or Silent Data
Corruption (an incorrect or corrupted output was generated). Prior tools like Relyzer do
















Figure 3.3: A quality aware error outcome classification and their implication for error-
efficient approximation and resiliency.
a Silent Data Corruption (SDC) outcome.
The AEA tools refine the notion of an error outcome by including the quality of the er-
roneous output as part of this outcome. They assess the quality of the corrupted/erroneous
output by measuring its deviation from the error-free/precise output using the quality met-
rics provided by the user. Thus, an error that produces a quality degradation of (say) 20%
is said to have a different outcome from one with a quality degradation of (say) 25%.
In this work, we introduce a new categorization of error outcomes [31] to incorporate
the notion of output quality into the category of errors traditionally known as Silent Data
Corruptions (SDCs), as illustrated in Fig 3.3.
We use the term Output Corruption (OC) to indicate the outcome of an error where
the execution runs to completion without crashing the program, but where the output does
not match up identically to that of the golden (error-free) output. In the literature, such
outcomes have previously been uniformly referred to as SDCs. However, we observe that
there is a subclass of these previously classified SDCs that is, in fact, detectable and not
strictly silent. Such outcomes can be detected using a variety of low-cost mechanisms such
as range detectors [12, 13]. Additional detectors are introduced in the AEA tools to catch
NaNs, infinity values, negative outputs (if not expected by an application), and a check to
see if the final output of the erroneous execution generates the same number of values as the
golden output, irrespective of deviation. Our categorization refers to the output corruptions
detected through the above means as Detectable Data Corruptions (DDC). It refers to
the remaining output corruptions, which are not detectable and truly silent, as Silent Data
Corruptions (SDC).
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The SDCs are further categorized as follows:
SDC-Good: These SDCs are highly tolerable SDCs which produce negligibly small quality
degradations. This category also includes outcomes where the deviations from the golden
output occur only in non-significant portions of the output (e.g., program related statistics
and timing information).
SDC-Maybe: These are potentially tolerable SDCs. The entire class is not outright tol-
erable, but a subset of SDCs in this class may be tolerable based on user-provided application
quality constraints – usually in the form of an acceptable quality threshold.
SDC-Bad: These produce such large quality degradations that it can be reasonably
assumed that they are not tolerable for most applications and users.
The above categorization of the SDCs is dependent on the domain-specific quality metric
(required) and acceptable quality thresholds (optional) provided by the user. If a quality
threshold is provided by the user, then whether an SDC is tolerable or not is a binary decision
based on whether the resulting output quality degradation falls below or above the quality
threshold. In the absence of user-provided quality thresholds (e.g., in cases where the user
wants to undertake program analysis or tuning), the the SDC error sites are classified into
SDC-Good, SDC-Bad, and SDC-Maybe.
To assist the user, the AEA tools incorporate simple domain- specific and common sense
quality metrics and thresholds that a user can choose. For example, negative values and
infinities are examples of obvious DDC outputs for many financial applications, and quality
differences of less than one-hundredth of a cent could be assumed to be SDC-Good. The
classification into SDC-Good and SDC-Bad occurs only if the user chooses to apply common
sense domain-specific thresholds provided by the tool (Section 3.3.5); Otherwise all the SDC
error sites are classified as SDC-Maybe.
For each error site belonging to the SDC-Maybe error class, the AEA tools also records
its associated output quality degradation. Hence, the output quality for a given error site is
characterized by its error outcome class (also called error outcome category or simply error
category) and additionally, in the case of SDC-Maybe, by the amount of quality degradation
introduced in the output.
3.3.5 Workloads and Quality Measures
To evaluate the AEA tools, we use workloads across three different benchmark suites
(Parsec [122]6, Splash-2 [109] and Accept [4]) and spanning multiple application domains.
6Approxilyzer uses Parsec 2.1, whereas gem5-Approxilyzer and DataApproxilyzer use Parsec 3.0. The two





Calculates prices of options with Black-
Scholes partial differential equation
Swaptions Financial Modeling
Computes prices of a portfolio of swaptions
using Monte Carlo simulations
SPLASH-2 [109]
FFT Signal Processing 1D Fast Fourier Transform
LU Scientific Computing
Factors a matrix into the product of a lower
& upper triangular matrix
Water Scientific Computing
Evaluates forces and potentials that occur
over time in a system of water molecules
ACCEPT [4] Sobel Image Processing
Image convolution kernel implementing the
Sobel filter
Table 3.4: Applications studied.
Application DDC SDC-Good SDC-Bad SDC-Maybe
Blackscholes Fi > $500 max-abs-diff < $10
−4 max-rel-err > 100% max-rel-err
Fi < $0
Swaptions Fi > $500 max-abs-diff < $10
−4 max-abs-diff > $1 max-abs-diff
Fi < $0
No
LU No App-Specific max-rel-err < 10−4% max-rel-err > 100% max-rel-err
Detectors
No
Water App-Specific max-rel-err < 10−4% max-rel-err > 100% max-rel-err
Detectors
No
FFT App-Specific rel-l2-norm < 10−4% rel-l2-norm > 100% rel-l2-norm
Detectors
No
Sobel App-Specific mean-pixel-diff < 10−4% mean-pixel-diff > 100% mean-pixel-diff
Detectors
Common to all Fi = NaN Errors in non-
apps Fi = Inf significant portions
#F != #G of the output
Table 3.5: Quality metrics and quality thresholds used for different applications.
Table 3.4 provides a brief description of the applications studied.
Table 3.5 details the quality metrics and quality threshold ranges used (per application)
in evaluating the AEA tools7. In the absence of specific domain studies and standardiza-
tion [87, 120, 121], we have done our best to choose quality metrics that strike a balance
between over- and under-estimating an application’s tolerance to errors. For example, con-
sider outputs with multiple components. Without further guidance, one must first determine
a difference function for each component and then a method to aggregate across the compo-
the two versions.
7Determining the quality metrics and quality thresholds to use involved a multi-month effort where we
consulted different domain experts to understand how they use use the application and how much quality
loss they can tolerate
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nents. Depending on the magnitude of the individual components, we use the absolute dif-
ference (small magnitude) or the relative difference (large magnitude) for the per-component
difference function. To aggregate across components, we use the maximum instead of the
average (average can hide very large errors in individual components when the number of
components is large). In cases where there is an established common practice to analyze the
output, we use the corresponding quality metric. For example, FFT produces a matrix and
we use the relative difference in the bounded L2 norm to determine the output quality8. In
the case of Sobel (which produces an image output), we measure the pixel difference between
images [4]. More precisely, given a golden output G and a faulty (erroneous) output F , both
having n components, where n ≥ 1, Table 3.5 uses the following quality metrics.
(1) max-abs-diff : This metric calculates the maximum absolute difference between the
components of the golden and faulty outputs.
max-abs-diff = max(|G1 − F1|, |G2 − F2|, . . . , |Gn − Fn|) (3.3)
(2) max-rel-err : This metric calculates the maximum of the relative error between the





max-rel-err = max(rel err1, rel err2, . . . , rel errn) (3.5)
(3) rel-l2-norm : This metric is typically used in mathematics to directly compare two
matrices. The metric estimates the relative difference in the bounded L2 norms (BL2N) of
















8We do not use this for LU because it effectively produces two triangular matrices and how the errors in
the two are composed depends on how the output is used.
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(4) mean-pixel-diff : This metric is used for image outputs and calculates the mean of
the differences between individual pixels within the images (normalized as percentage).
mean-pixel-diff =
|Gi − Fi|
255 ∗ n ∗ 100 (3.9)
Table 3.5 also lists the quality threshold ranges for identifying SDC-Good and SDC-Bad
(Section 3.3.4). We use fairly conservative values that we believe will be reasonable for
most users and applications. As mentioned in Section 3.3.4, the AEA tools uses detectors
to catch DDCs. These detectors include range violations, NaNs, infinity values, negative
outputs (if not expected by an application), and a check to see if the final output of the
erroneous execution generates the same number of values (components) as the golden output,
irrespective of deviation. The DDC detectors used for different applications are detailed in
Table3.5.
3.3.6 Output of Error Analysis
0x4028cf,  3678000, r8, 1, Destination    :::      SDC-Good : 0.00008%
PC
Cycle number
(dynamic instance of PC) 
Register Name Error outcome category
Output quality deviation caused 
by error at this error site




Example of a single entry from the instruction error profile
0x401a88,  2250443, Read-1, 0x6a10a, 2, 7    :::      SDC-Maybe : 4.25%
PC
Cycle number
(dynamic instance of PC) 
Access-id
Memory Address
Byte offset Error outcome category
Output quality deviation caused 
by error at this error site
ERROR  SITE  DESCRIPTION ERROR  OUTCOME
Bit
Example of a single entry from the data error profile (1-bit error model)
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.4: A single example entry, describing a single error site and its corresponding error
outcome, is shown for (a) instruction error profile (error model - one bit transient error in
dynamic instruction register) and (b) data error profile (error model - one bit transient error
in data bit accessed by a dynamic instruction).
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The output of the error analysis (for a given application) is a comprehensive error profile
of the application. The error profile contains a detailed list of the error outcomes for virtually
all errors (for a given error model) in the program’s execution. Each entry in the error profile
contains two pieces of information, (1) the description of an error site in the program and
(2) the error outcome (Section 3.3.4) of an error at the described error site.
Approxilyzer and gem5-Approxilyzer use an error model of transient errors in instructions
(Section 3.3.2) and hence the error profile they output characterizes the behavior of errors
in program instructions, and is called the instruction error profile. DataApproxilyzer, on
the other hand, analyzes transient errors in program data (Section 3.3.2) and accordingly
its output error profile is called the data error profile.
Figure 3.4 shows a single example entry, each from the instruction and data error profiles.
The instruction error profile entry, for example, shows that an error, in bit 1 of register 8 in
the dynamic instance of instruction 0x4028cf (this is the static PC) at cycle number 3678000,
will lead to an output with a quality degradation of 0.00008%, which, using the common-
sense thresholds supplied by the tool, is an error outcome categorized as SDC-Good. The
entry for the data error profile in Figure 3.4 shows an example error model of a 1-bit error in
data that is stored in system memory (DRAM in this case). Hence, the error-site describes
the particular data bit at a specified location (address) in memory that was corrupted when
it was read/written by the given dynamic instruction. Note that the examples shown in
Figure 3.4 show just a single entry each from the error profiles. In reality, the error profiles
can have millions (or even billions – depending on the size of the application) of such entries
corresponding to different individual error sites in the application.
3.3.7 Use-case Aware Error Outcome Categorization
Error-efficient computing environments often trade accuracy in the program output for
gains in other system parameters such as energy or performance. Two error-efficient tech-
niques are discussed in this work – (1) approximate computing which deliberately introduces
errors in computation for improved performance or energy, and (2) ultra-low cost hardware
resiliency which allows some unintentional hardware errors to escape as user-tolerable output
corruptions (rather than incurring high overheads to prevent all errors).
The application error profile generated by the AEA tools, which quantify the output
quality of each error site in the program, can be used to understand the trade-offs between
loss in output accuracy with respect to other system benefits for different error-efficiency
schemes. In this section, we explain how, based on the error outcomes reported in the error
profiles, the AEA tools can identify which error sites in the application need protection from
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Error outcome category Is this class of error sites
approximable?








Table 3.6: Error outcomes and their potential for approximation and resiliency overhead
savings.
transient errors (low cost resiliency), or alternatively, which error sites could be approximable
(approximate computing). we will demonstrate how this information can be used to enable
different error-efficiency techniques in Chapter 4.
Section 3.3.4 describes the various categories of error outcomes. The knowledge of each
error site’s output quality can be used to further categorize and equalize error sites accord-
ing to the error-efficiency context in which the error analysis (and hence the application’s
error profile) is used. The error outcome equalization for two error-efficiency use-cases are
described below (summarized in Table3.6).
(1) Low-Cost Resiliency: Each error site’s output quality is used to decide whether that
error site needs protection from transient errors (Table 3.6). Error sites that result in Masked
outcomes do not need to be protected since they produce the golden (correct) output even
in the presence of transient errors. Low cost detectors (as discussed earlier in Section 3.3.4)
can be used to catch the Detected category of errors and hence the associated error sites
do not need to be protected. In the absence of AEA tools, we would have to protect all
OC error sites. With the quality information provided by the AEA tools, the system can
selectively protect only those OCs that are neither tolerable by the user/application, nor
can be protected by low cost detectors. Since SDC-Good is inherently tolerable and DDC
(like Detected) can be captured using other low cost detectors, these error sites need not be
protected. SDC-Bad error sites produce intolerable outputs and hence they always have to
be protected. SDC-Maybes may or may not need protection based on whether they meet
the user’s quality threshold.
(2) Approximate Computing: Table 3.6 provides a classification of which error outcome
categories are approximable and which are not. Error sites that produce Detected, DDC
and SDC-Bad outcomes are clearly not acceptable and are considered as not approximable.
SDC-Good and Masked error sites are considered approximable. SDC-Maybe error sites
are potential candidates for approximation depending on whether their quality meets the
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acceptable quality threshold set by the user.
3.3.8 Error Pruning
The comprehensive error profile generated by the AEA tools contain the error outcomes
for millions (or even billions) of error sites present in typical programs. In order to accurately
analyze such a large number of error sites, the AEA tools employ error site pruning (or simply
error pruning) techniques (pioneered by Relyzer [33]) to reduce the number of error sites
needing detailed study (by error injection), either by predicting their outcomes or showing
them equivalent to other errors.
Compared to a näıve campaign that performs an error injection for every error site, the
AEA tools dramatically reduce (by many orders of magnitude) the number of error injections
required to predict the error outcome for all error sites. They use a hybrid technique of
program analysis and error injections to perform this comprehensive analysis with high
accuracy while performing relatively few error injections.
The AEA tools build on key insights gained by prior work [33] that errors propagating
through “similar“ control and data flow paths in the program result in similar outcomes.
Program analysis (both static and dynamic) and some heuristics are used to determine this
similarity and group resulting error sites predicted to have similar outcomes in an equivalence
class. Using an error injection experiment on a single representative from an equivalence
class (called the pilot), they predict that all members of the class will have the same error
outcome (as the pilot). Hence, these tools are able to predict the error outcomes of virtually
all the error sites in the application, with high accuracy, using relatively few error injection
experiments (in the pilots). Dynamic instances (or data accesses) of (from) the same static
instruction are searched to find equivalent-outcome instructions (or data).
We do not claim that the error pruning techniques and heuristics used in this work are the
fastest or the most accurate. However, as we will show later in this chapter, the techniques
used hit the sweet spot of very high accuracy (> 95%) with very high error pruning (up to
5 orders of magnitude reduction in errors). Exploring improvements to our error pruning
technique is part of our future work.
The rest of this section describes the error pruning techniques developed by the prior work
Relyzer. Specific error pruning techniques employed by the individual AEA tools will be
described later in this Chapter.
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Background: Relyzer’s Error Pruning Techniques
Prior work called Relyzer [33] was the first to employ the novel error-pruning techniques
described in this section. Relyzer used the error model of transient errors in (integer) regis-
ters of dynamic instructions. Relyzer systematically analyzes all application error sites (ac-
cording to its error model) and carefully selects a small subset for thorough error injection
experiments such that it can still estimate the outcomes of all the errors in the application.
To achieve this goal, Relyzer applies a set of pruning techniques that are classified as known-
outcome and equivalence-based pruning techniques. The known-outcome techniques largely
use static (and some dynamic) program analyses to predict the outcome of an error. The
equivalence-based techniques prune errors by showing them equivalent to others using static
and dynamic analyses and/or heuristics. This section briefly describes these techniques;
detailed explanations and examples can be found in [33].
The first step of error analysis (for Relyzer as well as the AEA tools from this work)
is to enumerate all the errors that can impact the application. This requires an error-free
execution trace for a given application (and input). Each dynamic instruction instance in the
trace forms a potential application error site. Relyzer studies errors in architectural integer
registers and in output latches of address generation units (this is equivalent to errors in
operand registers of load and store instructions that hold the memory address).
While enumerating the list of all application error sites, Relyzer stores all the error site
related information such as static instruction (program counter), error sites within the in-
struction (e.g., names of registers), number of dynamic instances of the instruction etc.
Error pruning techniques are then applied on this initial set of errors. The rest of the section
enumerates the various error pruning techniques applied.
Known-outcome pruning technique
Bounding addresses: Transient errors can make applications access memory locations
that fall out of the range of the allocated address space. Such accesses are likely to result
in detectable error outcomes (e.g., fatal traps, segmentation faults, application aborts, and
kernel panic). Hence, there is no need for injection experiments to identify the outcome of
most such errors and these can be directly pruned as follows. The range of valid addresses
are determined, for both the stack and the heap, by studying the dynamic memory profile
of the application.
Once the range of the valid addresses are identified, the errors that would allow a memory
instruction to access an invalid address are pruned (e.g., errors in high order bits of the
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address when the error-free trace shows valid addresses are within lower order bits). The
pruned errors (error sites) are apriori determined to produce detected error outcomes. This
technique is applicable to memory instructions (both loads and stores).
Equivalence-based pruning techniques
The equivalence-based class of pruning techniques eliminates errors that are equivalent to
each other from the initial set of errors and retains only the representative errors (pilots) for
thorough error injection experiments. The pruning techniques are further categorized as as
precise and heuristics-based, based on whether they use accurate analyses or heuristics to
form the equivalence classes.
Precise equivalence technique
Def-use analysis: A register definition is created whenever a register is used as a desti-
nation operand in an instruction. Errors in the definition of a register have similar behavior
to that of errors in the first use of this definition. Therefore, errors in the definition are
pruned out and errors in the first use are retained. Note that this technique prunes errors
only in the definition and not in the uses. There can be multiple uses of a definition, and er-
rors in different uses may have different error propagation. Whenever a definition is pruned,
the information of the first use is recorded. This allows relating the error outcomes of the
first use to the definition’s at a later stage. Ideally, the destination register operands of all
the instructions can be pruned by this technique. However Relyzer only prunes errors in
those destination registers that have a first use within the same basic-block. This was done
to keep the implementation simple yet precise; Relyzer uses a static program pass for to
identify def-use pairs and the presence of conditional moves makes the precise association of
a definition with its first use non-trivial.
Heuristics-based equivalence techniques
Control-equivalence: This heuristic pruning technique uses the observation that errors
propagating through similar code sequences are likely to behave similarly. It also uses
the observation that a majority of the errors appear in code sequences that are executed
many times. Consider a static instruction I with many dynamic instances in the error-
free execution under consideration. The pruning technique attempts to partition all these
dynamic instances of I into equivalence classes, based on the control flow path followed after
the dynamic instance.
It is convenient to describe and implement the algorithm at the basic block level. The tech-
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nique uses the error-free application execution to enumerate all possible control flow paths
up to a depth n starting at the basic block that contains the instruction of interest. Depth
is defined as the number of branch or jump instructions encountered. For the paths that
were exercised multiple times in the execution, it randomly selects one dynamic occurrence,
a pilot. It prunes all other unselected executions of such paths (population) and assumes
that errors in those dynamic executions are represented by the selected ones (pilots). More
precisely, a dynamic instruction instance on a pilot path serves as a pilot for other instances
with the same PC on the other paths in its population.
Figure 3.5 (from [33]) explains through an example how this pruning technique selects
pilots. The figure presents a control flow graph of a small program, with the basic blocks
represented by the black and grey circles with numbers on their sides. Assume the grey
basic block is not exercised by the dynamic execution of interest. Assume n = 5 (depth until
which control flow is tracked). Suppose that the objective is to find representative pilots
for an instruction in basic block 1. All control flow paths starting at basic block 1 up to a
depth of 5 that are executed in the dynamic error-free execution of interest are enumerated.
Basic block 4 is never executed and hence it does not appear in the list of dynamically
exercised paths. Each path is identified as forming a new equivalence class. There will be
potentially many instances of such paths in the dynamic execution trace. One dynamic
execution sequence is randomly identified for each equivalence class and named as the pilot
for that class. As mentioned before, a dynamic instruction instance on a pilot path serves
as a pilot for other instances with the same PC on the other paths in its population.
Relyzer applies this technique to prune errors in all instructions other than stores and
those that affect stores within a basic block. This is because the propagation of an error in
a store also depends on the addresses of the loads in the control flow path taken (only loads
to the same address as the store will propagate the error). The next technique described
deals with this distinction. Exceptions to the above are a few SPARC specific instructions;
namely, save, restore, call, return, and read state register. Relyzer does not not inject errors
in these instructions and therefore does not consider them any further. Relyzer also does
not inject errors in dead instructions and does not consider those any further either.
Overall, control-equivalence has the potential of pruning a large fraction of the errors by
softening the constraint on evaluating all dynamic occurrences from a specific code section.
Store-equivalence: An error in a store instruction propagates through the loads that
read the erroneous values. Load addresses are not entirely captured by the control flow path
taken after the store. Therefore, an alternate heuristic, called store-equivalence, is used for
errors in store instructions or in instructions that a store depends on within the same basic








Dynamically exercised paths up to depth 5  
1 → 2 → 5 → 6 → 7 → 8 
1 → 3 → 7 → 8 
1 → 3 → 7 → 1 → 2 → 5 
1 → 3 → 7 → 1 → 3 → 7 
1 → 2 → 5 → 6 → 7 → 1 
Figure 3.5: Control-equivalence example from [33]. The figure shows a CFG for a small
program starting at basic block 1 and ending at basic block 8. All dynamically exercised
control paths up to a depth, say 5, are enumerated. Here basic block 4 (showed in grey) never
gets exercised. Therefore control flow paths through this node do not appear on the list of
dynamically exercised paths. The executions along each of these paths form the equivalence
classes for similar error outcomes.
that a store writes in an error-free execution and recording all read accesses to this address.
It treats the errors in stores differently whenever a different permutation of load instructions
read the stored value.
Figure 3.6 (from [33]) illustrates this heuristic with an example. Consider Store 1 and
Store 2 as two dynamic store instruction instances from the same static instruction. To
determine if the errors in these two store instructions will have the same outcomes, Relyzer
examines all the loads that return the values written by these stores in the error-free execu-
tion, i.e., Load 1a and Load 1b for Store 1 and Load 2a and Load 2b for Store 2 from the
figure. It first checks whether the number of such loads is the same (two for each store in the
figure). If this is the case, it then checks whether the static instructions (program counters)
of the corresponding loads are the same; e.g., if the program counters of Load L1a and Load
L2a are the same and if those of Load L1b and Load L2b are the same in the figure. If
these match, then Relyzer concludes that the two dynamic store instructions are very likely
to have similar error outcomes and places them both in the same equivalence class.
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Store 1 






Load 2b Load 2a 
Load 1a Load 1b 
Figure 3.6: Store-equivalence example from [33]. Store 1 and Store 2 are two store in-
structions from the same static instruction writing to addresses A and B respectively. Load
1a with program counter PC-L1a and Load 1b with program counter PC-L1b are two load
instructions reading the value from address A. Similarly, Load 2a and Load 2b are two
loads from address B with program counters PC-L2a and PC-L2b respectively. The store-
equivalence heuristic requires that PC-L1a equal PC-L2a and PC-L1b equal PC-L2b.
3.3.9 Validation of Error Analysis
The AEA tools use similar error pruning techniques as those described in Section 3.3.8.
Since heuristics-based equivalence techniques rely on heuristics to predict the outcome of
error sites, validation experiments are needed to measure the accuracy of these techniques,
and hence, the accuracy of the tool in predicting error outcomes. Note that known-outcome
and precise equivalence techniques use precise a priori knowledge, to determine error out-
come and show equivalence respectively, and hence do not need validation (and will not
be discussed further). In this section, the validation experiments undertaken to show the
accuracy and precision of the AEA tools are described.
1. Baseline Validation:
The heuristic-based equivalence techniques rely on heuristics to group error sites that
produce similar quality outcomes into an equivalence class. They predict the quality
of each member of an equivalence class based on the outcome of an error injection
experiment on its pilot (Section 3.3.8). Similar to the methodology used in prior
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work [33], the validity of the equivalence techniques is measured by the extent to
which the they correctly group error sites (with the same outcome) into equivalence
classes.
Specifically, the validation attempts to answer the following question: how accurately
does the error outcome of the pilot predict the error outcome of the other error sites
in its equivalence class? For validating a single pilot, error injections are performed
in a sample of error sites (not including the pilot) – called the population – chosen
randomly from the pilot’s equivalence class. The error outcome of the population
is then compared with that of the pilot to gain confidence that the pilot accurately
represents the population, and hence the equivalence class. For example, a pilot that
produces a DDC has a 100% validation/prediction accuracy if the injection experiments
for all of its associated population also produced DDCs.
To validate a pilot of an SDC-Maybe class, it is further required that the quality
degradation (refered to a QD) of the pilot match that of the population to be considered
a correct prediction. For example, consider a pilot X that generates an SDC-Maybe
with quality degradation of 12% (written as QD-12 for brevity). Suppose 86% of its
population is SDC-Maybe with QD-12, 6% is SDC-Maybe with QD-13, 5% is SDC-
Maybe with QD-10, and 3% is SDC-Bad. Then the prediction accuracy of pilot X is
86%.
The baseline validation described above is general and measures the accuracy of the
techniques independent of any error-efficiency use-case or context (discussed further
below). Hence, this type of evaluation is referred to as CF (context-free) validation.
2. Flexible Quality Window:
Quality is a continuous parameter and requiring the pilot’s QD to exactly match the
QD of the associated population is unnecessarily conservative and a tall order for
any tool. We therefore introduce a flexibility parameter, δ, that allows a fine-grained
margin of error at QD boundaries. For the validation of pilot X described above,
setting δ = x means that an error site in its population with QD of 12 ± x would be
considered as a correct prediction. Thus, pilot X’s prediction accuracy with δ = 1 is
92% and with δ = 2 is 97%.
Note that Masked, SDC-Good and SDC-Bad error-sites also have quality information
associated with them. Masked outcomes have a QD = 0 (no quality degradation),
SDC-Good outcomes have QD < Th1 and SDC-Bad outcomes have QD > Th2, where
Th1 and Th2 are common-sense application specific thresholds set by the AEA tools
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(as described in Section 3.3.5 and Table 3.5). Thus, the δ parameter can also allow
for fine-grained error margins in quality at the boundaries of these categories. For
example, given a pilot SDC-Maybe with QD-1, setting δ = 2 will result in all Masked
outcomes in the associated population to be counted as correct prediction.
3. Equalizing Error Outcomes for Error-Efficiency Use-Case:
Since the output of the AEA tools can be used to enable different error-efficiency
techniques, it is interesting to extend the baseline validation to include the context
in which the error analysis is used. As mentioned in Section 3.3.7, we study low-cost
resiliency and approximate computing as two representative error-efficiency use-cases
in this work and we evaluate the AEA tools for both these contexts.
Validation for Resiliency: In this first case, the AEA tools are used to determine which
error sites in the application need to be protected for resiliency (Section 3.3.7). There
is no need to distinguish between Masked, SDC-Good, DDC, and Detected outcomes
since all of them do not require protection. Therefore these error outcomes can be
grouped together.
Validation for Approximation: In the second case, the AEA tools are used to determine
which error sites are approximable (Section 3.3.7). Therefore, there is no need to
distinguish between Masked and SDC-Good outcomes since they are approximable,
and they can be grouped together. Similarly, SDC-Bad, DDC, and Detected outcomes
can be grouped together since they are not approximable.
Thus, for a given use case, a pilot is said to have a correct prediction for a member
of its equivalence class if both the pilot and the member produce an outcome within
the same group as defined above for the use case. We henceforth use Res and Approx
when considering use-specific validations for resiliency and approximation respectively.
To illustrate the above with an example, consider an equivalence class whose pilot Y
generates a DDC. Suppose 86% of its population is DDC, 6% is Masked, 5% is SDC-
Maybe with QD-2, and 3% is Detected. Then the prediction accuracy of pilot Y for
CF is 86%, for Res is 95% and for Approx is 89%.
In the presence of user specified output quality thresholds (referred to as QT ), SDC-
Maybe error sites can be equalized based on if their QD falls above or below the QT.
For instance, if the QT provided is 5% (i.e., the user is willing to tolerate a QD of up
to 5%), then the SDC-Maybe error sites with QD-2 in the example above are classified
as being approximable and not needing resiliency protection (for the approximation
and resiliency use-case respectively). Thus the prediction accuracy for pilot Y , from
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the example above, is refined to 100% for Res (Approx validation accuracy remains at
89%).
To illustrate all of the above concepts with a combined example, consider a pilot Z that
generates an SDC-Maybe with QD-6. Suppose the error outcomes of its population are as
follows: (a) 84% of its population is SDC-Maybe with QD-6, (b) 6% is SDC-Maybe with
QD-3, (c) 5% is SDC-Maybe with QD-8, (d) 3% is Masked, and (e) 2% is DDC. Then
the validation accuracy of Z for the different validation strategies is as follows:(1) CFδ=0
(Context free and no flexible quality) is 84% (a is correct), (2) CFδ=2 is 89%=84%+5%
(a and c are correct), (3) Resδ=2 is 89%=84%+5% (a and c are correct), (4) Approxδ=2
is 89%=84%+5% (a and c are correct), (5) Resδ=2,QT=7 is 100% (all are correct, even c,
which lies above the QT, because its QD falls within the δ = 2 margin of the pilot), and (6)
Approxδ=2,QT=7 is 98% (e is incorrect).
The overall validation accuracy for an application is obtained by calculating the average of
the prediction accuracy across all the pilots studied, weighted by the size of their equivalence
class. Validation accuracy for individual equivalence-based pruning techniques (for example,
control-equivalence, store-equivalence etc.) can be obtained by studying the accuracy of
pilots from equivalence classes built using the individual techniques.
To gain confidence in the AEA tools, it is imperative that the accuracy of a sufficient num-
ber of equivalence classes (and their pilots) are evaluated using the validation methodology
described in this section. To evaluate each AEA tool, we perform the validation experiments
for ∼750 pilots from each application. This corresponds to a 99% confidence interval with
a 5% error margin. Each pilot is validated against a sample population size of 750 (drawn
randomly from the equivalence class), which also corresponds to a statistical confidence of
99% with a 5% error margin. In all, I perform approximately 7.6 million error injection ex-
periments – 2.6 million for Approxilyzer, 1.6 million for gem5-Approxilyzer and 3.4 million
for DataApproxilyzer – to validate the AEA tools.
The AEA tool-suite described in this work has been developed over many years and hence,
there are minor methodological differences in the evaluation of individual tools (inspired by
collaborator and reviewer feedback). These include variations in benchmarks, inputs, (minor
variations in) validation methodology etc. For example, Approxilyzer discretizes output qual-
ity into multiple Quality Bins (QB), fine-grained enough to capture small quality variations.
For example, with the max-rel-err metric, the bins are 1% wide, and quality degradation
values of 12.1%, 12.6% and 13.3% are assigned a QB of 13, 13, and 14 respectively. And
thus the QD value stored with the SDC-Maybe outcomes correspond to the QB values. The
various quality bins associated with different applications and metrics are detailed in [24]
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(Table II).
DataApproxilyzer’s validation is slightly modified to evaluate ”purity” of the equivalence
classes (analogous to validation in clustering techniques) which identifies the largest set of
similar error outcomes within the population [26]. Hence, the accuracy of a given equivalence
class is based on the extent to which it contains error outcomes of a single category (instead
of comparing it to the pilot). This eliminates effects (over- or under- estimation) introduced
by the randomness of picking pilots (which may or may not belong to the largest error
outcome set within the equivalence class). For example, consider an equivalence class E
whose population distribution is 97% Masked and 3% DDC. If its randomly chosen pilot
belongs to the DDC set, then baseline validation described in this section will assign E and
accuracy score of 3%. On the other hand if the pilot is Masked, then the accuracy of E is
97%. Using the purity metric, the accuracy of E is 97% (largest common outcome class)
and is independent of the pilot. All the concepts of flexible quality window and use-case
equalization still apply (each error-site is compared to the most common error outcome).
The methodological differences within the AEA tools are relatively minor and are not
anticipated to affect the accuracy measurements significantly.
3.4 APPROXILYZER
In this section, we present Approxilyzer [24], an automated error analysis framework that
determines the quality impact of errors in program instructions. The error model that
Approxilyzer uses is single bit transient errors in operand registers of dynamic instructions
(Section 3.3.2). To our knowledge, Approxilyzer is the first tool that quantifies the quality
impact of a single-bit error in (operand registers of) virtually all dynamic instructions of an
execution with high accuracy and low-cost. The output of Approxilyzer’s error analysis is
the comprehensive instruction error profile for a given application (Section 3.3.6).
The evaluation results presented in this section show that Approxilyzer can predict output
quality, at very fine granularities, with high accuracy (95% on average) and at low-cost (up
to 5 orders of magnitude fewer error injections than näıve techniques).
3.4.1 Error Pruning
To build the application’s comprehensive error profile, Approxilyzer employs a hybrid error
analysis technique which uses a combination of program analysis and few error injections
(Section 3.2). Approxilyzer builds upon Relyzer [33], a tool that predict the outcomes
of errors in integer registers of dynamic instructions. Relyzer’s predictions, however, only
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consider whether an error will affect the output but does not quantify how the output will
be affected. Relyzer determines if an error results in being Masked, Detected, or a Silent
Data Corruption (SDC). Relyzer does not consider output quality, marking all corruptions
in an output (no matter how trivial) as an SDC outcome.
Approxilyzer refines the notion of an error outcome by including the quality of the erro-
neous output as part of this outcome (Section 3.3.4). It assesses the quality of the corrupt-
ed/erroneous output by measuring its deviation from the error-free/precise output using the
application-specific quality metrics provided by the user (Section 3.3.3).
Approxilyzer hypothesizes that Relyzer’s main insight (that errors propagating “similarly”
through the program are likely to result in similar outcomes) also holds true when considering
quality as part of the error outcome. That is, errors propagating ”similarly” through the pro-
gram are likely to generate program outputs of similar quality. Approxilyzer uses Relyzer’s
error pruning techniques and heuristics – bounding addresses, def-use, control-equivalence
(control depth is set to N=50, as in prior work [30]) and store-equivalence (described in
Section 3.3.8) – to predict similarity and to divide error sites into equivalence classes. Val-
idation experiments (as described in Section 3.3.9) are performed to test this hypothesis
and we show that this is indeed the case (Section 3.4.4). Additionally, while Relyzer only
studied errors in a integer registers (which in turn only allowed it to study errors in a small
subset of integer instructions), Approxilyzer’s analysis extends to errors in both integer and
floating point registers (thereby enabling analysis of errors in virtually all instructions in the
program).
Thus, Approxilyzer is able to enumerate, with high confidence, the output quality gener-
ated for a given error in the program. And it is able to do this for virtually all errors in the
program instructions with relatively few error injections – 3 to 5 orders of magnitude fewer
error injections when compared to näıve techniques.
3.4.2 Workloads and Inputs
To evaluate Approxilyzer, we select five benchmarks from two different benchmark suites
spanning multiple application domains (application descriptions can be found in Section 3.3.5).
Table 3.7 lists the workloads and inputs used to evaluate Approxilyzer. The quality metrics
and quality thresholds (common-sense thresholds provided by the tool) used for each of the









Table 3.7: Workloads and inputs.
3.4.3 Error Injection Framework and Speed
The error injection simulation infrastructure is similar to that used for [33], based on Wind
River Simics [110] and GEMS [123] running the applications on OpenSolaris and compiled
to the SPARC V9 ISA.
We inject single bit flips in integer and floating point architectural registers. Hence, we
only consider instructions that employ either an integer or floating point register as an
operand. For example, we do not inject errors in instructions such as call (no operands), ret
(no operands) or branches that use special condition code registers. Such instructions will
not be considered for any of the error-efficiency techniques demonstrated in this work.
Although error injections are performed only in the pilots of the generated equivalence
classes, this can still lead to a large number of error injections, especially for longer appli-
cations. In order to reduce the simulation time, we only study 99% of the error sites in
the application, thereby trading off simulation time for a modest loss in coverage [33]. The
1% of error sites not included in the study do not detract from the observations and gains
reported.
Approxilyzer retains Relyzer’s speed benefits, with negligible additional overheads. Com-
pared to a (hypothetical) framework that would perform an error injection for each error
site, Relyzer (and hence, Approxilyzer) is able to prune error injections by 3 to 5 orders of
magnitude [33]. The remaining error injections complete on a cluster of 200 machines in a
few days. Approxilyzer adds a few hours to this process to perform quality calculations and
error outcome categorizations.
3.4.4 Approxilyzer Validation
We carry out validation experiments as described in Section 3.3.9. We discuss the val-










































Figure 3.7: Approxilyzer validation geared towards resiliency.
Validation for Resiliency: The results for validation geared towards resiliency are shown in
Fig. 3.7. All of the applications show very high pilot prediction rates with an average predic-
tion rate of 96% across applications using a very fine quality window of 2 (bar corresponding
to Res(δ = 2)).
Swaptions and Water see big gains in validation just by applying the Res optimization
(Note that Res(δ = 0) equals just applying Res without any flexible quality window). Both
of these applications have high SDC-Good rates and therefore many pilots that are picked
for validation belong to the SDC-Good outcome category. Some of these equivalence classes
(with SDC-Good pilots) contain a mix of Masked and SDC-Good error sites, leading to lower
overall validation for CF (δ = 0).
Water especially has a high rate of SDC-Good outcomes which are due to very small
errors (< 10−6%) in the program statistics part of the output file. Approxilyzer heuristics
(not surprisingly) combine these error sites with Masked outcomes into equivalence classes.
As a result, applying the Res optimization causes the validation rate of Water to jump from
71% to 98%.
In addition to having equivalence classes with mixed SDC-Good and Masked outcomes (as
described above for Water), Swaptions also has some pilots with DDC outcomes belonging to
equivalence classes that feature a mix of DDC and Masked outcomes. These pilots represent









































Figure 3.8: Approxilyzer validation geared towards approximation.
If the error causes the random number to exceed the (expected) range of 0 to 1, it causes
floating point overflows which result in NaN values. Because Approxilyzer heuristics cannot
accurately distinguish this special case, Swaptions contains some equivalence classes with a
mix of Masked and DDC outcomes which results in poor validation for CF (δ = 0). Applying
the Res optimization, causes the validation rate of Swaptions to go up from 79% to 99%.
While still high at 90% (for Res(δ = 2)), Blackscholes shows the lowest validation ac-
curacy of the applications studied. Further analysis shows that this is due to a few pilots
whose equivalence classes have a mix of SDC-Maybe and SDC-Bad outcomes. This is why
increasing the quality window size (δ) does not cause the prediction rate to increase. The
reason behind the mixed equivalence class can be attributed to the fact that Blackscholes
calculates the option price for a portfolio containing more than 64,000 options and hence,
the same instructions produce OCs of different quality based on the input being processed at
any given execution cycle. While range detectors to capture certain SDC-Bad outcomes and
specialized heuristics to better capture variations in data patterns can be applied to handle
some of these cases, their implementation is left to future work. Applying user-specified
quality thresholds can also equalize some of the SDC-Maybe and SDC-Bad outcomes and
improve the accuracy. In spite of these special cases, Blackscholes shows high prediction
rate.
Validation for Approximation: Fig. 3.8 shows the graph for Validation considering Ap-
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proximation. On average, the validation percentage for Approx(δ = 2) is 94% across all
applications. Swaptions shows lower validation predominantly due to poorly validated DDC
pilots belonging to a few floating point instructions (validation accuracy for integer pilots
with Approx(δ = 2) is 97%) operating on random numbers. While the Res optimization
equalized these outcomes, the Approx considers DDC and Masked outcomes separately and
hence the validation accuracy is not improved. Simple range detectors to check the range of
the random numbers can resolve this issue and we leave its implementation to future work.
Overall, the average validation percentage, across Approx(δ = 2) and Res(δ = 2), for the
applications studied is 95%. Thus, we conclude that Approxilyzer can capture the output
quality – at very fine granularities – with high accuracy for the purposes of both Resiliency
and Approximate Computing.
3.5 GEM5-APPROXILYZER
Approxilyzer has significantly furthered the state-of-the-art in automated error analysis, by
providing the precise impact (execution anomalies and output quality) of single-bit transient
errors on every operand register bit in virtually every dynamic instruction in a program
execution, with high accuracy and low-cost. Furthermore, Approxilyzer can analyze general-
purpose applications while placing minimal burden on the programmer.
Approxilyzer’s unique features enable new avenues of research, but limitations in its orig-
inal implementation hinder its usability. Approxilyzer relies on Wind River Simics [110], a
proprietary full-system simulator and is designed to handle only applications compiled for
the SPARC ISA. The restrictions imposed from both the simulator and ISA make a wide
adoption of the tool challenging.
To mitigate these restrictions, we develop gem5-Approxilyzer [25], a fully open-source [28]
implementation of Approxilyzer that enables support for more ISAs, beginning with x86
in this work. gem5-Approxilyzer is built using the open-source gem5 simulator [83] which
facilitates (with relative ease) the future inclusion of more ISAs into the tool. Building
gem5-Approxilyzer required significant engineering effort to support x86 error analysis on
gem5. For example, Approxilyzer’s original implementation for SPARC assumes constant
register size and instruction encoding length, which is not the case for x86.
This work is the first to show Approxilyzer’s effectiveness/accuracy with a different ISA,
namely x86. Since gem5-Approxilyzer analyses errors in applications compiled to x86 (and
Approxilyzer techniques were evaluated for SPARC), validation experiments are performed
to show the accuracy and effectiveness of Approxilyzer’s error pruning techniques (Sec-
tion 3.4.1) for x86. We show that gem5-Approxilyzer is effective in error pruning and
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reduces the number of error injections required by up to two orders of magnitude over a
näıve campaign9. We also show that gem5-Approxilyzer predicts the impact of errors on the
program’s output quality with high accuracy (> 92% on average and up to 99.9% for some
applications). Hence, gem5-Approxilyzer produces accurate and precise instruction error
profiles at relatively low-cost.
The remainder of this section details the implementation challenges of building gem5-
Approxilyzer and demonstrate the effectiveness and accuracy of gem5-Approxilyzer.
3.5.1 Error Model
gem5-Approxilyzer uses the same error-model as Approxilyzer – single-bit transient er-
rors in operand registers of dynamic instructions in the program (Section 3.3.2). However,
because gem5-Approxilyzer analyzes applications compiled to CISC x86 (vs. Approxilyzer
that analyzes RISC SPARC) there are additional considerations which are detailed below.
In this work, we undertake error injection in registers of x86 macro-instructions. Modern
CISC implementations like x86 often implement the complex machine instructions (macro-
instructions) using low-level instructions called micro-instructions or micro-operations. Micro-
instructions are generally specific and proprietary to the micro-architecture and not faith-
fully recreated in publicly available simulators. Hence, we restrict the analysis to macro-
instructions.
For this study, we only consider general-purpose registers and SSE10 registers in x86.
We do not inject errors in special-purpose, status, and control registers (e.g., %rsp, %rbp,
rflags) to simplify the error model and reduce the number of error injections required for
a first-order analysis. We assume that these always need protection and can be hardened
in hardware (e.g., with ECC). We also do not inject in implicit11 registers in this work.
Extending gem5-Approxilyzer to support these registers is relatively straightforward and we
leave it to future work.
9The gains from error-pruning are lower in this work (compared to Approxilyzer) since we use minimized
program inputs that have been shown to considerably speedup error analysis [29]. Since these smaller inputs
lead to programs with less dynamic instructions (per static instruction), the potential for error pruning is
considerably reduced. Yet, even for these smaller programs, considerable error pruning is achieved. The
gains from larger inputs are expected to be commensurate with Approxilyzer.
10The binaries we study do not explicitly use floating point stack registers (st0-st7) in the region of interest
and hence we do not study them.
11For example, the instruction imul rbx performs the following signed multiplication: rdx : rax←− rax∗rbx.
We only inject errors in rbx and not in rax and rdx.
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3.5.2 Implementation Details
The inputs required by gem5-Approxilyzer are detailed in Section 3.3.3. The user can
optionally mark the beginning and end of a code region of interest (ROI) – either by anno-
tating the source or providing static PCs marking the beginning and end of the ROI – for
analysis. In the absence of an ROI, the full application is analyzed.
gem5-Approxilyzer executes four phases to produce an application’s instruction error pro-
file (Section 3.3.6).
(1) Phase 1 extracts static and dynamic properties of instructions executed within the
ROI. An instruction parser module analyzes static instructions in the application’s disas-
sembly to identify registers used, determine if the instruction affects control flow (jumps,
conditional branches, function calls, etc.), and identify any registers that contain memory
addresses (these are marked for address-bound pruning). Information from this static pass is
used to build the def-use chains that are used by pruning techniques in Phase 2. Next, gem5
is used to produce a full dynamic execution trace of user-mode instructions and memory
accesses. From this trace, only the (dynamic) instructions that are found within the static
disassembly, along with their corresponding memory accesses, are extracted for analysis;
gem5-Approxilyzer does not analyze external library code, system code, or calls to them.
gem5-Approxilyzer further simplifies the trace to only contain the execution within the ROI
(if an ROI is provided).
(2) Phase 2 prunes error sites using the same techniques as Approxilyzer – by apply-
ing control- and store-equivalence as well as address-bound and def-use techniques. gem5-
Approxilyzer processes the execution trace from Phase 1 to build control-equivalence classes
and def-use chains. The memory accesses recorded in the trace are used to build store
equivalence classes and perform address-bound pruning. At the end of this phase, gem5-
Approxilyzer picks a pilot for each equivalence class and creates the set of error sites for
error injections.
(3) Phase 3 performs the error-injection experiments using the error injector module
built for gem5. The error injector takes as input the error-site description: dynamic instruc-
tion described using the cycle number of the simulation, register information (register name
and whether it is used as a source/destination operand) and register bit number. The error
injector pauses the simulation at the specified dynamic instruction and flips the bit in the
register. For source registers, the bit flip is performed before the instruction execution. For
destination registers, the error is simulated by performing the bit flip after the instruction
execution (otherwise the error would be overwritten by the instruction execution). The sim-
ulation then proceeds, checking for any hangs and crashes, or other symptoms to identify
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Detected outcomes. If no Detected symptoms are encountered before the simulation ends,
gem5-Approxilyzer compares the generated output with the error-free execution’s output.
If there is an OC, gem5-Approxilyzer uses the user-provided quality metric to evaluate the
output quality.
(4) Phase 4 analyzes the outcome of each error injection and assigns it the appropriate
error outcome, i.e., error outcome category and quality degradation (QD) score for OCs.
gem5-Approxilyzer then assigns the same error outcomes to pruned error sites associated
with the pilot, and finally outputs the application’s comprehensive instruction error profile
containing all the error sites studied and their corresponding error outcomes.
For an end-to-end error analysis with gem5-Approxilyzer, the error injections in Phase 3
consume the most time – several days worth of CPU time versus only few minutes/hours
consumed by all the other phases combined for the experiments reported here. Thus, using
effective pruning techniques that can reduce the total number of error injections in Phase 3
is the most direct means of reducing the tool’s analysis time.
3.5.3 x86 Implementation Challenges
While phases 3 and 4 (described in the previous section) are largely ISA independent,
phases 1 and 2 require customization to support different ISAs. Since x86 is a CISC ISA,
opcode lengths vary, and hence the instruction parser in Phase 1 must capture instruction
semantics correctly to identify source and destination operands of different instructions. De-
pending on the complexity of the macro-instructions, a varying number of micro-instructions
can be generated. Any memory accesses performed by these micro-instructions in the gem5
memory trace must be mapped to the correct macro-instruction. Since x86 allows for vari-
able register sizes, another challenge in Phase 2 is to correctly associate registers of varying
sizes with their aliased 64-bit registers. This must be done carefully to identify aliased def-
use pairs which enables pruning the right set of error sites within an aliased register. For
example, %ax and %eax both alias to %rax. While performing def-use pruning, only the
lower 16 bits of %eax definition must be pruned if the first use is %ax.
3.5.4 Extensions to gem5-Approxilyzer
gem5-Approxilyzer has been designed to be reasonably modular (e.g., each phase in Sec-
tion 3.5.2 is a separate module) to enable future extensions to support different ISAs, error
models, and pruning techniques. This section briefly elaborates on some details for future
extensions.
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The gem5 simulator currently supports many ISAs, and gem5-Approxilyzer could support
them with the following modifications. 1) The instruction parser in Phase 1 must be modified
to capture the semantics of the new ISA. 2) ISA-specific behaviors that affect control flow
(e.g., branch delay slots for SPARC) should be incorporated into the control-equivalence
algorithm accordingly. 3) Register aliasing must be captured correctly to track def-use
pairs.
The error-injector module in Phase 3 can be modified to support other error models such
as multi-bit injections or injections to other system structures like DRAM. The error-pruning
module in Phase 2 would need to be extended to support pruning algorithms appropriate
for the chosen error model.
gem5-Approxilyzer performs Phase 2 analysis on the dynamic trace generated by gem5
in Phase 1. For very long executions, this may result in excessively long traces, requiring a
tighter coupling of phases 1 and 2 to trace and analyze parts of the execution at a time.
3.5.5 Workloads and Inputs
To evaluate gem5-Approxilyzer, five benchmarks are selected from three different bench-
mark suites spanning multiple application domains (application descriptions can be found
in Section 3.3.5). Table 3.8 lists the workloads and inputs used in the evaluation. These
inputs are chosen because we have shown (in Chapter 5) that performing error analysis on
these inputs is much faster and at least as accurate as for larger reference inputs provided
by benchmark suites [29]. We use gem5 to simulate an Ubuntu-16.04 system, and use GCC
7.3 with -O3 optimization to compile the applications. The quality metrics and quality
thresholds (common-sense thresholds provided by the tool) used for each of the applications
is detailed in Section 3.3.5.
3.5.6 Error Pruning Effectiveness
gem5-Approxilyzer employs the same error pruning techniques as Approxilyzer – control-
equivalence (depth set to N=50) and store-equivalence as well as address-bound and def-use
techniques. The address-bound and def-use techniques together are referred to as non-
heuristic (NH) pruning techniques, since they do not employ any heuristics (Section 3.3.8).
The effectiveness of gem5-Approxilyzer is measured by observing how many error sites
were pruned using the various pruning techniques. For each application, we measure first
the number of error sites in the application’s region of interest (column 3 in Table 3.8)
and then the number of error sites remaining after the pruning (column 4 in Table 3.8)
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Application Input Error Sites Pruned Error
Total Remaining Sites (%)
Blackscholes 21 options 232K 100K C: 12.24
S: 9.45
C+S+NH: 56.77
Swaptions 1 option 10.3M 720K C: 52.47
1 simulation S: 7.85
C+S+NH: 93.01
LU 16x16 matrix 1.2M 268K C: 23.49
8x8 blocks S: 22.72
C+S+NH: 77.91
FFT 28 data points 4.4M 215K C: 43.99
S: 21.50
C+S+NH: 95.05
Sobel 81x121 pixels 85.3M 300K C: 62.74
S: 20.94
C+S+NH: 99.65
Table 3.8: Benchmarks, inputs, and error-site pruning by technique (C: Control-Equivalence,
S: Store-Equivalence, C+S+NH: total pruning using control, store, and non-heuristic tech-
niques)
to calculate the number of error sites that have been pruned. This metric evaluates the
tool’s effectiveness since the number of error sites pruned directly reduces the number of
error-injection experiments needed to analyze the application.
The last column of Table 3.8 shows the percentage of error sites pruned by gem5-Approxilyzer
using the control-equivalence (C), store-equivalence (S), and non-heuristic (NH) pruning
techniques. At 56.77%, Blackscholes has the smallest total (C+S+NH) pruning. Blacksc-
holes is a small application, which coupled with our choice of a small input leads to a very
small execution footprint (as can be seen by the small number of total error sites). This
translates to few dynamic instructions per static PC which leads to very small equivalence
classes. The average size of the equivalence class in Blackscholes is just 1.96. Since the
amount of pruning is directly proportional to the size of the equivalence class, it is not sur-
prising that the pruning effectiveness for Blackscholes is limited. The maximum pruning is
achieved in Sobel, at 99.65%. Apart from Blackscholes, all the other applications see a one
to two orders of magnitude reduction in the number of error injections needed to compre-











































































Res (δ = 2) Approx (δ = 2) Res (δ = 2, QT = 5) Approx (δ = 2, QT = 5)
(a)  Control (b)  Store (c)  Combined
Figure 3.9: gem5-Approxilyzer validation for (a) control equivalence, (b) store equivalence,
and (c) combined (control + store) equivalence.
3.5.7 gem5-Approxilyzer Validation
We evaluate the accuracy of gem5-Approxilyzer using validation experiments as described
in Section 3.3.9. Figures 3.9(a), 3.9(b), and 3.9(c) show the validation accuracy for the
control equivalence, store equivalence and their combination respectively. On average, both
control and store equivalence techniques show high accuracy (> 92%) for Res and Approx
with δ = 2. Note that the flexible quality parameter δ = 2 used here corresponds to 2%
error margin for Blackscholes, FFT, LU, and Sobel, while for the financial applications,
Blackscholes12 and Swaptions, it corresponds to the absolute difference in the dollar value
set to $0.01 (difference of 1 cent or less).
In summary, gem5-Approxilyzer is able to correctly predict the output quality of the x86
application error sites with very fine granularity (2% or within a single cent).
Swaptions (> 94%), LU (> 98.5%), and Sobel (> 99.9%) show very high validation accu-
racy across the board. While still relatively high, Blackscholes shows the poorest validation
accuracy for both control (Resδ=2 = 87%, Approxδ=2 = 86%) and store (Resδ=2 = 78%,
Approxδ=2 = 79%). As mentioned before, Blackscholes has small equivalence classes which
12Two different quality metrics are employed for Blackscholes (Table 3.5) and hence the flexibility param-
eter δ is applied to both metrics.
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can lead to poor prediction accuracy even if a single error site is predicted incorrectly.
We observe that the pilots that have low prediction accuracy in Blackscholes and FFT
(and a few in Swaptions) predominantly belong to two categories: (a) pilots are SDC-Maybe
and the populations also produce SDC-Maybe but with quality degradations that have a
wider range than allowed by the δ and (b) pilots of equivalence classes that have a mix of
outcomes at the border of either SDC-Bad and DDC or SDC-Maybe and SDC-Bad. More
sophisticated heuristics that combine control and data flow might capture specific patterns
in these applications more accurately and we leave their exploration to future work. Across
all applications, we observe that pilots with Masked, SDC-Good, and Detected outcomes
show almost perfect (> 99.9%) validation accuracy.
Both Blackscholes and FFT show an improvement (> 90%) when a user quality threshold
is applied. For brevity we show results for QT=5, but we performed this experiment with a
range of different QT values and observed a similarly high validation accuracy. This implies
that even for pilots that fail to predict the quality at a fine granularity, the grouping of the
equivalence classes is sufficiently accurate to be used in many realistic use cases. On average,
we observe that when a quality threshold is supplied, the validation accuracy is > 97% for
both store and control heuristics (and hence their combination).
In summary, the results show that the techniques used by gem5-Approxilyzer are very
accurate in precisely quantifying the impact of errors on output quality for x86 applications.
3.6 DATAAPPROXILYZER
In this section, we describe DataApproxilyzer, the first automated application-level error
analysis tool to perform extensive analysis of errors in program data. DataApproxilyzer
extensively analyzes many, and in some cases all, errors (for a given data error model)
and determines the output quality produced (for each error) with high accuracy (98% on
average) and at fine granularity (within a 2% error margin). The error models used by
DataApproxilyzer are multi-bit (1-, 2-, 4- and 8-bit) transient errors in (data stored in)
system memory (details of the error model can be found in Section 3.3.2). The output of
DataApproxilyzer is the given application’s data error profile that extensively lists the data
errors (for a given data error model) that can impact program execution along with the
corresponding output quality produced in the presence of each error (Section 3.3.6).
DataApproxilyzer builds on the hybrid error analysis techniques (Section 3.2) developed
by Approxilyzer (and by extension gem5-Approxilyzer) and employs a combination of pro-
gram analysis and (relatively) few error injections to generate the application’s data error
profile. DataApproxilyzer introduces a novel equivalence-based error pruning technique (Sec-
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tion 3.3.8) called Load-Order-Equivalence that prunes the number of data error sites that
need detailed analysis through error injections by up to 99.9% (98% on average) for the
workloads studied. The main insight offered by the Load-Order-Equivalence technique is
that errors in data bits that are read (and therefore consumed and propagated) by the same
sequence of load instructions in the program, produce outputs of similar quality. We under-
take validation experiments (as described in Section 3.3.9) to show the high accuracy (98%
on average) of the Load-Order equivalence technique (Section 3.6.5). DataApproxilyzer is
the first to show that equivalence-based error pruning techniques can be applied to multi-bit
data errors.
In this section, we elaborate on the the Load-Order-Equivalence technique used by DataAp-
proxilyzer and show that DataApproxilyzer can predict error outcomes for data errors in the
program with high accuracy and at low cost.
3.6.1 Error Pruning Technique
Like the other AEA tools (Approxilyzer and gem5-Approxilyzer) described in this work,
DataApproxilyzer also uses error pruning techniques to identify just a small subset of pilot
error sites which require error injections (Section 3.3.8). DataApproxilyzer uses a new equiv-
alence based pruning technique called Load-Order equivalence, which uses a data-flow based
heuristic (simply referred to as the Load-Order heuristic) to equalize ”similar” data errors
into equivalence classes. This heuristic captures how errors in program data are propagated
and consumed by subsequent computation(s) in the execution. Specifically, the Load-Order
heuristic captures the sequence of dynamic instructions in the program that read (and thus
propagate) the corrupted data.
The Load-order heuristic improves upon the store-equivalence heuristic (used by Approx-
ilyzer and gem5-Approxilyzer) that equalizes single-bit errors in operand registers of store
instructions (Section 3.3.8). Single-bit errors in operand registers of store instructions consti-
tute a small subset of memory (data) errors, when the store instruction writes the corrupted
values in the register to system memory; The Load-Order technique used by DataApproxi-
lyzer improves upon store-equivalence to make analysis of these more efficient. Additionally,
DataApproxilyzer analyzes many more data errors in memory (both single- and multi-bit)
that lie outside this subset of errors. Note that while some registers directly access data
(such as destination operands of load instructions), errors in such registers is fundamentally
different than errors affecting (the same data in) memory since the errors in memory will
persist across multiple instructions that access this data. And hence, the analysis of such
memory errors need a modified approach.
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The remainder of this section details the methodology of the Load-Order equivalence
technique.
Pre-processing for Error Equalization:
The first step DataApproxilyzer performs is to identify and label all the error sites in the
application. To do this, DataApproxilyzer extracts the application’s (error-free) dynamic
memory trace and labels each memory access made by a dynamic instruction (referred to
as a Dynamic-Memory-Access) with a unique identifier (called a Dynamic-Memory-Access
ID). Each Dynamic-Memory-Access ID consists of (1) the instruction’s static PC (Program
Counter), (2) the instruction’s dynamic instance, usually identified by some abstract se-
quence number in program order (such as the cycle number at fetch) and (3) a tuple, called
the micro-access-ID, consisting of the type of memory access (read or write) and a number
to differentiate between multiple Dynamic-Memory-Accesses of the same type within a given
dynamic instance (common in CISC instructions). An example toy memory trace is shown
in Figure 3.10 to illustrate this process of assigning Dynamic-Memory-Access IDs.
PC
Dynamic 
instance Memory access(es) made by the dynamic instruction
A n1 Read i bytes from address X
Dynamic-Memory-Access ID = A_n1_Read-1 
Write j bytes to address Y
Dynamic-Memory-Access ID = A_n1_Write-1 
B m1 Read i bytes from address U
Dynamic-Memory-Access ID = B_m1_Read-1 
A n2 Read i bytes from address V
Dynamic-Memory-Access ID = A_n2_Read-1 
Write j bytes to address W
Dynamic-Memory-Access ID = A_n2_Write-1 
B m2 Read i bytes from address W
Dynamic-Memory-Access ID = B_m2_Read-1 
A n3 Read i bytes from address X
Dynamic-Memory-Access ID = A_n3_Read-1 
Write j bytes to address Y









Figure 3.10: Toy trace showing the terminology of Dynamic Memory Accesses and when they may
be equalizable.
Each data bit accessed by a given Dynamic-Memory-Access is an individual error site.
Hence, if Dynamic-Memory-Access D accesses data of size n (where n>=1) bytes starting
at memory address X, then each of the n∗8 data bits starting at X is a potential error site.
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Each error site (individual data bit) is described/labeled by the Dynamic-Memory-Access
ID, the memory address of the access and a byte offset and bit number.
Load-Order Equalization Technique:
In this section we describe the Load-Order equalization heuristic used in DataApproxi-
lyzer. We evaluated a few different equalization heuristics for DataApproxilyzer (described
in the next section) before picking the heuristic with the best performance and accuracy
(reported here).
Error equalization is attempted only within Dynamic-Memory-Accesses that have the same
PC and micro-access-ID. The goal of equalization is to identify error sites that are consumed
(used) and propagated similarly through the program; data bits accessed from different
PCs or micro-access-IDs are considered as being dissimilar for this purpose. Thus, error
sites belonging to Dynamic-Memory-Accesses from different PCs or from the same PC but
having different micro-access-IDs will never be in the same equivalence class. The Dynamic-
Memory-Accesses in Figure 3.10 are colour coded to show Dynamic-Memory-Accesses that
can potentially be equalized (those with the same colours) with each other.
Given Dynamic-Memory-Accesses with the same PC and micro-access-ID (called equal-
izable Dynamic-Memory-Accesses), we use an equivalence heuristic to identify Dynamic-
Memory-Accesses that have similar error propagation in the program execution and hence
can be equalized.
The equivalence heuristic used is called the Load-Order heuristic. For a given Dynamic-
Memory-Access D, the Load-Order heuristic records the PCs of all the loads (Dynamic-
Memory-Accesses of type Read) executed after D that read from the same memory location
(same memory address) as D, in a list called the Load-Order-Chain. The Load-Order-Chain
concatenates consecutive reads from the same PCs into a single entry so as to observe
longer load patterns. The Load-Order-Chain stops being updated when its size reaches a
pre-determined limit l or when a write to the same address as D is encountered. Such
Load-Order-Chains are built for each Dynamic-Memory-Access in the program. Equalizable
Dynamic-Memory-Accesses that have the same Load-Order-Chains are grouped together
in the same meta-equivalence class. Figure 3.11 illustrates the Load-Order equalization
heuristic for two equalizable Dynamic-Memory-Accesses.
The size l of the Load-Order-Chain is set to 50 in this work to restrict the number of
equivalence classes (and hence the number of pilots for error injection) generated. We start
with l=50 since prior work[30] has shown that a control depth of 50 can adequately capture
different program paths for error propagation. The high pruning percentage and accuracy of
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this technique validates this choice and we stop there. Exploring smaller Load-Order chains
for more efficient analysis is left for future work.
Individual data bits within an data byte or word(s) accessed by a Dynamic-Memory-Access
can display different error-characteristics. For example, an error in the most significant bit
(MSB) of a data word can lead to a different error outcome compared to an error in the least
significant bit (LSB). Hence, it is crucial that error analysis distinguishes between individual
data bits within Dynamic-Memory-Accesses and only group together data bits that occupy
the same relative positions within an equivalence class (for example, all MSBs across different
Dynamic-Memory-Accesses in the same meta-equivalence class will be grouped together and
all LSBs will be grouped together). Thus, given an meta-equivalence class of Dynamic-
Memory-Accesses E, all data bits in the same position (byte offset and bit number) across
all the Dynamic-Memory-Accesses in E will be grouped together into equivalence classes.
To illustrate with an example, say that a single representative Dynamic-Memory-Access D
is chosen from E. Since D accesses data of size n (where n >= 1) bytes, it contains n ∗ 8
data bits. Each of these data bits is an individual error site (for the 1-bit error model) and
are each chosen individually as pilots for error injection. The error outcome O from an error
injection at the data bit located at byte m (m <= n), bit b of D’s access is assigned to the
corresponding data bits at byte m and bit b for all the Dynamic-Memory-Accesses in E. For
the multi-bit error models the appropriate number of bits are chosen and equalized to the
same bit positions across the members of E.
Other Heuristics Considered
The “goodness” of an equivalence heuristic is measured by (1) how effective it is at pruning
the number of error sites that need analysis by error injections (referred to simply as heuristic
effectiveness) and (2) how accurate it is at grouping “similar” errors into equivalence classes,
i.e, it did not group “dissimilar” errors together (referred to as heuristic accuracy).
A “good” equivalence heuristic will equalize more error sites into fewer equivalence classes
leading to fewer pilots and larger pruning. But this alone is not sufficient since accuracy is a
necessary requirement for an equivalence heuristic. Accuracy of equivalence heuristic deter-
mines if the pilot chosen for analyses truly represents the other members of the equivalence
class and hence determines the accuracy of the final memory error profile generated. Thus,
the best heuristic is one that shows high pruning effectiveness and high accuracy.
We also considered and evaluated other equivalence heuristics for DataApproxilyzer based
on data and control flow, before picking the Load-Order heuristic. For example, we con-
sidered two variation of the Load-Order heuristic: (1) which tracks not only the PC order
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Load-Order-Chain = <PC-B, PC-C> 
PC-A_m_MemAccess-1 X
PC-C  Read  X  
PC-D  Write  X  
PC-B  Read  X  
PC-B  Read  X  
Load-Order-Chain = <PC-E, PC-F> 
PC-A_n_MemAccess-1 Y
PC-E  Read  Y  
PC-F  Read  Y 
PC-G  Write  Y
PC-A_m_MemAccess-1 PC-A_n_MemAccess-1
Equivalent
iff,  PC-B = PC-E and PC-C = PC-F 
Figure 3.11: Equalization of two Dynamic-Memory-Accesses using Load-Order heuristic.
Both Dynamic-Memory-Accesses have the same micro-access-ID and PC and hence are
equalizable. The micro-access-ID is shown simply as MemAccess-1 to illustrate that the
methodology is the same irrespective of whether the memory access is a read or a write.
but also the number of times each load PC reads a corrupted value and (2) full load chains
(this is similar to the store equivalence used by Approxilyzer [31]) with different limits on
the size of the load chains. We also considered simply using the control-equivalence heuris-
tic from Approxilyzer. We found the Load-Order heuristic to provide the largest pruning
percentage; the number of pilots to be analyzed were reduced by up to 80% compared to the
next best heuristic, which was a variation of the Load-Order heuristic but with no cap on
size of the load chain. This is because, in hot code with large loops, dynamic instructions
(belonging to the same static instructions) in different iterations may never be equalized if
we strictly track every subsequent load or branch within the loop (they will monotonically
lead to decreased chain lengths with each iteration); leading to more equivalence classes and
hence smaller pruning. We will show in Section 3.6.5 that the Load-Order heuristic is also








FFT 28 data points
Sobel 321x481 pixels
Table 3.9: Workloads and inputs.
3.6.2 Workloads, Input and Quality Thresholds
To evaluate DataApproxilyzer, five benchmarks from three different benchmark suites
spanning multiple application domains (application descriptions can be found in Section 3.3.5)
are used. Table 3.9 lists the workloads and inputs used to evaluate DataApproxilyzer. To
facilitate extensive analysis of data errors for large applications like Swaptions, FFT and LU,
we chose minimized inputs (Chapter 5) that can enable fast and comprehensive error anal-
ysis. For relatively smaller benchmarks like Blackscholes and Sobel we use reference inputs
provided in the Parsec [122] benchmark suite and Intel’s Approximate Computing Toolkit
(iACT) [124] respectively. The quality metrics and common-sense domain-specific quality
thresholds provided by the tool (to identify SDC-Good, SDC-Bad and DDC outcomes) used
for each of the applications is detailed in Section 3.3.5.
Beyond this, a user can optionally specify quality thresholds that make SDC-Maybe out-
puts with quality degradation within this threshold acceptable. For validating DataApprox-
ilyzer (Section 3.3.9), we use the following 3 different quality thresholds (QT) values (with
varying degrees of error-tolerance):
1. Threshold 1: 2% quality degradation is acceptable for Blackscholes, LU, FFT and
Sobel. Absolute loss in dollar value of less that one-tenth of a cent (<$0.001) is
acceptable for Swaptions.
2. Threshold 2: 5% quality degradation is acceptable for Blackscholes, LU, FFT and
Sobel. Absolute loss in dollar value of less that one cent (<$0.01) is acceptable for
Swaptions.
3. Threshold 3: 10% quality degradation is acceptable for Blackscholes, LU, FFT and




We use the gem5 [83] simulator for extracting memory execution trace and for simulating
error injections. We use the full system (Ubuntu-16.04) functional simulator in gem5 with
atomic CPU and atomic memory accesses (fast-mem option). We use GCC 7.3 with -O3 to
compile the studied applications.
For carrying out the error injection simulations, we developed an error injector module in
gem5 that is capable of stopping at specific target cycle numbers (corresponding to specific
dynamic instruction instances) and injecting n-bit errors at the targeted address bits.
3.6.4 Error Pruning Effectiveness
To evaluate the error pruning effectiveness of the Load-Order equivalence heuristic, we first
calculate the total number of error sites in the application. Next we calculate the error sites
corresponding to the pilots chosen after equalization using the Load-Order heuristic. The
relative difference in the number of error sites between the pilots and rest of the application
is the application’s pruning percentage.
Application Number of Total Error Remaining Error
Data Bytes Sites in Sites after Pruning
Analyzed Application (% Pruned)
Blackscholes 1835.3K 251,313,760 205,248 (99.9%)
Swaptions 30.75K 2,820,064 44,864 (98.4%)
LU 2.8K 410,432 35,616 (91.3%)
FFT 13.3K 1,373,592 25,368 (98.15%)
Sobel 309K 371,105,472 7,960 (>99.9%)
Table 3.10: Error site pruning statistics for DataApproxilyzer.
Table 3.10 lists the number of error sites before and after pruning as well as the percentage
of error sites pruned (in the last column) using the Load-Order equalization heuristic. On
average 98% of error sites are pruned across all the workloads with Sobel showing the highest
pruning at>99.9%. Most of the applications see orders of magnitude reduction in the number
of error sites to be analyzed, with the largest being a 5 orders of magnitude reduction
for Sobel. Even LU, which has the lowest pruning percentage at 91.3% sees an order of
magnitude reduction in error sites that need to be analyzed with error injections. LU is a
small application (with minimized inputs) with only 6K dynamic memory instructions and
an average of 12 dynamic instances per static memory instruction. Thus the size of the
equivalence classes formed are small which equates to less pruning. The amount of error
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site pruning is directly proportional to the size of the equivalence classes; larger equivalence
classes equates to a single pilot representing a bigger number of error sites. Thus, larger
applications have more potential for error pruning.
Hence, we conclude that the Load-Order equivalence technique is very effective at error
pruning.
3.6.5 DataApproxilyzer Validation
We undertake validation experiments as described in Section 3.3.9 to evaluate the ac-
curacy of the Load-Order equivalence technique and hence, DataApproxilyzer. Fig 3.12
shows the validation accuracy of DataApproxilyzer (on the Y axis), targeted to approximate
computing (Approx) and resiliency (Res), for the workloads studied, across the four error
models and three quality thresholds (Threshold 1 in Fig 3.12(a), Threshold 2 in Fig 3.12(b)
and Threshold 3 in Fig 3.12(c)). We can see from the figure that the validation accuracy is
very high across the board with average validation accuracy (across workloads and quality
thresholds) for Approx of 1-bit and 2-bit error models at 99% and the validation accuracy of
4-bit and 8-bit error models at 97%; For Res, the validation accuracy of 1-bit, 2-bit and 4-bit
error models is 99% and the validation accuracy for 8-bit error models is at 98%. LU and
Sobel show almost perfect validation for all error models and across all quality thresholds.
FFT shows the worse validation, especially for 4-bit and 8-bit error models, with the worst
case validation accuracy of 86% for 8-bit errors with Threshold 3 for Approx. Upon closer
examination, we find that the bad validation of FFT at 4-bit and 8-bit error models comes
from a few equivalence classes that contain SDC-Maybe outcomes with a wider range of
output quality degradation than that allowed by the validation methodology. Adjusting the
flexibility quality window δ to 5% increases FFT’s validation accuracy across the board to
96% (and up to 99%). Further increasing δ to 10% increases FFT’s validation accuracy to
>98% across all the error-models and quality thresholds.
Thus, these results show that error equalization performed by DataApproxilyzer using
the Load-Order equalization technique is accurate – for both Approx and Res – for all the
studied workloads across a range of realistic quality thresholds. Not only is the equalization
accurate for 1-bit data errors, it also holds for 2-bit, 4-bit and 8-bit errors. Furthermore,
we have shown that it can accurately predict the impact of 1-bit, 2-bit, 4-bit and 8-bit data
errors on the quality of the program output up to a very fine granularity (within an error
margin δ of 2%).
In summary, we show that DataApproxilyzer is not only effective at reducing the number
of error injections required to analyze program data but is also highly accurate in precisely
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Figure 3.12: Validation accuracy for DataApproxilyzer
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predicting the program’s output quality in the presence of 1-bit, 2-bit, 4-bit and 8-bit data
errors.
3.6.6 Building the Application’s Data Error Profile
The application data error profile is a list of all the data error sites analyzed in the program
along with the output quality expected when they encounter an error. This is straightfor-
ward for error models where the number of pilots generated are feasible to comprehensively
analyze by error injection experiments. However, for complex error models, comprehensive
error injections is all pilots can be prohibitively expensive. To illustrate with an example,
suppose that DataApproxilyzer equalizes data errors in a program P, prunes 99% of data
and identifies just 64 bits of data (as pilot) for detailed analysis by error injection. We
can now comprehensively analyze P for all 1-bit and 2-bit errors by performing just 64 and
2016 error injections respectively. However, to analyze P for all 8-bit errors would require
approximately 4 billion error injections. Nevertheless, even in cases of n-bit errors where com-
binatorial explosion makes 100% comprehensive analysis infeasible, statistical methodologies
can be employed to generate an extensive data error profile that can provide a first-order
estimate of the program data’s error characteristic.
In this section we describe how we build the data error profile for the different error
models.
1-bit: We build a comprehensive data error profile by (1) doing error injections in all
pilot data bits and (2) assigning their error outcomes to the corresponding data bits in their
equivalence classes. Hence, the final Data Error Profile comprehensively lists all the error
sites (for this error model) in the application along with their error outcomes.
2-bit, 4-bit, 8-bit: Ideally for an n-bit error model, a comprehensive data error profile
will list the error outcome for all n-bit error sites in the program. But this can quickly become
prohibitive as n increases. Hence, we use a statistical methodology to build a data error
profile that provides a first order estimate of the error characteristics of the program data
that can be used for targeted error-efficiency technique. In Chapter 4, we will demonstrate
how an application’s data profile can enable a customized approximate computing technique.
And hence, here we show an example of how an extensive data error profile can be built
for a use-case of approximate computing. Note that this methodology can be tuned based
on analysis budget and use-case. While we leave the exploration of other methodologies to
future work, we note that the methodology described here is sufficient for the error-efficiency
use case described in Section 4.4.
For a given n-bit error model (n > 1), 16 different n-bit error injections are performed in
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each pilot’s data (note that there are multiple pilots in the program). We chose 16 different
combinations of multi-bit errors since we observed that most of our pilots spanned 16 or
32 data bits and using 16 different combinations increased the probability that each of the
different bits were included in at least one n-bit error-site composition. We observe the out-
comes from 16 error injections per pilot and calculate the percentage of approximable error
outcomes (Section 3.3.7). We then assign this percentage (as an approximation probability)
to each of the data bits in the pilot and therefore to each of the data bits in its corresponding
equivalence class. Thus the data error profile contains each single data bit in the application
along with the probability that an n-bit injection spanning the given data bit will result in
an approximate outcome.
3.7 CONCLUSION
This work introduces a suite of automated application-level error analysis tools – Approx-
ilyzer, gem5-Approxilyzer and DataApproxilyzer – that can determine the output that the
program will produce for each of the billions of error that the program might encounter in its
computation and data. To the best of our knowledge, the error analysis tools and techniques
developed as part of this work are the first-of-their-kind that satisfy all six requirements of
automation, accuracy, precision, comprehensiveness, (relatively) low-cost and generality.
The automated error analysis tools accurately (>95% on average, up to 99.9%) quantify
the impact of virtually all errors (for a given error model) in a program’s computation and
data on its final output quality at very fine granularities (within a 2% error margin). Using a
hybrid approach (built upon prior work [33]) of program analysis and relatively few (up to five
orders of magnitude less) error injections, these tools can comprehensively analyze billions of
possible errors that can impact a program’s execution at low cost. They impose the absolute
minimal programmer burden by only requiring the user to provide an unmodified program
(along with relevant program inputs), a (domain-specific) quality metric and optionally a
quality threshold. These tools are general and can be used to analyze any general-purpose
application and have been evaluated for five different error models. The output of automated
error analyses are comprehensive application error profiles that list the errors that can affect
the program’s execution (instructions and data) along with the corresponding output quality
expected for each of the errors. The application error profiles can be used by programmers
or systems to derive a comprehensive view of the application’s error characteristics without
the need for programmer expertise.
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Chapter 4: AUTOMATED ERROR ANALYSIS TO CUSTOMIZED
ERROR-EFFICIENCY
The paradigm of error-efficient computing exploits new opportunities for compute effi-
ciency by allowing the system to make controlled errors. One of the fundamental require-
ments for achieving safe and effective error-efficiency is to understand how errors encoun-
tered during a program’s execution impact the quality of the program output. In the ab-
sence of systematic methodologies to guarantee output quality in the presence of errors,
error-efficient techniques today rely on program or domain experts to understand the error
tolerance characteristics of their program and articulate it via custom annotations, data-
types, error-bounds on function parameters etc. [3, 4, 5, 17, 18, 19]. This is very limiting
since such expertise is sparse and can take years to develop for specific domains [20, 21, 22].
To alleviate this dependence on programmer expertise, this work developed automated error
analysis tools (Chapter 3) that can automatically determine the impact of billions of errors
in the program’s computation and data on its output quality.
The application error profiles generated by the automated error analysis tools allow us
to derive a comprehensive view of the error characteristics of the application without the
need for programmer expertise. To demonstrate the versatility of this approach, this work
demonstrates how these automatically generated error profiles can be used to devise different
error-efficiency solutions – from low-cost resiliency to approximate computing – that are
tailored to the application and user requirements.
In the rest of this chapter, we first show how the application instruction and data error
profiles can enable an understanding of the application’s error characteristic, which can
inform their potential for error-efficiency. For example, the application’s error profile is used
to perform a first-order analysis to identify promising subsets of instructions and/or data that
can be potentially targeted by approximate computing techniques. The error profiles can
also be used to gain insights that can motivate further research. For example, we show that
error profiles for the same application, compiled to different ISAs (SPARC vs. x86), can vary
widely [25]; motivating the need for customized error-efficiency for different architectures,
and validating the choice of error analysis at the machine-code level (as opposed to at the
intermediate representation or source-code level).
Next, we demonstrate how the first-order understanding built from the application’s error
profile can be used to build error-efficiency solutions that are customized to the application
and user targets. For example, we demonstrate how an application’s instruction error profile
is used for error-efficiency solutions targeted towards ultra-low cost resiliency to transient
hardware errors [31]. We show that large resiliency overhead reductions (up to 55%) are
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possible if the user is willing to tolerate a very small loss in output accuracy (1%) while still
providing high (99%) resiliency coverage [31]. In another example, we demonstrate how the
data error profile can be used to enable an approximate computing technique. Specifically,
the data error profile is used to (1) automatically identify non-critical or approximable data
(for a given user-specified quality threshold) and (2) map them to be stored in approximate
DRAM with low refresh rates (which saves power – 23% on average for our workloads – but
incurs modest errors), without programmer intervention [26]; prior techniques required the
programmer to identify non-critical data with annotations. We show that this automatic
mapping to approximate memory meets the quality target set by the user 98% of the time,
on average, over (tens of) thousands of executions.
In summary, this chapter demonstrates the versatility of the automated error analysis
methodology in enabling a diverse range of customized hardware and software error-efficiency
solutions targeting both instructions and data.
4.1 METHODOLOGY TO IDENTIFY ERROR-EFFICIENCY OPPORTUNITIES
Error-efficient computing environments often trade accuracy in the program output for
gains in other system parameters such as energy, performance or resiliency overheads. The
application error profiles, which quantify the output quality of each error site in the program,
can be used to tune the loss in output accuracy with respect to other system benefits. Two
error-efficient techniques are discussed in this work – (1) approximate computing which
deliberately introduces errors in computation for improved performance or energy, and (2)
ultra-low cost hardware resiliency which allows some unintentional hardware errors to escape
as user-tolerable output corruptions (rather than incurring high overheads to prevent all
errors).
In Section 3.3.7 (Table 3.6), we detail how, based on the error outcomes reported in the
error profiles, the AEA tools can identify which error sites in the application need protec-
tion from transient errors (low cost resiliency), or alternatively, which error sites could be
approximable (approximate computing). The reasoning about the error-efficiency potential
of individual error sites can be extended to larger granularities, such as instructions (both
dynamic and static) and data bytes, based on the error outcome of their constituent error
sites. The methodology is described below.
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4.1.1 Low-Cost Resiliency
The application error profiles can be used to tune the loss in output accuracy with respect
to reduction in the overhead costs related to resiliency. Section 3.3.7 (Table 3.6) describes
how each error site’s output quality is used to decide whether that error site needs protection
from transient errors. Error-sites with Masked, SDC-Good, DDC and Detected outcomes
do not need resiliency protection. SDC-Bad error sites need to be protected. SDC-Maybes
error sites may or may not need protection based on whether they meet the user’s quality
threshold.
This reasoning about which error sites need protection from transient errors can be ex-
tended to larger granularities such as instructions (both dynamic and static) based on the
quality of their constituent error sites. For example, the instruction error profile contains
error sites that describe individual register bits in operand registers of dynamic instructions.
The description for each error site in the instruction error profile (Section 3.3.6) identifies
the register, the dynamic instance and the static instruction that contains the given error
site. Thus, this information can be used to identify dynamic and static instructions in the
application that need resiliency protection. For a given dynamic instruction, if any of its
constituent error sites (spanning all bits of all operand registers accessed by the dynamic
instruction) needs resiliency protection, then the dynamic instruction is marked as needing
resiliency protection. Similarly, if any of the dynamic instructions belonging to a single
static instruction (identified by program counter or PC), is marked as needing resiliency
protection, then that static instruction is deemed as needing resiliency protection.
4.1.2 Approximate Computing
The application error profiles can be used to identify which error sites in the program are
potential first order candidates for approximations. Section 3.3.7 (Table 3.6) describes how
each error site’s output quality is used to decide whether that error site is a candidate for
approximation (referred to as approximable) or not. Error sites with Detected, DDC and
SDC-Bad outcomes are considered to be not approximable. Error sited with Masked and
SDC-Good outcomes are considered approximable. SDC-Maybe error sites can be approx-
imable (or not) depending on whether their output quality meets (or does not meet) the
output quality threshold set by the user.
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Approximation Potential of Instructions
The knowledge of individual error sites can be extended to decide the approximation po-
tential of instructions (static and dynamic) based on the quality of their constituent error
sites. Using the instruction error profile, if any error site in a dynamic instruction (span-
ning all bits of all operand registers accessed by the dynamic instruction) is deemed not
approximable, then the dynamic instruction is marked as non approximable. Otherwise, the
dynamic instruction is marked as a potential candidate for approximation. The knowledge of
the approximation potential of dynamic instructions can be similarly composed to decide if
a static instruction is approximable (all constituent dynamic instructions are approximable)
or not (at least one constituent dynamic instruction is deemed not approximable). Note that
individual error sites can be composed to different granularities (using the same methodol-
ogy described here) depending on the approximation techniques. For example, individual
operand registers within dynamic instructions may be considered for approximation depend-
ing on the approximation potential of their constituent error sites (all bits within the given
operand register).
Approximation Potential of Data
The approximable potential of error sites within the application data error profile (Sec-
tion 3.3.6) can similarly be used to identify approximable data at different granularity within
the program. For example, we can understand the approximation potential of a single byte
of program data by looking at the error outcome for all of its constituent bits accessed at
different dynamic instructions in the entire program. To illustrate with an example, consider
data byte D stored at memory starting at address A. Whether data byte D is approximable
is decided by looking at error sites corresponding to all data bits located at memory loca-
tions A to A+7, across all dynamic instructions that access these data bits. If all of the
constituent error sites are approximable then data byte D is considered approximable.
For n-bit error models (n > 1), for each data error site, the data error profile generated
by DataApproxilyzer lists the probability (as a percentage) that an error at the given error
site will result in an approximable outcome (Section 3.6.6). Thus, when using the data
error profile across these error-models, approximable data bytes are identified for different
approximation targets (for example, data bytes that produce approximable error outcomes
100% of the time they encounter an error vs. those that are approximate only 50% of the
time they encounter an error).
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4.1.3 Discussion
Since this work uses transient single bit errors as the intruction error model, instructions
marked as approximable may be false positives, since they may produce unacceptable quality
output with approximation techniques that use different error models. False negatives,
however, are expected to be rare since in most cases if a single bit upset in an instruction
causes an unacceptable outcome, then it is highly likely that multi-bit upsets will also result
in unacceptable outcomes. Similarly, for data since the error analysis only considers the
impact of one (n-bit) transient error in isolation, data bytes marked as approximable may
be false positives; false negatives are similarly expected to be rare.
While this approach is aggressive, we believe it is still useful since it narrows the huge
exploration space for approximation to a manageable smaller set of instructions and data
on which it is feasible to do further rigorous and targeted analysis. Another benefit of this
approach is that the identification of approximable instructions and data is automatic and
needs only minimal programmer input – end-to-end quality metrics and quality thresholds
– and no program modifications. This makes it feasible even for novice programmers to
analyze any program for hidden approximation opportunities.
The AEA tools significantly reduce analysis time by performing error injections only in
the pilots of the generated equivalence classes (Section 3.3.8). This can still lead to a
large number of error injections, especially for longer applications. In order to reduce the
simulation time, we only study 99% of the error sites in the application (for Approxilyzer [24]
analysis), thereby trading off simulation time for a modest loss in coverage [33]. The 1% of
error sites not included in the study do not detract from the observations and gains reported
in this work. While identifying approximable instructions, these remaining error sites might
introduce some false positives (in the event that they produce unacceptable errors). This is,
however, consistent with the overall goal to tolerate some false positives, while minimizing
false negatives, in the quest to uncover approximation opportunities in the application. For
resiliency overhead tuning, these unexplored error sites might represent missed opportunity
(in the event that they produce SDCs) for further overhead reduction than that reported in
this work.
4.2 EXPLORING FIRST-ORDER ERROR-EFFICIENCY OPPORTUNITIES
In this section, we will detail how a given application’s instruction and data error profile
can be used to derive a first-order understanding of its potential for error-efficiency.
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4.2.1 Output Corruption Distribution
In this study, we examine the instruction error profiles generated by Approxilyzer (Sec-
tion 3.4) to gain insights into application error characteristics. Fig. 4.1 shows the distribution
of error outcomes for error sites in the studied applications1 (Section 3.4.2). Each applica-
tion exhibits a unique distribution of error outcomes. At 68.8%, LU contains the highest
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of error outcomes for the applications studied.
Fig. 4.2 shows the different categories of output corruptions, separately for integer and
floating point register error sites. Swaptions and Water show very high percentage of SDC-
Good at 76% and 58% respectively while Blackscholes produces 68% DDC (for both Integer
and Float combined). Swaptions and FFT show an interesting dichotomy in the behavior
of errors in the integer vs. floating point registers, implying perhaps, a need for separate
techniques for resiliency and approximation across the two different register classes. LU’s
OC error sites are almost exclusively (>98%) composed of SDC-Bad outcomes. This may
1The OC (originally SDC) rates reported in this work are different from the rates reported in previous
work [13, 33] as our error model is different. We study errors in both integer and floating point architectural
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of output corruptions (OC) in integer (INT) and floating point
(FLOAT) registers.
either imply that LU is inherently not tolerant to errors or that the quality metric used to
classify errors in the output of LU may not be the correct choice.
These results illustrate how the instruction error profile can be employed to automatically
analyze an application to gain insights into its behavior in the presence of errors in its
instructions.
4.2.2 Exploring Approximation Opportunities in Program Instructions
In this section, we use the instruction error profile (generated by Approxilyzer) to analyze
the approximation potential of static instructions for five workloads (Section 3.4.2). We use
the same technique used to identify which static instructions are potentially approximate
(Section 4.1.2), to also identify approximation along different static instruction granularities.
For example, if all the error sites related to a particular register in a static instruction were
deemed approximable, then we say that the register is approximable. In this case study we
do this analysis for the following static instruction granularities:
(1) Full Instruction (FI): The entire static instruction (i.e., all register bits) is approx-
imable.
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(2) Partial Instruction, Full Register (PI FR): At least one full register in the
static instruction is approximable. (3) Partial Instruction, Partial Register, x bits
(PI xb): At least one x bit long register chunk in the static instruction is approximable.
For the purposes of this study we do not assume a quality threshold. Instead, we estimate
the best and worst case approximation bounds. For the best case, we assume that all the
SDC-Maybes have acceptable quality and hence are approximable. For the worst case we
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Figure 4.3: Graphs (a) and (b) show the first order worst and best case bounds respectively
for the percentage of static instructions (studied) that are approximable for each applica-
tion at different granularities of approximation. Graphs (c) and (d) show the percentage
of dynamic instructions (in the full application) generated by these static approximable
instructions in the worst and best case respectively.
Figure 4.3(a) and 4.3(b) show, for each application the worst and best case bound, re-
spectively, on the number of static instructions, marked as candidates for approximation (as
described in Section 4.1.2). In order to understand the potential impact of approximating
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these static instructions, Figure 4.3(c) and 4.3(d) show the proportion of dynamic instances
produced by these static instructions in the full application. Note that while the static
instruction percentage shown is for the fraction of static instructions studied, for a better
insight, the dynamic instruction percentage reported is the fraction over the entire appli-
cation, which includes dynamic instances of instructions that Approxilyzer does not study
(Section 3.4.3).
The graphs show that, on average, between 34% (worst case) to 40% (best case) of the
static instructions studied have 32 bits of continuous register chunks that can be candidates
for approximation (assuming a technique can exploit approximations at that granularity).
These static instructions account for 27% (worst case) and 36% (best case) of dynamic
instructions respectively. Of the applications studied, Swaptions shows the most potential
for approximation. This is commensurate with its high SDC-Good and overall low OC error
sites, as shown in Section 4.2.1.
Another insight gained from this experiment is that even applications that do not have full
instructions that are approximable, may contain pockets of smaller register chunks (partial
instructions) that are tolerable to errors. Hence, techniques that can exploit approximation
at these finer granularities can conceivably achieve big gains and unlock the hidden potential
in many new applications traditionally not considered as candidates for approximate com-
puting. For example, in the best case, while only 4% of the static instructions (producing
3% dynamic instructions) in Blackscholes are marked as candidates for (full instruction)
approximation by Approxilyzer, this number goes up to 29% (31% dynamic instructions)
when considering individual 32b register chunks. While in this work we only consider static
instructions for approximation, such analysis can also be carried out along the dimension
of individual dynamic instructions to further understand the application’s approximation
potential2.
In summary, the instruction error profile can be used to understand the best and worst case
bounds on the approximation potential of an application even without a clear quality thresh-
old. Such analysis can unlock much hidden approximation potential that can then be targeted
by specialized techniques.
4.2.3 Exploring Approximation Opportunities in Program Data
In this case study, we use the data error profile generated by DataApproxilyzer (Sec-
tion 3.6) to perform a first order analysis that estimates the approximation potential of
2This can be useful to determine if the application will benefit from approximation techniques at the
dynamic instruction granularity (e.g., task skipping [125] and loop perforation [39]).
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different data bytes in each workload studied (Section 3.6.2), across different approximation
targets and different data error models (Section 3.3.2). To calculate the approximation po-
tential of a single data byte for the 1-bit error model, we look at all the error sites listed
in the data error profile corresponding to all bits (across all dynamic accesses) of the given
data byte and calculate the percentage of error outcomes that are approximable. For the
multi-bit error models, we similarly identify constituent error sites in the data error profile
and average the corresponding approximation probability listed (Section 3.6.6). This gives
an estimate of the approximation potential of the data byte under consideration. We do this
for all application data bytes, thereby building a list of data bytes that are approximable
for given approximation targets. The building of this list of approximable data bytes takes

































































































Figure 4.4: Percentage of approximable data bytes across different error models and approx-
imation targets.
Fig. 4.4 shows the percentage of application data bytes (on the Y axis) that are approx-
imable at different approximation targets (shown on the X axis). The line at 90% on the
X axis, for example, represents data bytes that are approximable 90% of the times they
encounter an n-bit error. We only show four workloads here for brevity. We see that 46%
of the data bytes in Blackscholes are 100% approximable when perturbed by single-bit er-
rors. However, they quickly become non-approximable (yielding egregious outcomes), when
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perturbed by multi-bit errors. FFT shows a similar trend of being less tolerant to multi-bit
errors. However, we note that most of the data bytes in FFT are tolerant to a significant
number of errors. For example, >80% of the data bytes in FFT are approximate 40% of the
time (40 on the X axis) they encounter errors of any bit length. Further analyzing FFT’s
data error profile to understand patterns in error sites that are approximable is an interesting
future direction.
The trend-lines for LU, Swaptions and Sobel (not shown for brevity) show that a high
percentage of program data in these workloads are approximable – perturbing the data using
the 1-bit, 2-bit, 4-bit and 8-bit error models leads to acceptable loss in output quality a large
fraction of the time. For example, >80% of data bytes in Swaptions are approximable 99%
of times they encounter an error. This number is even higher for Sobel where 99% of data
bytes are approximable 100% of the time for all the error models studied.
In summary, the data error profile (generated by DataApproxilyzer) makes it possible to
automatically perform such analysis that enable programmers and approximate computing
systems to make informed decisions about the approximation potential of the program data
and possibly inform data targeted approximations.
4.2.4 Application Error Profiles under different ISAs
In this case study, we compare the error profiles of the same applications compiled to
two different ISAs – SPARC and x86. First we use gem5-Approxilyzer to generate the
instruction error profile for workloads (Section 3.5.5) compiled to x86 binary. Next, we
generate instruction error profiles for the same workloads compiled to a SPARC binary
using Approxilyzer. This allows a first-order comparison comparison of the resiliency and
approximation characteristics of the same workloads for two different ISAs.
Figure 4.5 compares the distribution of error outcomes (for all the error sites) in each ap-
plication for the x86 and SPARC ISAs. The instruction error profiles of the same application
look rather different for the different ISAs. We note, however, that some differences are ex-
pected due to the CISC vs. RISC nature of the instructions as well as the fact that x86 uses
many more implicit registers (that we do not inject into) compared to SPARC. The graph
shows that SPARC has a higher percentage of more egregious outcomes. For example, while
Blackscholes-x86 has many error sites that lead to SDC-Good, SDC-Maybe, and SDC-Bad
outcomes, the error outcomes in Blackscholes-SPARC produce such bad quality output that
they become DDCs. We leave a deeper analysis of the causes for these differences to future
work.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of error outcome categories for the applications studied using the
x86 and SPARC ISAs.
static instructions that need (1) resiliency protection and (2) are candidates for approximate
computing (using the methodology described in Section 4.1) under given output quality
thresholds. Figure 4.6 shows the percentage of static instructions that need resiliency pro-
tection and those that are approximable for the same quality threshold (QT) across the two
ISAs.
The wide differences across the two ISAs and the lack of a clear trend further underscore
the importance of error analysis tools (such as those developed in this work) that can analyze
applications at the binary level to devise customized resiliency and approximation solutions
for different architectures. Source-code or IR-level error analysis may not lead to the most
optimized solutions.
4.3 CUSTOMIZED LOW-COST RESILIENCY USING THE APPLICATION ERROR
PROFILE
In the previous section, we demonstrated how the application error profile can be used
to build a first-order understanding of the application’s error-efficiency potential. In this
section we will show an end-to-end workflow of how this understanding of the application’s



















































PCs that need resiliency protection PCs that may be approximable
Figure 4.6: Percentage of static PCs in the application that need resiliency protection and
percentage of PCs that are approximable across x86 and SPARC. The same quality threshold
is used across both ISAs: 5% for Blackscholes, Sobel, FFT, and LU; $0.001 for Blackscholes
and Swaptions.
show how the application’s automatically generated instruction error profile is used to enable
an ultra-low cost resiliency solution to transient hardware errors that can be tuned to user
or system requirements.
4.3.1 Background for Resiliency Analysis
As we have discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3, increasing susceptibility of hardware to
errors pose a challenge to the reliability of modern systems. In this section, we will briefly
recap some background on resiliency analysis as well as establish the goal of resiliency analysis
performed in this study.
Traditional reliability solutions, relying on indiscriminate redundancy in space or time,
are too expensive for a range of systems – from small embedded systems to large-scale high-
performance computing systems. Therefore, there has been significant research in cross-
layer solutions [126, 127] that rely on the software layers of the system stack to provide
acceptable end-to-end system resiliency for hardware errors at lower cost than hardware-
only solutions [128, 129, 130, 131].
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Early work recognized that a large majority of hardware errors were either masked at
the software level or resulted in easily detectable anomalous software behavior [12, 57,
132, 133, 134, 135, 136]. Since the former errors require no action and the latter can be
detected using zero to very low-cost detection mechanisms, such software-centric resiliency
techniques show immense promise. Unfortunately, these techniques allow some hardware
errors to escape detection and result in undetected and potentially unacceptable silent data
corruptions (SDCs)
Such SDCs have been an obstacle in the widespread adoption of software-centric resiliency
techniques; therefore, significant recent research has focused on characterizing and reducing
these SDCs either through hardware solutions (e.g., use of ECC in hardware memory struc-
tures) or software solutions (e.g., insertion of software checks in application code regions de-
termined to be too vulnerable to SDCs) [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 56, 68, 82, 107, 126, 137, 138, 139].
Underlying all of these solutions is the need for techniques that find SDCs in the appli-
cations of interest. In this study, we use the term resiliency to mean the ability of a given
piece of software to avoid an SDC for a given hardware error. This study is concerned with
identifying SDC-causing instructions in a given program.
4.3.2 Methodology to tune Output Quality vs. Resiliency vs. Overhead
As explained in Section 4.1.2, using the application’s instruction error profile, specific
static instructions can be targeted for resiliency protection based on the quality threshold
specified. Given additional criteria regarding resiliency (the fraction of output corruption
producing error sites in the application that must be protected, hereby referred to as ”re-
siliency coverage” or simply ”coverage”) and the maximum overhead to be incurred for
protection, an optimizer can pick the optimum balance of output quality, resiliency cover-
age, and overhead to target user requirements. We produce tuning curves that show the
tradeoffs for different combinations.
To produce the different tuning curves, we first identify the instructions that need resiliency
protection for different output quality thresholds (range of quality degradations). Then a
0/1 knapsack algorithm is used to pick the instructions for resiliency protection that offer
the specified coverage for the least overhead. A similar methodology is used in [33] to tune
resiliency vs. overhead, but without relaxation of output quality.
The (software-based) resiliency protection scheme we assume in this work is instruction
redundancy ([140]) and charge one instruction worth of overhead to protect a given instruc-
tion. Hence, the execution overhead cost for protecting static instruction X is equivalent to
the dynamic instruction count of X.
103
To illustrate the above with a simple example, consider two candidate static instructions
A and B, each responsible for 30% and 20% of the output corruption error sites in the
application, and producing 5% and 10% of the dynamic instructions, respectively. Assume
that the maximum quality degradation (QD) produced by an error in A and B is 1% and
4% respectively. Then for no quality loss, to cover 50% of the output corruption error sites
(resiliency coverage), both A and B have to be protected and the (execution) overhead cost
of doing so is their cumulative dynamic instruction count; i.e., 15%. If the user is willing to
accept a quality loss of 2%, we do not have to protect A, and essentially get the resiliency
coverage afforded by A (30%) at no additional overhead cost. For resiliency coverage of 50%
(with acceptable quality loss of 2%), we will need to protect B and incur an overhead of
10%.
For this study, we use the instruction error profile generated by Approxilyzer and hence
use the same workloads as Approxilyzer (Section 3.4.2). The analysis to generate quality vs.
resiliency vs. overhead curves for an application takes several minutes of CPU time for the
workloads studied.
4.3.3 Customizable Low-Cost Resiliency
Fig. 4.7 shows the resiliency overhead cost vs. coverage for different levels of acceptable
output quality degradation (QD) using the methodology in Section 4.3.2. Graphs for four
of our five benchmarks is shown (the fifth, LU, is discussed later). Each graph shows the
following curves corresponding to different levels of acceptable quality degradation.
(1) All Output Corruptions: This curve represents the optimal overhead vs. cover-
age when all output corruption (OC) causing instructions are protected. It represents the
state-of-the-art in the absence of the output quality impact information (provided by the
automatically generated instruction error profiles) to distinguish instructions that produce
acceptable quality output.
(2) All SDC-Bad + SDC-Maybe: This curve shows the optimal overhead vs. coverage
when all the instructions causing SDC-Bad and SDC-Maybe outcomes are protected. This
is the graph that will be generated in the absence of specific user-defined quality thresholds.
Instructions that only produce SDC-Good and DDC are automatically removed from the
list of instructions to protect.
(3) All SDC-Bad + SDC-Maybe with QD>x : These are the optimal overhead vs.
coverage curves with user-specified quality threshold x. For these curves, Approxilyzer does
not protect instructions that produce SDC-Maybe with QD≤x from the list of instructions
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Figure 4.7: Tuning resilience vs. execution overhead vs. output quality for different applica-
tions.
quality loss in the output, then we need not protect the instructions that we know will not
suffer a quality degradation greater than x% in the presence of transient errors.
The gaps between the various curves for each point along the x axis represent the over-
head/cost savings by not applying resiliency protection to those instructions that produce
acceptable quality loss when perturbed. The benchmarks shown in Fig. 4.7 show significant
overhead savings if the user can tolerate very small quality loss. For example, if the user
can tolerate a 1% quality degradation in the output, then the resiliency overhead costs can
be reduced by 20%, 55%, and 11% for Blackscholes, Water and FFT respectively, while still
achieving 99% coverage (the difference between the All Output Corruptions and All SDC-
Bad + SDC-Maybe with QD>1% curves at 99% on the x axis). Similarly, for a quality loss
of less than one hundredths of a penny in final stock price (All SDC-Bad + SDC-Maybe
with QD>$0.001 ), Swaptions achieves an overhead reduction of 26% while providing 99%
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coverage.
Swaptions has many instructions that exclusively contain SDC-Good error-sites. Hence
the overhead is significantly reduced by not protecting those instructions (99% coverage for
All SDC-Bad + SDC-Maybe has an overhead of 3%). Further increasing the application’s
quality degradation threshold provides marginal benefits (2% overhead reduction).
Blackscholes also does not show any benefit from increasing the quality degradation thresh-
old, but for a different reason. As mentioned in Section 3.4.4, many (static) instructions in
Blackscholes produce a mix of SDC-Bad and SDC-Maybe outcomes (with wide QD ranges)
and hence they are always protected. Blackscholes does, however, achieve a 20% overhead
reduction by not protecting instructions that only generate DDC and/or SDC-Good out-
comes.
FFT, on the other hand, displays a behavior contrary to Swaptions and Blackscholes –
all its overhead reductions come from increasing the acceptable quality threshold of SDC-
Maybes (the curves for All Output Corruptions and All SDC-Bad + SDC-Maybe sit on top
of each other). This can be attributed to the fact that none of the instructions in FFT
exclusively produce only DDC or SDC-Good outcomes. Changing the quality threshold
from QD>1% to QD>5% results in an additional overhead reduction of 12% for the 99%
coverage point.
Water shows the most overhead reduction while tolerating a small quality loss. This
is because Water has many instructions that contain a mixture of SDC-Good and SDC-
Maybe error sites that result in very small quality degradation. Hence even a small quality
degradation threshold results in large gains.
LU (not shown in the figure for brevity) shows no gains from either quality tuning or from
not protecting SDC-Good and DDCs. This is because, as seen from Fig 4.2, LU produces
only SDC-Bad corruptions and hence all of the instructions need protection.
In summary, most of the applications studied show significant resiliency overhead reduc-
tions while suffering very small accuracy losses. Thus, the application’s instruction error
profile can be used to target ultra-low cost resiliency solutions in an error-efficient environ-
ment.
4.4 CUSTOMIZED APPROXIMATE COMPUTING USING THE APPLICATION
ERROR PROFILE
To demonstrate the versatility of the (automatically generated) application error pro-
files in enabling error-efficient techniques, this section shows a second end-to-end workflow
targeting a different error-efficient technique – Approximate Computing. Specifically, the
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application’s data error profile (generated by DataApproxilyzer) is used to automatically
identify approximable data bytes in the program (for a given user-specified quality thresh-
old) and simulate their storage in approximate memory with sub-optimal (but low energy)
refresh rates (Flikker [18]). The evaluation shows that, on average, this automatic approx-
imate data partitioning and mapping to approximate memory meets the quality target set
by the user 98% of the time over (tens of) thousands of simulations.
4.4.1 Approximate Memory Technique
There have been different techniques suggested for approximate memory solutions that
trade-off errors in memory for performance or energy benefits. One such technique suggested
for approximate memory is Flikker [18]. Flikker allows developers to specify critical and non-
critical (approximate) data in programs and the runtime system then allocates this data in
separate parts of memory. The portion of memory containing critical data is refreshed at the
regular refresh-rate, while the portion containing non-critical data (referred to as approximate
memory) is refreshed at substantially lower rates. This partitioning saves energy at the cost
of a modest increase in data corruption in the non-critical data.
While Flikker needed programmer annotations to identify approximate data, here the
application’s data error profile is used to automatically identify critical data to store in ap-
proximate memory for a given quality target (thus removing the burden on the programmer).
Note that while the data error analysis performed by DataApproxilyzer analyses (multi-bit)
errors in one data block at a time, a model like Flikker can induce errors in multiple data
blocks in an execution. We show (in Section 4.4.4) that the partitioning of approximate
and critical data (to store in approximate and precise memory regions respectively) is accu-
rate; i.e., it leads to acceptable (within user specified thresholds) output quality over tens of
thousands of simulated runs.
4.4.2 Flikker Design Overview
This section provides a brief overview of the Flikker hardware design described in detail
in [18]. Flikker enhances existing DRAM architectures (in modern mobile devices) that
allow for a partial refresh of DRAM memory by allowing different refresh rates for different
sections in memory.
Memory systems in smartphones devices consume power both when the device is active
(active mode) and when it is suspended (standby mode). In standby mode, the refresh
operation is the dominant consumer of power, and hence the focus of Flikker [18] is on
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reducing refresh power. In modern mobile systems, several low-power DRAM states are
used in different system scenarios [18]. Self-refresh is a feature of low power mobile DRAMs
in which the DRAM array is periodically refreshed when the processor is in standby or sleep
mode. Partial Array Self Refresh (PASR) is a low power state in which only a portion of the
DRAM array is refreshed. DRAM cells that are not refreshed will lose their data in PASR.
The main difference between Flikker DRAM and PASR is that instead of discarding the data
in a part of the memory array (by not refreshing the data), Flikker lowers the reliability of
the data (by refreshing the data at a lower rate). As a result, Flikker is able to achieve power
savings without compromising on the amount of memory available to applications [18].
In the Flikker DRAM architecture, each bank is partitioned into two different parts, the
high refresh (error-free) part and the low refresh (erroneous) part. DRAM rows in the high
refresh part are refreshed at a regular refresh cycle time (64 milliseconds or 32 milliseconds
in most systems). The error rate of data in the high refresh parts is negligible (similar to
data in state-of-the-art DRAM chips). On the other hand, the low refresh part is refreshed
at a much lower rate (longer refresh cycle time) and its error rate is a function of the refresh
cycle time.
Figure 4.8 [18] shows the Flikker Bank Architecture. The DRAM bank is partitioned into
two parts, the high refresh part, which contains critical data, and the low refresh part, which
contains non-critical data. The high refresh/low refresh partition can be assigned at discrete
locations as shown in Figure 4.8. Henceforth, we refer to the the low-refresh part of memory
as simply approximate memory. The non-critical data that is stored in approximate memory
is referred to as approximate data.
4.4.3 Methodology to Map Data to Approximate Memory
Identifying Approximate Data
The data error profile (generated by DataApproxilyzer) is used to perform a first order
analysis that estimates the approximation potential of different data bytes in each workload
studied across different approximation targets and different error models. Using the method-
ology described in Section 4.2.3, for each of the four error models studied (Section 3.3.2),
we first build a list of data bytes that are approximable for the given error model and given
approximation targets. The approximation target that we use for this study is 100%, i.e., for
each error model, we list data bytes that are approximable 100% of the times they encounter
an error. Next, we pick the data bytes that are approximable (for a given quality threshold)
across all 4 error models (1-bit, 2-bit, 4-bit and 8-bits). We denote these data bytes as
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Figure 2. Flikker Bank Architecture. The DRAM bank is partitioned into
two parts, the high refresh part, which contains critical data, and the low
refresh part, which contains non-critical data. The high refresh / low refresh
partition can be assigned at discrete locations, as shown by the dashed lines.
The curly brackets on the left show a partition with 1/4 high refresh rows
and 3/4 low refresh rows.
pared with fast low-power states, self-refresh and deep power-down
has lower power consumption as well as longer wakeup time. Un-
like the self-refresh, the deep power-down mode will stop all re-
fresh operations and hence the DRAM will lose data in deep power-
down state. In the following, we will discuss details of these low-
power states.
Self-refresh: Self-refresh is a feature of low power mobile
DRAMs in which the DRAM array is periodically refreshed even
if the processor is in sleep mode. The self-refresh operation is per-
formed by dedicated hardware on the DRAM chip. The self-refresh
mode is activated only when the mobile device is in standby and
the processor is put to sleep as it incurs considerable latencies to
transition in and out of self-refresh mode. The Operating System
(OS) needs to activate self-refresh before putting the mobile device
to sleep.
Partial Array Self Refresh (PASR) is an enhancement of the
self-refresh low power state [18] in which only a portion of the
DRAM array is refreshed. DRAM cells that are not refreshed will
lose data in PASR. In a system with PASR, before switching to self-
refresh mode, the OS needs to specify the portion of the memory ar-
ray to refresh. In Micron’s mobile DDR SDRAM [18] with 4 banks,
there are five different options for PASR, full array (4 banks), half
array (2 banks), quarter array (1 bank), 1/8 array (1/2 bank), and
1/16 array (1/4 bank).
The main difference between Flikker DRAM and PASR is that
instead of discarding the data in a part of the memory array, Flikker
lowers the reliability of the data. As a result, Flikker is able to
achieve similar levels of power savings as PASR, without compro-
mising on the amount of memory available to applications.
Fast Low-power States: Mobile DRAMs also employ low-
power states during active mode to conserve power. These low-
power modes are activated even when there are brief periods of no
DRAM traffic as the latency of transitioning out of these states is
only around 10 nano-seconds. The transition to/from these modes
is performed by the DRAM controller and does not need OS inter-
vention. The power consumption in these low-power states is typi-
cally less than half of the DRAM power-consumption without any
memory accesses.
3.2 Flikker DRAM Architecture
Figure 2 illustrates a Flikker DRAM bank. In Flikker DRAM, each
bank is partitioned into two different parts, the high refresh fault-
free part and the low refresh faulty part. DRAM rows in the high
refresh part are refreshed at a regular refresh cycle time Tregular
(64 milliseconds or 32 milliseconds in most systems). The error
rate of data in these high refresh parts is negligible (similar to data
in state-of-the-art DRAM chips). On the other hand, the low refresh






Figure 3. Self-refresh counter in the Flikker DRAM.
Tlow) and its error rate is a function of the refresh cycle time (see
Section 3.3).
Mobile DRAMs use a hardware counter during the self-refresh
operation to remember which row to refresh next, known as the
self-refresh counter. Flikker DRAM extends this counter by a few
extra bits (see Figure 3.2) in order to support two refresh rates. The
Flikker self-refresh counter also has an additional “refresh enable”
output. The DRAM row is refreshed only when the refresh enable
bit is set to “1”. A configurable controller sets different values to
refresh enable bit based on higher bits of the row address and the
extra bits, and thus control the refresh rate of different DRAM rows.
The number of additional bits required in the self-refresh
counter is given by the ratio of Tlow to Tregular . For example,
in a system where Tlow = 16 × Tregular , the Flikker self-refresh
counter requires 4 extra bits. The refresh enable bit is always set
to “1” when the row address is a high refresh row. For low refresh
rows, the refresh enable bit is set to “1” only when the extra bits
has a predefined value (say “1111”). In the case of 1/8 high refresh,
when the extra bits are “0000” through “1110”, the refresh enable
bits is only set for row addresses with highest three bits of “000”.
When the extra bits are “1111”. The refresh enable bits is set for
all row addresses. With this configuration, the low refresh rows
(rows with “001” through “111” in highest bits of row address) are
refreshed 16 times less frequently than the high refresh rows.
3.3 Flikker DRAM Error Rates
Previous work [3, 36] has measured DRAM error rate as a function
of refresh cycle time. Bhalodia presents the per cell DRAM error
rate under different temperatures and different refresh cycles [3].
Venkatesan et al. measure the percentage of DRAM rows that are
free from errors with a low refresh rate [36]. Although these two
measurements are at different granularity (per cell versus per row),
their results are consistent with each other.
Table 1 shows the DRAM error rates used in our experiments
which are based on Bhalodia’s measurements [3]. The retention
time of DRAM cells decrease with temperature. Therefore, under
a given refresh cycle, the DRAM error rate increases with ambient
temperature. We assume an operating temperature of 48°C, which
is higher than the operating temperatures of most smartphones, and
hence our error-rates are higher than those likely to be experienced
under real conditions.
Note that the above error-rates are only a function of the re-
fresh period and temperature. In particular, the error-rates do not
depend on the duration of low refresh mode. This is because errors
in DRAM cells are primarily caused by manufacturing variations
among their retaining capacities. Thus, under a given temperature
and refresh rate, a fraction of DRAM cells loses their charge, and
this fraction is independent of how long the refresh rate is applied.
3.4 Flikker DRAM Power Model
We use an analytical model to estimate the power consumption of
the Flikker DRAM. The model is based on real power measure-
ments in mobile DDR DRAMs with PASR [18]. The self-refresh
power consumption is calculated as follows:
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Figure 4.8: Flikker DRAM bank architecture [18]. The bank is partitioned into high- and
low-refresh parts at discreet locations. The curly brackets on the left show a partition with
1/4 high refresh rows and 3/4 low refresh rows.
approximable or non-critical and mark them to be mapped to approximate memory.
Non-critical data bits are selected using the above methodology for different user-acceptable
quality thresholds. The quality thresholds used in this study are described in Section 3.6.2.
For the convenience of the reader, the quality thresholds used are recapped below:
1. Threshold 1: 2% quality degr dation is acceptable for Blackscholes, LU, FFT and
Sob l. Absolute l ss in dollar value of l ss that ne-t nth of a cent (<$0.001) is
acceptable for Swaptions.
2. Threshold 2: 5% quality degradation is acceptable for Blackscholes, LU, FFT and
Sobel. Absolute loss in dollar value of less that one cent (<$0.01) is acc ptable for
Swaptions
3. Threshold 3: 10% quality degradation is acceptable for Blackscholes, LU, FFT and
Sobel. Absolute loss in dollar value of less that ten cents (<$0.1) is acceptable for
Swaptions.
Simulating Errors in Approximate Memory
The approximate memory technique of lowering refresh rate saves power at the cost of
incurring modest errors in the non-critical (approximate) data stored in the approximate
memory. To simulate these errors in the non-critical data (stored in approximate memory),
we develop an error injector framework in the gem5 [83] simulator.
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The injector starts the application and executes it for an initial period. No errors are
injected during this initialization period. Then a self-refresh period is inserted, after which
errors are injected in non-critical memory to emulate the effect of lowering their refresh
rate. In order to keep track of the errors injected during the self-refresh period, the injector
maintains a modified bit for each non-critical data bit (in low refresh memory) which tracks
whether this bit has been accessed after the self-refresh period. Before a non-critical bit is
read, the corresponding modified bit is checked. If it is a 0, then the bit is flipped with a
pre-computed probability (error rate) and the modified bit is set to 1 (the modified bit is
set to 1 to prevent future error injections into these bits). This methodology is the same as
that employed by Flikker [18]).
In the original Flikker implementation, since a self-refresh cycle is only inserted once in
the beginning of the application (as described above), a write to a data bit automatically
sets the corresponding modified bit from 0 to 1 (no error is injected into this data). In
our evaluation, however, we also simulate errors in data values that are written during the
execution (this is similar to a self-refresh cycle occurring after the the data value is written
but before it is read); hence, the modified bit is reset to 0 on a write to the data bit. Note
that this results in our evaluation being stricter (more errors are injected in our study) than
in the original Flikker work. We will show later (Section 4.4.4) that even with this more
conservative methodology, we achieve high accuracy in identifying and mapping non-critical
data to approximate memory. Figure 4.9 shows the state transition diagram of the modified
bit.
The error rate that is used in this work is the same as Flikker [18] – 4 × 10−8 – which
corresponds to a refresh cycle of 1 second at an operating temperature of 48◦C. A refresh
cycle of 1 second is chosen as it is shown to achieve a desirable trade-off between power
savings and reliability [18].
Power Savings Estimate
An analytical power model (based on real power measurements in mobile DDR DRAMs
with PASR) is used in Flikker to estimate the power consumption of different Flikker DRAM
configurations [18]. Figure 4.10 (originally appearing in [18]) provides the self-refresh current
of different PASR and Flikker DRAM configurations (with different refresh cycle times for
the low-refresh part). We will use the values reported in Figure 4.10 to estimate power
savings. Note that for the results reported in this work, we assume a refresh time of 1s
and hence only use the values from the corresponding column. The self-refresh power is












Figure 4.9: State transition diagram of “modified” bit in fault-injector. Error is injected in
non-critical bits with probability P.
saved by Flikker is estimated as the difference between the power consumed in refreshing
all arrays at a high refresh rate (corresponding to the PASR with a high refresh size of 1
from Figure 4.10) and power consumed by Flikker configuration that uses low refresh rate
for part of the arrays. Hence, for a flikker configuration with 1/4 arrays at high refresh rate,
results in a power savings of 22.5%. .
Refresh Cycle [s] Error Rate Bit Flips per Byte
1 4.0 × 10−8 3.2 × 10−7
2 2.6 × 10−7 2.1 × 10−6
5 3.8 × 10−6 3.0 × 10−5
10 2.0 × 10−5 1.6 × 10−4
20 1.3 × 10−4 1.0 × 10−3




PASR Flikker1s 10s 100s
1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
3/4 0.47∗ 0.4719 0.4702 0.4700
1/2 0.44 0.4438 0.4404 0.4400
1/4 0.38 0.3877 0.3807 0.3801
1/8 0.35 0.3596 0.3509 0.3501
1/16 0.33 0.3409 0.3310 0.3301
Table 2. Self-refresh current in different PASR and Flikker configurations
(PASR current values are from [18]). ∗ This value is derived from linear
interpolation of full array (1) and half array(1/2) cases.
PFlikker =Prefresh + Pother
=Prefresh low + Prefresh high + Pother
=PL × Tregular
Tlow
+ Prefresh high + Pother




As shown in Eq. 1, PFlikker has two components, Prefresh,
which is the power consumed by refresh operations, and Pother ,
which is the power consumed by other parts of the DRAM (e.g.
the control logic) in standby. Prefresh is proportional to the refresh
rate; while Pother is independent of the refresh rate and is constant.
Then we divide Prefresh into Prefresh high and Prefresh low,
which correspond to the refresh power consumed by the high and
low refresh parts respectively (as shown in second line of Eq. 1).
We further explicate the relationship between refresh power and
refresh cycle time by representing Prefresh low as PL (which is a
constant) times Tregular/Tlow (third line in Eq. 1).
In order to evaluate PFlikker , we consider the DRAM with
PASR and DRAM with full array refreshed (i.e., regular DRAM)
as two extreme cases of Flikker. We calculate PPASR and Pfull
by assigning Tlow = ∞ and Tlow = Tregular in the third line
of Eq. 1. With these two extremes cases, we rewrite the third line
of Eq. 1 with PPASR and Pfull (as shown in the fourth line of
Eq. 1). The underlined and double-underlined parts of the third line
in Eq. 1 are equal to the corresponding parts in the fourth line.
Table 2 summarizes the self-refresh current of different PASR
configurations and Flikker DRAM with different refresh cycle
times for the low refresh part. The self-refresh power is calculated
as self-refresh current times power supply voltage (1.8V in our ex-
periments). It is important to understand that the self-refresh power
comprises the power consumed in refreshing the DRAM array, and
the power consumed to control the refresh operations of the DRAM
chip. The former is proportional to the refresh rate, while the latter
is a constant. Therefore, the self-refresh power does not decrease



























































































































































Figure 4. Error rate and power saving for different refresh cycles. The
high refresh part is 1/4 of DRAM array .
3.5 Power-Reliability Trade-off
The models derived in the two previous sections are used to derive
a suitable refresh rate for Flikker. Figure 4 shows the self-refresh
power saving and DRAM error rate of different refresh cycles in
a system with 1/4 of the memory array at the high refresh rate.
In Figure 4 (top), the X-axis represents the refresh cycle time,
the Y-axis on the left represents the power-savings in self-refresh
mode, while the Y-axis on the right represents the error-rate on
a logarithmic scale. It can be observed that the DRAM error rate
increases exponentially with the DRAM refresh cycle. However,
the self-refresh power saving saturates to about 25% at a refresh
cycle time of about 1 second.
Increasing the refresh cycle beyond 1 second leads to significant
increase in the error rates (the graph is draw to log-scale). For
example, from 1 to 20 seconds, the error rate increases over 3000
times, from 4.0 × 10−8 to 1.3 × 10−4. However, the improvement
in power saving corresponding to the refresh cycle increase is small
(22.5% to 23.9%). On the other hand, reducing refresh cycle time
from 1 second to 0.5 seconds leads to a steep decrease in power
saving. This finding is also substantiated in Figure 4 (bottom),
which shows the power-savings as a function of the error-rate (in
log scale). Therefore, we believe that a refresh cycle of 1 second
is near-optimal, as it achieves a desirable tradeoff between power
savings and reliability. This is the value we use in our experiments.
4. Flikker Software
In this section, we describe the changes that need to be made to
software so that it can use the Flikker DRAM. Figure 5 shows the
steps involved in the operation of Flikker. First, the programmer
marks application data as critical or non-critical. Second, the run-
time system allocates critical and non-critical data to separate pages
in memory, and places the pages in separate regions of memory
(i.e., high-refresh and low-refresh respectively). Third, the Oper-
ating System (OS) configures the DRAM self-refresh counter be-
fore switching to the self-refresh mode. Finally, the self-refresh
controller refreshes different rows of the DRAM bank at different
rates depending on the OS-specified parameters. Based on Figure 5,
modifications need to be made to the application, the runtime sys-
tem and the Operating System (OS).
14Figure 4.10: Self-refresh current in different PASR and Flikker configurations [18].
Note that since self-refresh (in PASR and therefore Flikker) is employed in standby mode,
the power savings estimate reported here are only for the power saved in standby mode.
This is still significant since prior work [141] shows cell phone usage profiles with 5% being
busy and 95% in standby mode (self-refresh state).
To estimate power savings for the workloads studied, we first compute the proportion
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of critical and non-critical data for each of the applications studied. As discussed in Sec-
tion 4.4.2 (and shown in Figure 4.10), the partitioning of approximate memory is done at
discrete boundaries. Therefore, only non-critical (or approximate) data that can fit into
a discrete partition is considered for power calculations. Furthermore, for power savings
estimation, we allocate approximate data in 4KB pages, so we do not count the data that
is fragmented, i.e., resides in the same page with non-approximate (critical) data. To il-
lustrate with an example, suppose 80% of data bytes in an application are identified to be
approximate (using the application’s error profile). Discarding the fragmented approximate
data-bytes, 78% of the data bytes are identified and marked into approximate pages. How-
ever, only 75% of data bytes are considered as being stored in approximate memory for
power savings (corresponding to a configuration where 1/4 of arrays are refreshed at normal
rate and 3/4 of the arrays are refreshed at lower rate). Note however that this is done only
for the power savings estimate using the methodology described above. To generalize the ac-
curacy of the techniques described in this work – which automatically identify approximate
data and map them to approximate memory – errors are simulated in all non-critical data
(80% of data bytes from the above example) that can potentially be stored in approximate
memory. We describe the methodology to determine the accuracy of mapping approximate
data to low-refresh approximate memory next.
Accuracy of Mapping Data to Approximate Memory
In this study, for a given user-specified quality target, we use the data error profile to auto-
matically identify non-critical data to be mapped to approximate memory. The application
is executed while simulating errors in data stored in approximate memory. The accuracy
of our approximate memory mapping is validated by verifying that the quality of the final
output produced by the execution is within the user specified quality target (used to gener-
ate the mapping). Since each execution can produce different errors in the non-critical data
(errors are randomly injected according to a given bit error rate), it is imperative that the
accuracy of a given mapping (for a given quality target) is verified over many executions.
We perform 10,000 simulations for each mapping (for a given quality threshold) of non-
critical data to approximate memory. The output produced at the end of the simulations is
observed. If the output quality degradation is below the quality threshold (that was used
to generate the mapping), the mapping is considered to be accurate. Thus, if all 10,000
simulations lead to acceptable outputs, the mapping accuracy is considered to be 100%.
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Memory System
Flikker [18] simulates approximate DRAM memory by reducing DRAM refresh rate. In
this work, we simulate an abstract approximate memory device that mimics the DRAM
with lower refresh rate. Caches are not simulated in this system. This is a deliberate design
choice to ensure that all the errors introduced in the non-critical data (due to the lowered
refresh rate) are “activated” or consumed by the execution. This need not be true in systems
that have caches. For instance, an error in DRAM will not be activated if a copy of the
data is present in SRAM. The design chosen is to present a strict (conservative) evaluation
of the accuracy of the approximate data mapping. Hence in real systems with caches, the
accuracy of the automatic approximate data mapping is expected to be higher than that
reported here.









































Figure 4.11: Accuracy of Mapping non-critical (Approximate) data to Approximate Memory
We evaluate the accuracy of mapping non-critical data to approximate memory using the
methodology described in Section 4.4.3. We observe empirically that each simulated execu-
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tion run (across workloads) incurs errors that number in the thousands. Figure 4.11 shows
the mapping accuracy (on Y axis) for the workloads studied using Threshold 1. The figure
shows that, on average, the workloads generate acceptable outputs (with quality degradation
less than Threshold 1), 98% of the time over tens of thousands of simulation runs. Sobel
shows the least accuracy at 92%. Upon closer inspection, a significant number of incorrect
outcomes in Sobel are caused by Segmentation Faults. As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, 99%
of data bytes are designated as approximable for Sobel. This includes data that is stored
in stack and heap including pointers, which can lead to egregious errors if corrupted with
multiple errors over time in the execution (the data error profiles are generated by analyzing
errors in a single data block – single data value read or written by a given instruction – at
a time). Extending the automated error analysis to analyze errors in multiple data blocks
within an execution is part of our future work.
We also study the accuracy of the approximate memory mapping generated using Thresh-
old 2 and Threshold 3. We observe similarly high mapping accuracy (>97% and 98% on
average across all thresholds) across these quality thresholds as well.
Hence, we conclude that the data error profile of applications can enable automatic extrac-
tion of non-critical (approximable) data for mapping to approximate memory.
4.4.5 Power Savings Estimate Using Flikker Power Model
We calculate the estimated power savings of mapping non-critical data to approximate
memory using the methodology described in Section 4.4.3. Figure 4.12 shows the power
savings observed across the studied workloads. Swaptions and LU show power savings of
22.5% and Sobel shows a power savings of 32%. Blackscholes and FFT show no power
savings as the original analytical model assumes a discrete DRAM partitioning which requires
at least 25% of approximable data (corresponding to 3/4 of high refresh rows) to achieve
any power savings. Choosing a different approximate memory architecture to exploit fine
grained approximate data or using a different criteria for selecting approximate data (such
as requiring non-critical data to be approximate 90% of the time, as opposed to our strict
criteria of 100%) could offer better power savings, but we leave their exploration to future
work.
4.5 CONCLUSION
The application error profiles generated by the automated error analysis tools enable
























Figure 4.12: Estimated power savings using the analytical power model from Flikker.
derstanding built from the application’s error profile can be used to build error-efficiency
solutions that are customized to the application and user quality targets. This work demon-
strates the versatility of this approach by showing two end-to-end workflows that use the
application error profiles to devise customized error-efficiency solutions.
First, the application’s instruction error profile is used for error-efficiency solutions tar-
geted towards ultra-low cost resiliency to transient hardware errors. It is shown that large
resiliency overhead reductions (up to 55%) are possible if the user is willing to tolerate a very
small loss in output accuracy (1%) while still providing high (99%) resiliency coverage. Next,
we demonstrate how the data error profile can be used to enable an approximate computing
technique. Specifically, the data error profile is used to automatically (without programmer
intervention) identify non-critical or approximable data (for a given user-specified quality
threshold) and map them to be stored in approximate DRAM with low refresh rates (re-
sulting in up to 32% power savings). The evaluations show that this automatic mapping to
approximate memory meets the quality target set by the user 98% of the time, on average,
over (tens of) thousands of executions.
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Chapter 5: IMPROVING SPEED AND SCALABILITY OF ERROR
ANALYSIS
The AEA tools discussed in this work significantly further the state-of-the-art in auto-
mated error analysis. But, their dependence on error injections (albeit orders of magnitude
fewer than naive techniques) can still make them too slow for some practical use cases. In
order to improve speed, some error analysis techniques may sacrifice comprehensiveness or
coverage by only analyzing a fraction, say 99%, of error-sites in the program. While this is
practical for most applications, it may be unacceptable for safety-critical applications which
need 100% coverage to enable highly accurate application of error-efficiency. For example,
resiliency analysis (Section 4.3.1) informed by an incomplete error profile (coverage lt100%)
may risk not protecting against some SDCs produced by the remaining 1% of error-sites
not covered. Since the hybrid error analysis described in this work use dynamic program
analysis and error injections, they are also input dependant. For robust error analysis, these
techniques must be scalable across different inputs and workloads. For all of the above
reasons, it thus is essential for error analyses to be be efficient and scalable.
This work presents Minotaur, a toolkit that shows a systematic adaptation of software
testing concepts to (hardware) error analysis, thereby significantly improving the speed and
scalability of error analyses. The novel insight behind Minotaur is that analyzing software
for (hardware) errors is similar to testing software for software bugs; therefore, adapting
techniques from the rich software testing literature can lead to principled and significant
improvements in error analysis. Minotaur techniques can benefit many error analysis tech-
niques; it is evaluated in this work by applying it to Approxilyzer [24].
Minotaur identifies, adapts, and evaluates four bridges between software testing and error
analysis:
Concept 1: Test-Case Quality → Input Quality. A key concept in software testing
is test-case (input) quality; i.e., an input’s effectiveness in finding bugs in the target software.
Several input quality criteria have been proposed in the literature, typically at the source-
code level, with statement coverage as a simple and widely used criterion (Section 5.1.1).
Typical error analysis techniques, for example those used for resiliency analysis [33] typically
use generic inputs often developed for performance evaluation; e.g., the reference inputs in
benchmark suites. Error analysis performed using these generic inputs could be sub-optimal
for specific error efficiency techniques, that, say identify SDC instructions (for resiliency
analysis) or for discovering approximable instructions (for approximate computing). Yet
there is no accepted input-quality criterion for error analysis (or for traditional resiliency
analysis or approximate computing).
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This work introduces the notion of input-quality criteria for error analysis, adapts several
widely used software testing criteria to the object-code level, and evaluates these criteria
for error analysis targeting both resiliency and approximate computing. Program counter
(PC) coverage, an analog of the widely used statement coverage, is found to be an effective
input-quality criterion for error analysis. Intuitively, PC coverage measures the fraction of
assembly instructions executed for a given input.
Concept 2: Test-Case Minimization → Input Minimization. Test-case minimiza-
tion for software takes a high quality, expensive/slow test and creates a cheaper/faster test
with similar high quality. Minotaur adapts minimization to error analysis by creating mini-
mized inputs (referred to as Min) that are smaller and execute faster than, but have similar
quality as, the reference inputs (Ref ).
Minotaur uses a Minimizer module to systematically (using a greedy binary search) reduce
the input till the Min input generated meets the specified minimization objective (speed in
this case) and input quality target (100% PC coverage). Applying minimization to seven
benchmarks (across multiple application domains) shows that using Min instead of Ref
speeds up error analysis by 4.1X (up to 15.5X for some benchmarks) on average.
The improved analysis speed afforded by Min enables it to be analyzed more comprehen-
sively, whereas Ref can be prohibitively expensive to analyze in its entirety [31, 33]. This
more comprehensive error analysis can, in turn, lead to more accurate resiliency and approxi-
mate computing solutions. For example, resiliency analysis using Min can correctly find 96%
of SDC causing static instructions (SDC-PCs) in the program whereas an incomplete (albeit
high coverage at 99%) analysis using Ref only finds 64% of the SDC PCs. In the context of
approximate computing, Min identifies 96% of first-order approximable instructions whereas
Ref only identifies 81%. This result that Min is more accurate (by enabling more compre-
hensive analysis) than Ref parallels recent work from the software testing literature on bug
detection [142].
Concept 3: Test-Case Prioritization → Error-Injection Prioritization.
Test-case prioritization for software systematically prioritizes test cases to find critical
software failures as early as possible. Minotaur adapts test-case prioritization in two ways—
prioritization of error injections for a given PC with a given input (Concept 3) and prioriti-
zation of inputs (Concept 4). Error injection prioritization can be effectively applied if the
context for which the analysis is performed is known. For example, if the context is to find
SDC PCs for resiliency protection then once a PC is found to generate an SDC, no further
error injections are performed on that PC because it needs to be hardened (protected against
SDCs) anyway. Similarly, if the context is to find approximable instuctions, then once a PC
is found to generate an output of unacceptable quality (egregious outcome), then it can be
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classified as non-approximable and no further injections are needed on it.
Several priority orderings are explored for error injections for a given PC. Surprisingly, we
find that random ordering reveals SDCs/egregious outcomes almost as quickly as an oracular
best case. Further investigation shows that an SDC-PC often produces SDCs for a very large
number of its injections; therefore, a random ordering quickly finds one such injection (same
trend for approximation). The combination of random ordering and termination of injections
on a PC after an SDC (or egregious outcome) discovery, combined with input minimization,
provides an average 10.3X speedup (up to 38.9X) in error analysis targeting resiliency by
employing Minotaur. Similarly, error analysis for first-order approximate instructions sees a
speedup 18X (up to 55X) by using Minotaur techniques of minimization and error injection
prioritization.
Concept 4: Test-Case Prioritization → Input Prioritization. Minotaur also
adapts test-case prioritization across multiple inputs. For example, to find SDC-PCs as
fast as possible, error analysis on the faster Min input is prioritized over the slower Ref
input. Then, for higher accuracy, we can additionally perform error analysis on the larger
Ref input, but only for those PCs not already classified as SDCs by Min. This prioritiza-
tion of inputs for resiliency analyses results in finding the union of SDC-PCs across both
inputs, while running on average 2.3X faster than analyzing both inputs independently in
their entirety.
To summarize, Minotaur shows, for the first time, that leveraging software testing con-
cepts for error analysis enables principled and significant benefits in speed and accuracy.
While the evaluation in this work uses Approxliyzer as the underlying error analysis, Mino-
taur and its concepts apply more generally. For example, Concepts 1 and 2 can be applied
to speed up any dynamic resiliency analyses that typically study large inputs, by producing
a smaller representative input for analysis. Error-injection analyses can greatly benefit from
Concept 3, by prioritizing error-injections and employing early termination for SDC-PCs.
Concept 4 can propel resiliency analyses to explore multiple inputs, a new direction which
previously was daunting due to speed and accuracy concerns of existing techniques. Mino-
taur provides a foundation for a systematic methodology for efficient error analysis based
on software testing, and opens up many avenues for further research. By building a bridge
between software testing and (hardware) error analysis, Minotaur lays the foundation for
systematically integrating (hardware) error analyses into the software development workflow.
As a working example, the rest of this study shows an application of Minotaur to Ap-
proxilyzer analysis targeting resiliency, with the goal of identifying SDC-PCs in a given
application. Henceforth, for brevity, Approxilyzer analysis targeted to resiliency will be sim-
ply referred to as resiliency analysis. Section 5.5 discusses evaluation of using Minotaur for
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Approxilyzer analysis targeting approximate computing.
5.1 BACKGROUND
This section provides an overview of the relevant software testing techniques adapted by
Minotaur and a brief recap of Approxilyzer (Section 3.4).
5.1.1 Relevant Software Testing Techniques
Software testing is the process of executing a program or system with the intent of finding
failures [143]. The objective of testing can be quality assurance, verification, validation, or
reliability estimation. This section discusses some techniques and best practices adopted by
the software testing community.
Test-Case Quality
In software testing, a test case is an input and an expected output used to determine
whether the system under test satisfies some software testing objective. A test set is a
collection of test cases. The number of all test cases can be intractably large. Thus, selecting
appropriate test cases has a significant impact on testing cost and effectiveness. Test cases
are selected by evaluating them using quality criteria relevant to the testing objectives.
Selecting a quality criterion involves a tradeoff. A “stronger” criterion enables closer
scrutiny of program behavior to find bugs, while a “weaker” criterion can be fulfilled using
fewer test cases [144]. The choice of criterion depends on several factors, including the size
of the program, cost requirements, and criticality of failure. Some popular criteria [144],
ordered from weaker to stronger, are: (1) statement coverage [145], which measures the
fraction of program statements executed by tests; (2) branch coverage [143], which measures
the fraction of branch edges executed; and (3) def-use coverage [144, 146], which measures the
fraction of pairs of variable definitions and their corresponding uses executed. Despite being
a weak criterion, statement coverage is typically used for testing commercial software due
to its low resource overheads. Branch coverage is often used for safety-critical systems [147].
The software testing literature provides an extensive analysis of various testing criteria [145].
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Test-Case Minimization
While running larger (or more) test cases is desirable for thorough testing, time and re-
sources limit the size (or number) of test cases that can be executed. Test-case minimization
is used to minimize the testing cost in terms of execution time [142, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152,
153]. The goal is to generate a smaller test case that has similar or (ideally) the same quality
as the original test case; e.g., covers the same statements.
Test-Case Prioritization
Resource constraints can sometimes make it infeasible to execute all planned test cases. It
thus becomes necessary to prioritize and select test cases so that critical failures can surface
sooner rather than later [148]. Test-case prioritization techniques schedule test cases in an
order that allows the most important tests, by some measure, to execute first. For example,
test-cases can be prioritized by their coverage. Many test-case prioritization techniques have
been proposed in the literature [148].
5.1.2 Approxilyzer
Minotaur is evaluated in this work using Approxilyzer (Section 3.4). In this work, the
error analysis performed in the context of resiliency with the end goal of identifying static
instructions (PCs) in the application that result in a Silent Data Corruption when perturbed
by errors (Section 4.3.1). While a detailed explanation of Approxilyzer methodology and
its use for application resiliency is provided in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, some of the key
concepts are briefly recapped here for the convenience of the reader.
Approxilyzer is a state-of-the-art instruction-level error (resiliency) analysis tool that is
fine-grained (it identifies individual SDC-PCs) and comprehensive (it analyzes nearly all
instructions). Approxilyzer uses a combination of program analysis and error injections to
determine the outcome of a single-bit transient hardware error occurring during the execution
of any dynamic instruction—in any source or destination register bit of the instruction—of
the given program and its input. The term error site is used to refer to the combination of
the dynamic instruction instance and its register bit that incurs the error.
Approxilyzer dramatically reduces the number of required error injections to predict the
error outcome for all application error sites for a given input. It systematically analyzes
all error sites, and carefully picks a small subset to perform selective error injections. It
uses novel error-site pruning techniques (pioneered by Relyzer [33]) to reduce the number
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Figure 5.1: A classification of error outcomes. Only outcomes of SDC-Bad and SDC-Maybe
constitute SDC-PCs.
of error-sites needing detailed study, either by predicting their outcomes or showing them
equivalent to other errors. To prune error sites, Approxilyzer partitions error sites into
equivalence classes such that the error outcome ofa single representative of each class is
needed to predict error outcome for all error sites in the class. However, it is still slow,
requiring millions of error injections for standard benchmarks with reference inputs [31].
Past studies, therefore, performed error injections only for the classes that contain 99% of
the error sites (sorted by equivalence class size), referred to as 99% error-site coverage—
analyzing the last 1% was deemed too expensive, because it can involve many more classes
and would require many more error injections [31, 33].
Approxilyzer distinguishes error-injection outcomes as masked, detected, or output cor-
ruptions (OCs). While most prior work considers all OCs as SDCs, Approxilyzer analyzes
the quality (degradation) of the corrupted outputs to further differentiate between output
corruptions that are tolerable to the user from those that are not. A comprehensive list of
error outcomes follows, also summarized in Figure 5.1:
• Detected: An error that raises observable symptoms and can hence be caught using
various low-cost detectors [12] before the end of execution.
• DDC: An OC that is detectable via low-cost mechanisms such as range detectors
applied on the output [13].
• SDC-Bad: An OC with very large (unacceptable) output quality degradations.
• SDC-Maybe: An OC that may be tolerable if the output-quality degradation is
within a user-provided acceptability threshold (if no threshold is provided, all SDC-
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Figure 5.2: Overview of Minotaur. Approxilyzer may be replaced with another resiliency
analyzer.
• SDC-Good: An OC that produces negligibly small (and acceptable) output quality
degradations.
• Masked: Errors that produce no output corruption.
To identify an SDC-PC, Approxilyzer examines the error outcomes for all error sites in
a given static PC. If even a single error site results in an unacceptable outcome (SDC-
Bad or SDC-Maybe for quality degradations outside the acceptability threshold), the PC is
classified as an SDC-PC. Because SDC-Good outcomes are tolerable, their error sites do not
need hardening and do not contribute to SDC-PCs.
5.2 MINOTAUR
This section describes Minotaur, a novel toolkit for principled and efficient resiliency
analysis for hardware errors. Figure 5.2 illustrates the complete system.
5.2.1 Input Quality
Ensuring that ”good” quality inputs are used for resiliency analysis increases the effec-
tiveness of the analysis. The concept of test-case quality (Section 5.1.1) is adapted to build
an Input Quality Checker (Figure 5.2) that measures the quality of the inputs used for
resiliency analysis.
The software test quality criteria are typically expressed at the source-code level, to make
it easier for developers to understand what is covered and what is not. There has also been
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// INPUT: c = True
// Source. 100% Statement Coverage
1. v = c ? E1 : E2 // covered
// Assembly. 75% PC Coverage
PC-1. beq c, $0, L2 # covered
L1: PC-2. move v, E1 # covered
PC-3. jump L3 # covered
L2: PC-4. move v, E2 # not covered
L3: …
Figure 5.3: Statement coverage vs. PC coverage.
some work on test coverage at the object-code level [154, 155], but it is not widely studied.
Approxilyzer’s resiliency analysis examines error models at the object code level and aims to
find assembly instructions that are vulnerable to SDCs (SDC-PCs). Hence, it is desirable to
measure the quality of the input used for resiliency analysis with quality criteria expressed
at the object code.
Figure 5.3 demonstrates the difference between using input quality criteria at the source
vs. object code level. Suppose a ternary operator is used by the developer, such as in Line
1. Assuming a value of True for the variable c, statement coverage (Section 5.1.1) of the
source code measures that this single input will cover (execute) 100% of the code. However,
for the same code compiled to assembly, only 75% of the instructions are covered (executed).
Analyzing resiliency with just this input does not provide full (100%) assembly instruction
coverage, and an error in assembly instruction PC-4 would not be captured.
For resiliency analysis, three test (input) quality criteria are adapted to the object code
level—statement, branch, and def-use coverage. The analog of statement coverage at the
object code level measures the fraction of static assembly instructions (or PCs) executed
by the input; we call it simply PC coverage. Branch and def-use coverage are analogously
adapted from the source to the object code level to consider assembly-level branches and
def-uses pairs, respectively.
The Input Quality Checker (Box 1 in Figure 5.2) evaluates whether a given input meets
the desired quality threshold (e.g., 90%) for a specified quality criterion (e.g., PC coverage).




Minimizing the input size can greatly speed up the resiliency analysis by reducing the
time for each error-injection experiment and/or reducing the total number of error injections
needed. Using insights from test-case minimization, we designed a systematic technique, a
Minimizer (Box 2 in Figure 5.2), that Minotaur uses to generate a minimal input, Min,
provided a reference input, Ref.
There is no general algorithm to minimize inputs across all application domains in soft-
ware testing [145]. The Minimizer algorithm in this work is specialized for the workloads
studied . Given a Ref, the goal of the Minimizer is to find a reduced input (Min) that min-
imizes a stated minimization objective (MinObj) (e.g., execution time) while satisfying an
input quality target (e.g., 90% PC coverage relative to Ref). We chose a simple, greedy al-
gorithm based on binary search for the Minimizer and found it effective. More sophisticated
optimizers may find better Min inputs; such an exploration is left to future work.
In addition to the minimization objective and input quality target, the Minimizer is pro-
vided with the list of input parameters (e.g., command line and other program-specific
parameters) and a set of parameter constraints (e.g, range or boundary conditions) to en-
sure that the Min generated is both legal and realistic. A realistic Min enables the resiliency
analysis to uncover SDC-PCs that are vulnerable for realistic conditions, avoiding over- or
under-protection. Domain knowledge enables understanding the realistic range of input val-
ues and how to change them (e.g., choosing image shrinking instead of sub-sampling pixels
or subsetting image inputs [156]) to achieve realistic inputs.
Figure 5.4 shows the algorithm (pseudo-code) of Minotaur’s Minimizer. It first performs
a pre-processing pass over the reference input’s parameter list and orders the parameters
according to their estimated impact on the minimization objective. The current imple-
mentation in this work determines this order by running the program with a few different
values for each input parameter and measuring the impact on the minimization objective.
This step can be accelerated with additional domain knowledge or automated using more
sophisticated optimizers.
Given the ordered parameter list, the Minimizer uses binary search to progressively change
each input parameter (one with highest impact on the minimization objective first) while
ensuring that the new input value meets the input quality target. Lines 6–10 of Figure 5.4
show this search for applications with (1) numeric inputs and (2) where reducing the value of
input parameters reduces (or does not affect) the minimization objective. All applications
studies (except Sobel, which takes as input an image) satisfy both characteristics, with
binary search sufficing for the value exploration. The images for Sobel are reduced using the
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studied . Given a Ref, the goal of the Minimizer is to find a reduced input (Min) that
minimizes a stated minimization objective (MinObj) (e.g., execution time) while satisfying
an input quality target (e.g., 90% PC coverage relative to Ref). We chose a simple, greedy
algorithm based on binary search for the Minimizer and found it e↵ective. More sophis-
ticated optimizers may find better Min inputs; such an exploration is left to future work.
In addition to the minimization objective and input quality target, the Minimizer is pro-
vided with the list of input parameters (e.g., command line and other program-specific
parameters) and a set of parameter constraints (e.g, range or boundary conditions) to
ensure that the Min generated is both legal and realistic. A realistic Min enables the
resiliency analysis to uncover SDC-PCs that are vulnerable for realistic conditions, avoid-
ing over- or under-protection. Domain knowledge enables understanding the realistic
range of input values and how to change them (e.g., choosing image shrinking instead of
sub-sampling pixels or subsetting image inputs [160]) to achieve realistic inputs.
1 PList: Parameter List, C: Constraints,
2 IQT : Input Quality Target, MinObj: Minimization Objective,
3 PListRef : Reference input’s PList
4 Function Minimizer(PListRef , C, IQT, MinObj):
5 PList OrderParams(PListRef , MinObj)
6 for param 2 PList do
7 lower  Minimum value of param provided C
8 upper  Reference value of param
9 PList[param] BinarySearch(lower, upper, C, IQT )
10 end
11 return PList
12 Function OrderParams(PList, MinObj):
13 return Ordered parameters of PList with respect to MinObj
14 Function BinarySearch(lower, upper, C, IQT ):
15 Search values between lower and upper provided C, checking if the candidate
value satisfies IQT
16 return minimum value that satisfies IQT
Algorithm ?? shows the pseudo-code of Minotaur’s Minimizer. It first performs a
pre-processing pass over the reference input’s parameter list and orders the parameters
according to their estimated impact on the minimization objective. The current imple-
mentation in this work determines this order by running the program with a few di↵erent
values for each input parameter and measuring the impact on the minimization objective.
This step can be accelerated with additional domain knowledge or automated using more
sophisticated optimizers.
Given the ordered parameter list, the Minimizer uses binary search to progressively
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Figure 5.4: Algorithm for Input Minimization.
resize utility in the ImageMagick suite [157], which accepts a numerical argument, adapting
the binary search to adjust this argume t. Si ilarly, other appli ation domains could also
require appropriate adaptation of the algorithm. At the end of this process, the Minimizer
outputs th final arameter list for the minimized input.
5.2.3 Error-Injection Prioritization
We next use insights from test-case prioritization to improve resiliency analysis for any
input (minimized or not). We evaluate error-injection prioritizations that order error injec-
tions for a PC such that error sites which are more likely to be SDC-causing are examined
earlier. Once an injection reveals an SDC, Minotaur does not perform injections for any
other error sites for that PC. Hence, error-injection prioritization can lead to early termina-
tion of error-injection campaigns, leading to significant savings. Box 3 of Figure 5.2 shows
the application of error-injection prioritization in Minotaur’s workflow.
We study the following ordering schemes for error-injection prioritization are to understand
which error sites result in SDCs:
• Bit position of registers (BitPos): Injecting into specific bits first (such as the
MSB or LSB).
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• Dynamic instance of error site (DI): Error sites from an earlier dynamic instance
may be more prone to SDCs than later dynamic instances.
• Register type (RT) – integer vs. floating point: Certain register types could be
more susceptible to SDCs than others.
• Operand kind (OP) – source vs. destination: Prioritizing source vs. destination
register may also show a pattern for SDC-causing instructions.
• Equivalence class size (ECS): This ordering is specific to Approxilyzer and prior-
itizes injections in error sites of largest equivalence classes first, which is the default
ordering used by Approxilyzer to maximize the number of error sites with predicted
outcome for a given number of total error injections.
• Random ordering: Error sites are chosen at random.
5.2.4 Input Prioritization
Mission-critical applications with high resiliency requirements must undergo analysis us-
ing multiple inputs to build confidence that most SDC-PCs in the application have been
identified. To that end, a näıve, but prohibitively expensive, scheme could analyze many
inputs in their entirety to find all SDC-PCs in an application. Instead, we adapt test-case
prioritization from software testing in the form of input prioritization to speed up resiliency
analysis for multiple inputs.
In this scheme, an Input Selector (Box 4 in Figure 5.2) chooses inputs for resiliency analysis
according to an order specified by an input prioritization objective. This work chooses to
analyze the input with the shortest execution time, prioritizing faster analyses first (e.g.,
we choose Min before Ref). Input prioritization can lead to faster resiliency analysis speed
for each subsequent input because the PCs already identified as SDC-PCs by prior inputs
need not be (re)analyzed. Thus, input-prioritization can be leveraged to find many of the
SDC-PCs from one (faster) input, and carry this information onto another (slower but larger)
input to avoid unnecessary error injections. Minotaur’s Input Selector can successively select
inputs for resiliency analysis until it meets an analysis target (e.g., a coverage or resource
target).
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Application Domain Ref Input Min Input PC Branch Def-Use
(%) (%) (%)
Blackscholes [122] Financial Modeling 64K options 21 options 100 100 99.38
Swaptions [122] Financial Modeling 16 options 1 option 99.91 99.23 98.42
5000 simulations 1 simulation
Streamcluster [122] Data Mining centers = [10,20] centers = [4,5] 99.97 99.77 98.67
num iterations = 3 num iterations = 1
LU [109] Scientific Computing 512x512 matrix 16x16 matrix 100 100 95.56
16x16 block size 8x8 block size
Water [109] 512 molecules 216 molecules 99.89 99.36 99.85
FFT [109] Signal Processing 220 data points 28 data points 100 100 99.59
Sobel [4] Image Processing 100% image size 25.25% image size 100 100 100
(321x481 pixels) (81x121 pixels)
Table 5.1: Applications studied and key input parameters (the ones that changed during
minimization) for Ref and Min. The last three columns show the coverage of Min relative
to Ref for different input quality criteria.
5.3 METHODOLOGY
5.3.1 Evaluation Infrastructure and Workloads
The error-injection infrastructure used here builds on Approxilyzer, based on simulation
using Wind River Simics [110] and GEMS [123] running OpenSolaris. The workloads used
are compiled to the SPARC V9 ISA with all optimizations enabled.
Approxilyzer’s error model uses single-bit architecture-level errors (Section 3.3.2), which
are a limited but effective [115] and realistic subset of hardware errors [101]. With resiliency
becoming a first-class software design objective [158], techniques with different speed, preci-
sion, and error models are needed at different stages of software development.For example,
early design stages specifically emphasize speed, so techniques using lower-level error models
may be inappropriate—either too slow, not available, or eschewed to maintain generality.
Thus, working with tools that use high-level models is a key application of Minotaur. Eval-
uating Minotaur with tools that use different error models (lower-level, multi-bit, etc.) is
part of our future work.
To evaluate Minotaur, this work uses seven workloads from three benchmark suites span-
ning multiple application domains, summarized in Table 5.1. Column 4 lists the reference
(Ref) input parameters used in this study. For five of the benchmarks—Blackscholes, Swap-
tions, LU, Water, and FFT—we use the same inputs as Approxilyzer(Section 3.4.2) for the
reference inputs. For Streamcluster, prior evaluations [39, 73] showed that the benchmark
benefits from realistic datasets (as opposed to data points generated internally by the appli-
cation); hence, a dataset from the UCI Machine-Learning Repository [159, 160, 161] is used
as its Ref input. For Sobel, the bird image from the iACT [124] repository is used as input.
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This work chooses relatively small Ref inputs for almost all applications to be conservative
and not over-estimate the benefits of input minimization. To evaluate the quality of the out-
puts, the same quality metrics as described in Section 3.3.5 are used Blackscholes, Swaptions,
LU, Water, Sobel and FFT; for Streamcluster, the maximum relative error (max-rel-err from
Section 3.3.5 is used.
Evaluating Minotaur using the above workloads involved performing over 8.4 million error-
injection experiments spanning approximately seven weeks of simulation time on a 200-node
cluster of 2.4GHz Intel Xeon processors.
5.3.2 Input-Quality Criteria
Since no available tool can easily measure test coverage at the object-code level, custom
tools were developed (as part of this work) using dynamic traces from Simics [110] for PC,
branch, and def-use coverage for the object code. For PC coverage, we simply track the PCs
executed by the input. For branch coverage, we store the unique branch-target PC pairs
that represent control edges exercised by the input. For def-use coverage, we analyze the
definition and use of operand registers exercised by the input, and store unique PC pairs
that represent a def-use edge. For all criteria, Min’s coverage is measured relative to Ref.
5.3.3 Input Minimization
Minotaur uses application run time as the minimization objective and targets 100% PC
coverage (relative to Ref) as the input quality target when possible. PC, branch, and def-use
coverage are measured for each Min relative to its corresponding Ref; e.g., if Min executes
all PCs executed by its Ref, it is considered to have 100% PC coverage. Similarly, if Min
exercises all branch-target and def-use pairs exercised by Ref, it is considered to have 100%
branch and def-use coverage, respectively.
PC coverage is chosen as our quality criterion because it is simple and fast to compute
and it is the analog of the widely used statement coverage criterion for software testing
(Section 5.1.1). We find that the Min inputs generated using PC coverage are surprisingly
effective (Section 5.4.1), and also exhibit high (but not perfect) branch and def-use coverage.
5.3.4 Accuracy Analysis
Minotaur uses input minimization to generate a Min that is a good representative of a
Ref. Minotaur’s accuracy for a given input is quantified as the fraction of SDC-PCs found
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by the input (either Min or Ref) relative to the total number of SDC-PCs found by the
union of both inputs.
To understand the sources of inaccuracy, the SDC-PCs identified by Min and Ref are
analyzed by grouping them into categories based on whether they were found by Ref, Min,
or both. We further distinguish the cases where certain PCs are explored (i.e., analyzed
for resiliency) by one input but not both inputs. The difference occurs when the targeted
error-site coverage (Section 5.1.2) is less than 100% and Minotaur chooses different PCs to
meet that coverage for the two different inputs. We use the term explore to convey that at
least one error site for a PC was analyzed (for a given input) by Minotaur. If no error site
for a PC was analyzed (for a given input), we say that the PC was not explored by the input.
Note that not explored does not mean not executed by the input; it simply means that the
PCs were not analyzed for resiliency.
The SDC-PCs are grouped into five categories:
1. Common: Both Min and Ref classify the PCs as SDC, which are considered accurately
classified by both.
2. MinSDC: Min classifies these as SDC-PCs and Ref explores them but does not classify
them as SDC-PCs. Although Ref did not find these SDC-PCs, they are still candidates
for hardening because they were found by a realistic Min input. Hence, these PCs are
considered accurately classified by Min, but not by Ref.
3. MinSDC+: Min classifies these as SDC-PCs and Ref does not explore them. For
similar reasons as MinSDC, this category is also considered accurately classified by
Min, but not by Ref.
4. RefSDC: Ref classifies these as SDC-PCs and Min explores them but does not classify
them as SDC-PCs. These PCs are inaccurately classified by Min because relying only
on Min’s analysis would leave these PCs unprotected.
5. RefSDC+: Ref classifies these as SDC-PCs and Min does not explore them. This
category is also considered inaccurately classified by Min.
The error-injection prioritization scheme (Section 5.3.5) does not affect accuracy because
it finds the same set of SDC-PCs for an input as without the optimization, albeit faster.
Employing the input-prioritization scheme for all inputs (Section 5.3.6) will result in 100%
accuracy since input-prioritization obtains the union of SDC-PCs found by analyzing all
inputs (while optimizing resiliency analysis speed).
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5.3.5 Error-Injection Prioritization
This work explores 38 different error-injection prioritizations using combinations of the
schemes from Section 5.2.3. For BitPos, DI, and ECS schemes, both ascending (A) and
descending (D) orderings are tested. Compositional schemes are also explored. For example,
BitPos A + ECS D first orders error injections by bit positions in ascending order (i.e.,
starting with the LSB), followed by ordering in descending equivalence class size. For RT and
OP schemes, we simply pick the type/kind of register (e.g., OPSrc or OPDest) to prioritize.
To understand the bounds on the error-injection prioritization gains, an Oracle best and
worst case are also evaluated. The best case assumes that the Oracle identifies an SDC-PC
with a single injection. For the worst case, the Oracle picks (for each PC) all injections
that are not SDC-causing before picking an SDC-causing injection, reducing the benefit of
early termination.
5.3.6 Input Prioritization
Minotaur’s Input Selector prioritizes (faster) Min over Ref. Section 5.4 shows that while
Min exhibits high accuracy (Section 5.3.4), it misses a small number of SDC-PCs found only
by Ref. To achieve 100% accuracy, resiliency analysis on Ref is run after resiliency analysis
on Min completes, but only for PCs that Min did not find as SDCs (Section 5.2.4).
5.3.7 Runtime Analysis of Minotaur
The time that Minotaur takes to perform resiliency analysis on a single input is evaluated.
The Input Quality Checker, Minimizer, and Input Selector (boxes 1, 2, and 4 in Figure 5.2)
take negligible time compared to the resiliency analysis (Approxilyzer) time (box 3); there-
fore, the focus here is on the resiliency analysis component.
Ideally, the runtime performance would be measured directly by measuring all components
of Approxilyzer and every error injection. However, this cannot be done precisely on a
busy cluster which introduces variability between runs. The total runtime is estimated by
measuring statistically sampled error injections and using formulas as follows.
The time for resiliency analysis for a given application and input (Ref or Min) depends
on: (1) equivalence class generation time (tequiv class gen) [31, 33], (2) total injections of
each outcome category (Imasked, Idet, IOC) for a target error site coverage, and (3) the av-
erage error-injection runtime of each outcome category (tmasked, tdet, tOC). We measure the
runtime for each category separately because it can be quite different; e.g., an OC error
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requires additional post-processing (compared to Masked) to quantify the error quality into
Good/Maybe/Bad categories, while Detected outcomes involve simulator and OS overhead
to report outcomes such as SegFaults.
The runtime is measured by sampling 1,000 error-injection experiments for each of masked,
detected, and OC outcomes per application and input, excluding outliers in the top and
bottom 2.5% of runs. The total samples correspond to a 99.8% confidence level with 5%
error margin in timing measurements [162]. The time for resiliency analysis is calculated as:
TotalRuntime = tequiv class gen +Σn (In × tn) (5.1)
where each outcome type n ∈ {masked, det, OC} is weighted by the number of injections
with that outcome and average injection runtime for that outcome.
In practice, error injections (the second term of Equation 5.1) dominate the total runtime
of resiliency analysis. Thus, even though tequiv class gen is much shorter for Min (order of
minutes) compared to Ref (order of hours), it is negligible compared to the total time of
injection experiments.
All runs for Ref and Min begin with a checkpoint at the start of the region of interest
(ROI), generally provided by the benchmarks, to avoid simulator startup cost and applica-
tion initialization overhead. The measurements are broken down into two components: the
application runtime only inside the ROI, and the remaining runtime from the end of the
ROI to the injection outcome. The latter runtime includes simulation overheads, various file
I/O, and analysis of the application output.
5.4 RESULTS
Minotaur’s impact on a resiliency analysis tool, Approxilyzer [31], is evaluated by ana-
lyzing (1) the speedup and accuracy from a minimized input (Min) for resiliency analysis
(Section 5.4.1); (2) the speedup from error-injection prioritization with early termination
(Section 5.4.2); (3) the combined speedup from minimization and error-injection prioritiza-





Table 5.1 shows the Min generated by applying Algorithm ?? to each Ref, using PC
coverage as the input quality criterion. Most applications show a large reduction of input
parameter values in Min (column 5), which translates to faster application runtimes relative
to Ref (Section 5.4.1).1 Additionally, Min maintains very high PC coverage relative to Ref
(column 6), which translates to high accuracy in finding SDC-PCs (Section 5.4.1).
Not all workloads achieve a significant application speedup with the input quality threshold
set to 100%. Slightly reducing the threshold by less than a percent, however, results in
substantially higher minimization for Swaptions, Streamcluster, and Water. We show that
the PC coverage reduction does not impact Min’s accuracy significantly (Section 5.4.1), while
allowing Minotaur to benefit from running the faster Min (Section 5.4.1).
The last two columns of Table 5.1 show the branch and def-use coverage of the generated
Min (relative to Ref) and are discussed further in Section 5.4.1.
Minimization Speedup
Min typically runs faster than Ref because it has fewer dynamic instructions, resulting in
fewer error injections and a shorter runtime per injection.
Figure 5.5 shows the total number of error injections needed for resiliency analysis for
an application, relative to analyzing 100% of Ref’s error sites (Ref100). Past studies found
that targeting 100% error-site coverage was too expensive and so targeted just the top
99% of error sites (Ref99), as discussed in Section 5.1.2. By using input minimization,
achieving 100% error-site coverage is no longer elusive for many applications. Figure 5.5
shows that for the Min inputs of Blackscholes, Swaptions, LU, and FFT, the number of error
injections required for 100% error site coverage (Min100) is comparable to the number of
error injections for Ref99 Thus, for these applications, it becomes tractable to run resiliency
analysis with Min100. The other applications (Water, Streamcluster, and Sobel) also reduce
the number of error injections from Ref100 to Min100, but the total number is still very large,
presenting a trade-off between resiliency-analysis runtime and error-site coverage. We choose
to favor runtime and use 99% error-site coverage for these applications. Henceforth, we use
the umbrella term Min (unless otherwise stated) to encompass Min100 for Blackscholes,
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Figure 5.5: Number of error injections for different error-site coverage targets for each bench-
mark, relative to 100% error-site coverage for Ref (Ref100). R=Ref, M=Min.
Swaptions, LU, and FFT, and Min99 for Water, Streamcluster, and Sobel. We use Ref to
refer to Ref99 for all applications.
Not only does Min require fewer error injections for most of the workloads studied, each
individual injection runs faster compared to Ref. Figure 5.6 shows the average runtime per
injection for Ref and Min for different outcome types (Masked, Detected, and OC). Each bar
is divided into the application runtime during the ROI (which begins after an application’s
initialization phase) and the simulation overhead (Section 5.3.7).
Min injections run 2.1X faster on average2 than Ref for all outcome types for two primary
reasons. First, the application runtime itself is faster (2.3X on average across outcome types)
due to the smaller input. Second, for some applications, the I/O and other simulation envi-
ronment overhead is significantly reduced for Min (1.8X on average). This is most notable
for LU and FFT, where a large output matrix is generated for Ref but not for Min. The out-
put matrix needs to be extracted for comparison and error classification (Figure 5.1). Min’s
smaller output matrices allow for faster post-processing, further speeding up the resiliency




























Application Run Time Simulation OverheadRunti




































Figure 5.6: Average runtime per injection, normalized to Ref. Each set of three bars rep-
resents (from left to right) Masked, Detected, OC runtime (Section 5.3.7), divided into
application runtime and simulation overhead. R = Ref and M = Min.
analysis relative to Ref for these applications.
Figure 5.7 shows the total speedup obtained for Min (and the Minotaur optimizations
discussed in the next sections). The first bar for each application shows the speedup from
using a Min input relative to Ref. Overall, the combination of having fewer error sites and
faster runtime per injection results in a 4.1X speedup for Min over Ref on average (up to
15.5X for FFT), with nearly all applications showing speedup. Even for the applications that
do not show much speedup (Streamcluster and Sobel), the Min inputs are more accurate than
Ref inputs (they identify more SDC-PCs) and benefit from error-injection prioritization, as




















































Figure 5.7: Min, MinEIP , and RefEIP speedup relative to Ref.
Minimization Accuracy
Figure 5.8 shows the accuracy of Ref and Min for each application. The Y-axis corresponds
to the union of SDC-PCs found by Ref or Min, distributed into the five accuracy categories
(Section 5.3.4). The results show that a majority of SDC-PCs are categorized in the same
way by both Ref and Min (60% on average are Common). Further, a large number of PCs
fall in the MinSDC and MinSDC+ categories (35% on average). These are SDC-PCs that
Min finds that Ref misses – either due to misclassification by Ref (MinSDC) or due to the
lack of exploration of that PC by Ref altogether (MinSDC+).
Figure 5.9 explains the surprising result of finding additional SDC-PCs over Ref in the
MinSDC+ category. The Y-axis corresponds to the total number of static PCs explored for
different error site coverage targets. Ref error sites, although much more than Min error sites
(Section 5.4.1), generally explore fewer distinct PCs than Min at lower error site coverage
targets. Figure 5.9 shows that, on average, for 99% error-site coverage (sorted by equivalence
class size), Ref explores 55% of the static PCs explored by the union of Ref and Min, while























































Figure 5.8: Min and Ref accuracy. The Y-axis represents all SDC-PCs found by Min or Ref
in an application.
workloads such as Streamcluster and Sobel, even though the total analysis time is similar to
that of running with Ref.
The remaining two categories, RefSDC and RefSDC+, reflect a loss of accuracy for Min.
For many workloads, there are no RefSDC+ because Min explores all the PCs explored
by Ref. The RefSDC category is also small, but not insignificant (4% on average). Upon
further study of the misclassified PCs, a majority of the mismatches are found to occur at
the boundary of SDC categories that distinguish if protection is needed or not. For example,
in many cases Ref identifies a PC as SDC-Maybe, but Min identifies it as SDC-Good. Often
the difference in output quality between these is less than 1%. Similarly, on the other end
of the protection spectrum, there are many PCs that mismatch because Ref classified the
PC as SDC-Bad but Min classified it as DDC.
Overall, Min shows significantly higher accuracy than Ref. Of the total SDC-PCs dis-
covered, on average, Min finds (the sum of Common, MinSDC, and MinSDC+ categories)
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Figure 5.9: Percentage of PCs explored for different error-site coverage targets. R = Ref, M
= Min.
Improving Min Selection Criteria
The branch and def-use coverage of Min (relative to Ref) is examined to understand if
these stronger criteria could have been used to generate an alternate Min that provides
higher accuracy than PC coverage. Table 5.1 shows that the Min inputs generated using
PC coverage already have very high branch and def-use coverage of 99.76% and 98.78%,
respectively, relative to Ref. Further, as discussed, Min already finds 96% of the SDC-PCs
discovered by the union of Ref and Min. Thus, the potential improvement from using the
more complex criteria is limited.
Nevertheless, the branch-target and def-use pairs that were in Ref but not in Min are
identified in order to determine if they were responsible for the RefSDCs in Figure 5.8. We
found that none of the RefSDC PCs intersect with the isolated branch-target pairs and only
four intersect with the def-use pairs (one each for Blackscholes and Swaptions and two for
LU). A more comprehensive analysis would explore the entire control and data flow paths








































ECS_D BitPos_D + ECS_D BitPos_A + ECS_D
DI_A + ECS_D RT_Int OP_Src
Figure 5.10: Min speedup with error-injection prioritization.
the stronger criteria would add further accuracy. Such an analysis and exploration of even
more complex input quality criteria (e.g., path coverage) is left to future work, given that
the results presented here already show that PC coverage provides an excellent sweet spot
for simplicity, performance, and accuracy.
5.4.2 Error-Injection Prioritization
38 different error injection prioritization schemes are studied in this work (Section 5.3.5).
For brevity, results for only the 7 most effective schemes are shown, in addition to the oracle
best-case and oracle worst-case schemes.
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 show the speedup results for Min and Ref, respectively, for different
error injection prioritization schemes with early termination enabled. The figures show a
noticeable speedup for most cases for both Min and Ref. Random prioritization gains the
best average speedup of 2.4X and 3.8X for Min and Ref (upto 3X and 8.1X), respectively,
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Figure 5.11: Ref speedup with error-injection prioritization.
To understand the surprising result that Random performs the best, Figure 5.12 plots
the cumulative probability (averaged over all SDC-PCs) of choosing an SDC-causing error
injection after n error injections in an SDC-causing PC. Figure 5.12 shows only four appli-
cations using Ref input, but the trends are representative across the workloads and inputs.
The figure shows that the probability of finding an SDC injection shoots up within the first
few injections. Upon investigation, an interesting insight is uncovered – when a PC is SDC-
causing, a large fraction of the injections in that PC result in an SDC outcome. Randomly
choosing an injection therefore tends to quickly find an SDC for that instruction. Thus,
Random error injection prioritization scheme is chosen for the remainder of the evaluations
in this chapter.
5.4.3 Minimization Plus Injection Prioritization
This section discusses the benefits of combining input minimization with error injection
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Figure 5.12: Cumulative probability (Y-axis) of picking an SDC-causing error injection
within the first n injections (X-axis) for an SDC-causing PC.
(1) using Min (discussed in Section 5.4.1), (2) using Min with error injection prioritization
(referred to as MinEIP ), and (3) using Ref with error injection prioritization (RefEIP ). As
previously discussed in Section 5.4.1, using only Minotaur’s input minimization optimization
for resiliency analysis provides a 4.1X average speedup (up to 15.5X) compared to Ref
(first bar for each application in Figure 5.7). Combining Minotaur’s input minimization
optimization with error injection prioritization results in an average speedup of 10.3X (up to
38.9X for FFT), relative to Ref. In contrast, RefEIP observes only a 3.8X average speedup
(up to 8.14X for LU) relative to Ref (third bar for each application in Figure 5.7 and also
discussed in Section 5.4.2).
Recall that the accuracy of MinEIP is the same as that of Min (Section 5.4.1). Thus, in
addition to MinEIP significantly outperforming Ref and RefEIP on average, MinEIP has the
added benefit of finding many SDC-PCs that were not found by Ref (and RefEIP ) – Min
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Figure 5.13: Resiliency analysis time for analyzing both MinEIP and RefEIP , without and
with input prioritization, normalized to analysis time for only MinEIP .
5.4.4 Input Prioritization
For safety-critical systems which may require even higher accuracy, Minotaur provides the
additional optimization of input prioritization. This optimization can speed up the analysis
of multiple inputs in an attempt to further improve SDC-PC identification without taking
the performance hit of running resiliency analysis for each individual input in its entirety.
Figure 5.13 shows the runtime of analyzing both MinEIP and RefEIP , without and with
input prioritization, normalized to the runtime of MinEIP (Section 5.4.3).
The first bar for each application shows the runtime of employing a naive input prior-
itization scheme, by simply running MinEIP followed by RefEIP analyses in their entirety
(MinEIP + RefEIP in the figure). The second bar shows the runtime of running MinEIP
and RefEIP with input prioritization enabled. That is, MinEIP is first run in its entirety
(which is relatively fast, as discussed in Section 5.4.3), followed by RefEIP but only for PCs
not identified as SDC-PCs by MinEIP . Thus, input prioritization requires the second input
(RefEIP in this study) to run for only a fraction of the original resiliency analysis time.
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Figure 5.13 shows that without input prioritization, MinEIP + RefEIP runs 3.7X slower
than MinEIP . Using input prioritization ((MinEIP + RefEIP )IP in the figure) brings the
analysis time to only 1.6X slower than MinEIP . Thus, leveraging input prioritization allows
Minotaur to analyze both inputs 2.3X faster on average than analyzing each input alone in
its entirety. By carrying over information from one input analysis to the next, Minotaur is
capable of achieving 100% accuracy while running much quicker than previous techniques.
5.5 MINOTAUR EXTENSIONS
Minotaur’s techniques can be used to benefit analyses beyond those discussed so far. This
section demonstrates Minotaur’s generality by discussing and evaluating two extensions.
5.5.1 Extension to Approximate Computing
Approxilyzer analysis can also be used to target approximate computing. Approxilyzer
classifies an instruction as approximable if no egregious errors – Detected, DDC, or OC
above a user-defined threshold – are observed for any dynamic instance of that instruction.
The following user-defined thresholds are used here: 1) for financial applications, errors in
individual outputs that are smaller than a cent are tolerable and 2) for other applications,
relative errors up to 5% in individual outputs are tolerable. The same Min and Ref inputs
as in Table 5.1 are used, and random error injection prioritization with early termination
is applied (we observe the same trend that randomized error injection ordering performs
close to oracle best). For approximate computing, early termination is triggered when an
error-injection reveals a PC as non-approximable, indicating that no further injections are
required for that instruction.
For approximate computing, Minotaur’s analysis time without error injection prioritiza-
tion is the same as that for resiliency since we use the same Min and Ref inputs. That is, Min
observes an average 4.1X speedup compared to Ref, due to Min’s smaller size (Section 5.4.1).
Applying error injection prioritization for approximate computing analysis (where early ter-
mination differs compared to resiliency, as described above), Min analysis can be sped up
by 4.4X on average, while Ref shows an average speedup of 5.53X. Combining the two op-
timizations, MinEIP shows an average speedup of 18X compared to Ref for approximate
computing analysis.
An accuracy metric similar to that in Section 5.3.4, is adapted from SDC-PC to
Approximable-PC. Min shows very high accuracy – of all the approximable-PCs identified
by both Min and Ref, on average, Min identifies 96% while Ref identifies 81%.
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5.5.2 Selective Instruction Analysis
Minotaur can speed up analysis for any desired subset of PCs. For example, a user may
desire to analyze the ”hot” PCs that account for X% of the dynamic execution. The user can
identify the ”hot” PCs by first profiling Ref and then switching to Min to run the resiliency
analysis. For instance, by targeting the PCs for the top 25% of the dynamic execution in
Blackscholes, MinEIP speeds up the analysis by 6.8X over Ref for the same PCs and with
100% accuracy.
5.6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work presents Minotaur, a toolkit to improve the error analysis by leveraging concepts
from software testing. Minotaur adapts several concepts from software testing for software
bug detection to error analysis (for resiliency and approximate computing): 1) identify-
ing test-case quality criteria, 2) test-case minimization, and 3) two adaptations of test-case
prioritization. Minotaur is evaluated on the error analysis tool, Approxilyzer. Minotaur’s
single-input techniques speed up Approxilyzer’s resiliency analysis (or approximate comput-
ing analysis) by 10.3X (18X) on average while significantly improving SDC-PC detection
accuracy (96% vs. 64% on average for resiliency, and 96% vs. 81% on average for approxi-
mate computing) for the workloads studied. Further, Minotaur presents a technique, input
prioritization, which enables finding SDC-PCs across multiple inputs at a speed 2.3X faster
(on average) than analyzing each input independently.
Although Minotaur is already very effective, there are many avenues of future work to
improve both Minotaur’s effectiveness and its applicability. For example, it is interesting
to explore more input quality criteria (such as path coverage, loop coverage, or state cover-
age [145]) as well as develop new quality criteria geared specifically towards resiliency (e.g.,
criteria derived from ACE bits [78] or PVF [15]) or towards approximate computing (e.g.,
using parameter range coverage). Employing more sophisticated optimizers to improve the
speed and scalability of the Minimizer along with custom minimization objectives (e.g., num-
ber of error-sites analyzed) for faster Mins is another future direction. The Input Selector
can also be improved by tuning analysis speed vs. accuracy for multiple Refs and Mins with
variable input quality thresholds.
To widen the applicability of Minotaur, it can be applied to other resiliency and approxi-
mation analysis techniques proposed in the literature, using a broader range of error models
abstracted at lower and higher layers of the system stack than studied here.
The end goal of this line of research is a seamless integration of (hardware) error analysis
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into the standard software development and testing workflow. Minotaur opens up many
avenues for further research towards this ambitious end goal. Modern software development
practices such as continuous integration encourage developers to continuously commit their
code, which would be ideally checked for error-efficiency, making fast and accurate error
analysis techniques such as Minotaur even more important.
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Chapter 6: RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we discuss related works that are pertinent to the contributions of this
thesis.
6.1 AUTOMATED ERROR ANALYSIS
This work develops a suite of automated application-level error analysis tools – Approxi-
lyzer, gem5-Approxilyzer and DataApproxilyzer (collectively referred to as the AEA tools)
[25, 26, 31] – that can automatically extract the error characteristics of applications (Chap-
ter 3). The AEA tools developed in this work significantly advance the state-of-the-art in
error analysis to meet all the six requirements of accuracy, precision, comprehensiveness,
automation, generality and low-cost.
While error analysis techniques that satisfy all six of the above requirements posed a sig-
nificant research challenge before this work, researchers have made progress by relaxing some
of these requirements. For example, one class of techniques rely on empirically introducing
a small (statistically determined) sample of errors during a program’s execution (referred to
as error injection) and observing the resultant behaviour [22, 58, 60, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70,
71, 72, 73, 74, 99, 101, 104, 105, 106, 131, 163]. These techniques aim to provide statistical
averages or probabilistic bounds of program behaviour under errors; they cannot compre-
hensively and accurately guarantee impact on output quality for the large majority of errors
that are left out during sampling.
Another class of techniques leverage program analysis of error-free execution to understand
how errors in data may propagate to affect program output [15, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82].
The widely used ACE [78] analysis is often used to measure the Architectural Vulnerability
Factors (AVF) [75, 76, 77, 78, 79] of hardware structures. PVF [15] isolates purely (program
or software dependent) architecture-level vulnerabilities in the AVF; ePVF [80] further iso-
lates bits that may lead to crashes and achieves a more accurate estimation of the program’s
SDC vulnerability. Many cross-layer resiliency solutions have been proposed using these
techniques [81, 164]. Shoestring [82] uses a compiler analysis to identify vulnerable program
locations. While fast (low-cost), such techniques cannot accurately and precisely model an
error’s impact on execution since they use information from an error-free execution.
The AEA tools developed in this work use a hybrid technique of program analysis and
(relatively) few error injections. The techniques employed by the AEA tools build upon
the error equalization and pruning techniques developed by prior work called Relyzer [33].
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Relyzer analyzed single-bit errors in integer instructions of programs to identify which errors
lead to silent data corruptions (SDCs). While Relyzer determined if an error affected the
final output, the AEA tools can precisely determine how an error affects output by quanti-
fying the output quality produced. Furthermore, the AEA tools can precisely quantify the
impact of errors for a wider range of errors – integer, floating point, instruction, data, single
and multi-bit.
There are other works in the literature that combine program analysis with selected error-
injection campaigns. MeRLiN [103] applies ACE-like analysis and error pruning to accelerate
statistical micro-architectural error injections. It can provide fine-grained reliability esti-
mates for hardware structures and SDC vulnerability estimates for software. VTrident [165]
uses error injections in static instructions to build an input-dependent model on top of Tri-
dent’s [166] error propagation analysis to predict the instruction’s SDC vulnerability. Other
works have attempted fault equalization for GPU [167] and Neural Network resiliency [168].
The analysis technique used by the AEA tools, is also a hybrid technique, but its primary
goal is not a statistical average or probability—it is to determine precisely if/how an error
in any specific instruction or data will impact the final output.
Relationships between errors in program and effect on output has also been widely studied
in the fields of software engineering[169, 170] and formal methods[171, 172]. Error analysis
employed in this work differs from these methods since the goal is not to find buggy code or
derive error bounds; rather the goal is to precisely determine the output quality produced
in the presence of errors caused by underlying hardware faults.
As part of the AEA tool-suite, this work develops gem5-Approxilyzer which is an open-
source error analysis tool built using the open-source simulator gem5 [83]. Other error
analysis tools have used gem5 as their base simulator. For instance, MeRLiN [103] uses
GeFIN [173] (which is also a built on top of gem5) to simulate micro-architectural error in-
jections. GemFI [174] is another error-injection tool that operates at the micro-architectural
level, is built on top of gem5 and supports both Alpha and x86 ISA. Other error-injection
tools, such as LLFI [104], analyze applications at the compiler intermediate representation
(IR) level. IR is ISA-independent by design, so such an analysis is independent of the
hardware architecture. However, there may be a loss in error site accuracy because IR still
requires additional transformations before producing the assembly [175]. FAIL* [105] per-
forms ISA-level analysis. FAIL* also uses gem5 and supports ARM but is limited to one
pruning technique: def-use analysis.
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6.2 AUTOMATED ERROR ANALYSIS TO CUSTOMIZED ERROR EFFICIENCY
This work demonstrates the versatility of the automated error analysis approach, by show-
ing how the automatically generated application error profiles can be used to devise different
(hardware and software) error-efficiency solutions – from low-cost resiliency to approximate
computing – that can be customized to user and system requirements with minimal pro-
grammer intervention (Chapter 4). We undertake a discussion of related works below.
6.2.1 Approximate Computing
Many techniques have been proposed that leverage approximate computing at the level
of software [10, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88], programming languages [2, 3, 4, 5,
17, 19, 45] and hardware [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97] for improved
performance, energy, or reliability. The techniques described in this work is orthogonal to
these and the application error profile (generated by the AEA tools) can potentially be used
to provide approximation hints to all of these techniques.
Programming language support, such as that in [2, 3, 4, 5, 45] helps programmers ab-
stractly express approximations and check program correctness at the cost of increased
programmer burden. Recent frameworks [17, 19, 176] build on these languages to auto-
matically identify approximate regions of the code while providing some statistical [17] or
probabilistic [176] guarantees on the final end-to-end error. While these frameworks advance
the state-of-the-art to greatly reduce programmer burden, they still require the programmer
to adopt a new programming language and/or modify their source code. Thus, they can-
not be used for very large multi-kernel programs (static analysis may be complicated and
under-estimate the approximation potential) or for programs where the source code is not
available (such as legacy code). We believe that the AEA tools developed in this work are
complementary to these technique and can be used as a front end plugin to these frame-
works. A concurrent work [43] provides statistical guarantees on final output quality given
an approximate kernel and accelerator configuration using compiler support and hardware
binary classifiers. While this work focuses on coarse-gain approximation with accelerators,
the AEA tools provide a general framework to study approximation at the fine granularity
of single instructions or single data byte.
SAGE [41] automatically generates approximate kernels for GPUs but like other meth-
ods [40, 177] uses an online mechanism to catch unacceptable quality degradation in a
reactive fashion. On the other hand, the error profile generated by the AEA tools provides
offline output quality information. Techniques such as [44] control output quality constraints
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by tuning various knobs in an approximate program. The AEA tools solves the problem of
identifying approximate code/data and as such is an orthogonal technique.
6.2.2 Resiliency
There exists a large body of work on resiliency analysis that does not assume that output
quality degradation is allowed [13, 15, 33, 56, 57, 82, 107, 132, 133, 135, 136, 138]. We will
focus here on works that allows quality degradation.
The idea of identifying unacceptable output corruptions for selective reduced-cost re-
siliency protection has previously been explored. A combination of error injections and static
analysis is used in [71] to identify Egregious Data Corruption (EDC) prone code and data
segments in computations that can then be protected by detector placements. IPAS [178]
uses machine learning to identify and protect only those Silent Output Corruptions (SOC)
instructions that alter the output of scientific codes. Khudia et al. [179] use compiler analysis
to identify critical variables in the application that are likely to generate Unacceptable Silent
Data Corruptions (USDCs) in the presence of errors and only protect those using strategic
expected value checks. The application error profiles generated by the AEA tools classify
error outcomes into categories based on approximation potential and predicts the impact
of errors in individual instructions (and data) with high accuracy. This allows for very fine
tuning of resiliency protection schemes for different quality and overhead requirements.
Application of approximate computing to hardware resiliency has also been demonstrated
in specialized domains such as bio-medical applications. Sabry et al. [180] study Electrocar-
diogram (ECG) monitoring wireless body sensor nodes and trade-off inaccuracies inherent
to the domain to achieve resiliency overhead savings. The AEA tools also exploits accu-
racy loss for resiliency overhead savings but does so in a manner that can be used by any
general-purpose program.
6.3 MINOTAUR
Minotaur is the first work to systematically adapt and apply software testing techniques
for fast and effective error analysis (Chapter 5). Section 5.1 describes the key background
related work from software testing. Other related works are discussed here.
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6.3.1 Concepts similar to Minotaur
The most directly related works from other domains with similarities to different concepts
in Minotaur are discussed here. IRA [156] uses statistical techniques to generate reduced
canary inputs that are used to explore different approximation techniques; once an appropri-
ate technique is found, it is applied to the larger input. In Minotaur, the Min input is used
not just for exploration, but also for the final resiliency analysis. The Ref input is analyzed
only if additional accuracy is desired from multiple inputs and even so, only a subset of Ref
needs analysis. A key difference is that IRA targets online production time analysis whereas
Minotaur is motivated by offline development time analysis.
DeepXplore [168] proposes the criterion of neuron coverage for quantifying the fraction
of a deep learning system’s logic exercised by a set of test inputs based on the number of
neurons activated by the inputs. Neuron coverage is an orthogonal application-specific input
quality criterion that could be employed by Minotaur for appropriate domains.
There are several (static and runtime) approaches in other contexts that share the same
goal as Minotaur’s early termination technique, namely, cutting the computation short with-
out sacrificing accuracy [32, 181, 182, 183]. A recent example is SnaPEA [181] where con-
volution operations are terminated early if their output is predicted to be zero.
MinneSPEC [184] aims to provide reduced input workloads to improve performance (usu-
ally runtime of applications), which differs from our objective of uncovering SDC causing
instructions.
6.3.2 Error Analysis Techniques:
As discussed in detail in Section 6.1, different error analysis techniques have been pro-
posed in the literature. These include resiliency analysis techniques that employ error-
injections [58, 60, 99, 101, 104, 105, 106, 131, 163], program analysis [15, 75, 76, 77,
78, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 164] or a hybrid combination [33, 103, 165, 166]. Criticality-
testing [69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 185] of approximate computations is another important analysis
technique for many domains.
Minotaur is an orthogonal technique that can be used to improve many of the above
techniques. In general, the concepts of measuring input quality and input minimization
are broadly applicable to all techniques that use application inputs. PC coverage as an
input quality criterion can conceptually apply to many of the above techniques, but it
needs experimental verification. Error injection prioritization can be directly applied to all
techniques that use error injections. Input prioritization is also a general concept that can
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be applied in cases where multiple inputs are used.
Minotaur can potentially be applicable to other hardware platforms as well. Although
this work focuses on CPUs, recent resiliency analyses on GPUs [67, 167, 186], for example,
can potentially benefit from the concepts of Minotaur to improve runtime and/or accuracy.
6.4 ERROR-EFFICIENCY FOR VIDEO SUMMARIZATION APPLICATION
We undertake a motivational study to demonstrate the effectiveness of error-efficiency
techniques for edge-computing applications used in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or UAVs
(Chapter 2). Specifically, we study a state-of-the-art Video Summarization (VS) application
(developed at IBM Research) that constitutes key end-to-end video and image analytics
aboard UAVs. In this first-of-a-kind work that studies the effect of approximations on system
resiliency, we show that software approximations to the VS application yields significant
energy and performance without degrading the overall resiliency of the system. In this
section, we discuss other works related to this study.
6.4.1 Error-Efficiency Techniques
Different error-efficient techniques (related to resiliency and approximate computing) have
been discussed in Section 6.1 and Section 6.2. Section 2.1.2 discusses many trends in ap-
proximate computing. A related area is analysis that performs criticality testing [70, 72]
and works that take advantage of soft computations - resilient code regions that result in
tolerable output corruptions, when perturbed by errors - to reduce resiliency overheads in
approximate environments [24, 69, 71, 187]. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the
first that directly measures the resilience of approximate algorithms.
In [188] Thomas et al. propose the term EDC describing outcomes that deviate signif-
icantly from the error-free outcomes of an application. Based on heuristics learned from
EDC characterization, they propose a detection mechanism to identify variables and loca-
tions to protect against EDC. We propose a novel quantitative metric for EDC evaluation on
a complete video stitching algorithm and approximation algorithms to achieve improvement
in energy efficiency and performance without significant loss in end-quality.
6.4.2 Computer vision for UAV-based mobile cognition
Extensive research has gone into image-stitching algorithms in the field of computer vi-
sion. In [189], Szeliski describes various algorithms for aligning and stitching images into
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seamless 2D photo-mosaics. Various state-of-the-art algorithms to handle and summarize
video content captured on-board a UAV-based processor, have been described in [49]. Rane
et al. [190] proposed a method to evaluate mosaic quality using maximum information re-
trieval. The method uses the similarity between the stripes of the mosaic and the original
frames to evaluate performance of mosaicking methods. The videos in the VIRAT dataset
contain both translational and rotational movements. However, unlike the algorithm evalu-
ated in our study, this method works when camera has only translational movement. The
evaluation method proposed by Camargo et al. [191] uses the distances between the cor-
responding keypoints in all frames after the mosaic is generated. This method is used to
compare different optimization methods for parameter estimation, but does not consider the
image distortions caused by error injection. Another work [192] empirically evaluates the
detectability of objects of interest for human observers when temporally local mosaics are
applied on the live aerial video, but cannot provide quantitative evaluation for error injec-
tion. Paalanen et al. [193] proposed a method to evaluate the mosaic quality using ground
truth data. However, ground truth data can only be obtained in synthetic datasets. Since
the dataset that we use for the evaluations in our study is a real-word one, determining the
ground truth is difficult. El-Saban et al. [194] use human eye to measure precision/recall
of the mosaic quality of image pairs. However, this method too cannot provide scientific
measurement of the distortion caused by error injection.
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Chapter 7: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Error-efficient computing has the potential to be a key enabler for many emerging ap-
plication domains – Edge Computing, AI, Robotics, etc. – with strict power, performance
and reliability requirements. However, despite its promise, the lack of general methodologies
and excessive programmer burden have limited its widespread adoption. This work aims
to democratize error-efficient computing by building systematic methodologies that remove
excessive programmer burden and enable the adoption of error-efficient computing.
The automated application-level error analysis tools developed in this work – Approxilyzer,
gem5-Approxilyzer and DataApproxilyzer – are the first-of-their-kind that can quantify the
impact of billions of individual errors in a program’s computation and data on its final
output quality. The comprehensive application error profiles (generated using automated
error analysis) can not only improve fundamental understanding of how applications/systems
behave when perturbed by errors, they can facilitate users to tune the trade-off between
output quality with other system benefits in an error-efficient environment while providing
output quality guarantees. Two such proof-of-concept workflows are demonstrated that
use the application error profiles to devise customized error-efficiency solutions – targeting
approximate computing and low-cost resiliency to hardware errors – that meet user/system
requirements and quality targets.
In order to facilitate the use of error analyses within the computing stack, a framework
called Minotaur is developed to significantly improve the speed (up to 55X) and scalability
(across multiple workloads and inputs) of error analyses. By showing a principled adap-
tation of software testing techniques to (hardware) error analysis, Minotaur takes the first
step towards the goal of integrating (hardware) error analysis into the standard software
development and testing workflow.
While this work shows the promise of automated error analysis techniques that can po-
tentially be integrated within a software development framework, there is still a long way
to go towards the research vision of automated full-stack methodologies that can provide
optimal system-wide error-efficiency solutions for emerging applications. The remainder of
this section describes some of the future work towards that vision.
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7.1 ERROR-EFFICIENCY AT SCALE FOR EMERGING COGNITIVE
APPLICATIONS
The work in this thesis has thus far shown fast, comprehensive and automated error
analyses for single-threaded CPU workloads from different domains (image processing, data
mining, scientific computing, etc.); precisely analyzing these workloads in their entirety was
a challenge before this work. Performing scalable and efficient automated error analysis for
large multi-threaded applications is a natural next step. It is especially interesting to analyze
cognitive applications – such as image processing, autonomous driving, virtual/augmented
reality and robotics – that aim to extract context/insight from vast quantities of data.
These applications heavily use sensory signals (image, audio, etc.) that can inherently
tolerate inaccuracies in data and/or computation and hence, are natural candidates for error-
efficient computing. Error-efficiency techniques applied to these domains today are largely
empirical and focused on single/few techniques which is sub-optimal and may leave additional
sources of efficiency untapped. An optimal solution that considers different combinations
of error-efficiency techniques (customized to system/user specifications) is an intractable
optimization problem today; automatic, scalable and comprehensive error analysis of these
applications can provide insights and be the first step towards a systematic methodology to
extract maximum resource efficiency for emerging domains.
7.2 ERROR-EFFICIENCY FOR PERFORMANCE, ENERGY AND BEYOND
The output of automated error analysis (for a given application) is a comprehensive ap-
plication error profile that lists each error (for the error model under consideration) that
can perturb the program’s execution along with its corresponding impact on output qual-
ity. This work shows a few examples (targeted to approximate computing and hardware
resiliency) of how these comprehensive error profiles can enable customized error-efficiency,
but this is just a beginning. Exploring other use-cases for application error profiles, such
as selective ECC deployment, mixed dynamic precision or criticality testing for emerging
storage solutions like non-volatile memories (NVMs) is an interesting future direction.
Error-efficiency techniques have largely been focused on trading functional correctness, in
the form of output inaccuracies, to improve power/energy or performance. But the promise
of error-efficiency and automated error analysis can potentially be extended to other do-
mains that deal with anomalies in computing behavior; for instance, efficient protection
from fault attacks, analyzing interference behaviour of secure/private data being computed
on erroneous substrates, using application error profiles to assist with debugging during
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hardware validation, etc. Another interesting direction is to explore if the error profiles
can be leveraged to design more efficient accelerators that exploit error-efficiency opportu-
nities [195, 196, 197].
7.3 ERROR-EFFICIENCY ACROSS THE COMPUTING STACK
An ideal error-efficient solution should take any application, along with user inputs (like
quality of service guarantees or optional domain-specific information) and map it to opti-
mal combinations of hardware/software error-efficiency techniques. To realize this, we need
integrated, full-stack solutions that treat error-efficiency as a first class metric at each layer
of the compute stack. This work thus far has been at the application layer of the stack and
it has shown how error-efficiency can be integrated into the software development workflow.
Other researchers have made progress at different layers of the stack – hardware/software
error-efficiency techniques, schedulers, optimizers, compilers, programming languages, etc.
However, we are missing the right abstractions to enable integration across the different
layers.
We are also seeing a trend towards specialization and heterogeneity at different scales. This
has been a boon for error-efficiency techniques that have leveraged hardware/software co-
design to extract maximum compute efficiency for specialized domains. However, it has made
the task of developing general full-stack error-efficiency methodologies, that still retain the
flexibility to specialize/customize at different layers, very challenging. Going forward, it will
be interesting to explore the following fundamental questions that need to be answered for
error-efficiency solutions across the compute stack: What are the right metrics to quantify an
application’s error characteristics? What is the right abstraction for programming languages
to express error-specifications in inputs, return values, instructions and data? How can
compilers encode/translate dynamic error-efficiency opportunities of applications? Can the
heterogeneous error characteristics of hardware be abstracted as standardized knobs that
can be tuned at the direction of software? Answers to these questions will require a cross-
disciplinary solutions.
7.4 SYSTEM WIDE ERROR-EFFICIENCY OVER HETEROGENEOUS SOURCES OF
ERRORS
As mentioned in the beginning of this thesis, part of the larger research vision is to
develop a principled and unified methodology for analyzing different sources of errors. This
is an important but extremely challenging problem since modern workloads can encounter
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a wide variety of heterogeneous components that have varied sources of errors, each with
a different error model and no established methodology for translation between them. It
is unclear how different error-efficiency techniques across a range of devices will interact,
combine and complement or negate each other to provide end-to-end application and/or
system benefits. System wide solutions that can holistically optimize for error effects arising
from heterogeneous compute, data and networks will require a systematic methodology for
incremental and compositional error-efficiency analyses over a range of workloads, devices
and error models. Conceptual intuition gained by this work postulates that, albeit hard,
this is a problem that can be solved. For example, this work provides an intuition for how
the problem of finding the errors in compute that lead to output corruptions can be tackled
by systematically performing incremental analysis over increasingly complex error models.
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